In , a vigorous debate about war tax resistance hit the pages of the Friends’ Intelligencer. You can find most of this in Volume ⅩⅩ at Google Books… with the exception of the opening article in the debate. The two pages that contain that article are tantalizingly missing from the on-line volume. I had to delve into the microfilm in the basement of the Berkeley university library this morning to find it.
First, some context: on , two years into the American Civil War, U.S. President Lincoln signed the Enrollment Act, which organized the first federal military draft in U.S. history.
The Friends’ Intelligencer debate is prompted by this Act, which allowed drafted men to either hire a substitute or to buy themselves out of the draft for $300. The long-standing Friends “discipline” instructed Quakers never to pay such a commutation tax, but, of course, neither could they serve in the military or hire a substitute.
Nathaniel Richardson, who was about 23-years-old at the time, opened the debate (he’s referred to as “N.R.” — “our friend from Byberry”). The Intelligencer knew they were stirring up a hornets’ nest, and so prefaced Richardson’s piece with an introductory paragraph reading “The subject here brought into view… may be considered as a disputed point, and in giving this essay a place, we of course open our pages to other friends who may feel it right to offer their sentiments.”
I’ll reproduce the whole of Richardson’s argument below (since you can’t find it anywhere else on-line), but I’ll try to briefly summarize it here first:
I acknowledge that there is a Quaker testimony against paying war taxes and commutation money, but this tradition that we have been handed down from our ancestors is unsuited to the present crisis where we are surrounded by difficulties unknown in former times. Past generations could uphold the testimony against paying war taxes and commutation money without encountering much serious difficulty aside from distraint of property or occasional imprisonment. Now, though, Quakers who refuse to pay or to fight risk being shot as deserters. So Quakers ought to closely examine their discipline and make sure it is strictly necessary to uphold their principles.
I think we can abandon this practice without violating our principles. When the government demands money from us, they are asking for something — property — that is a creation of government. It is the government’s to bestow or to demand just as surely as the coin with Cæsar’s image on it belonged to Cæsar. If the government were to ask us to act in violation of our consciences, it would be overstepping its bounds, but not if it merely asks for the return of the property that it superintends.
Some Quakers argue that to pay money in lieu of military service would be a tacit agreement that the government has a right to compel such service (and that such an agreement is itself a violation of our peace testimony). But this isn’t good reasoning, since, for instance, when somebody settles a lawsuit out of court by paying some portion of the suit’s demand just in order to avoid the expense going to court, nobody insists that this necessarily means that the lawsuit was valid. Similarly there’s no contradiction between paying the $300 in order to avoid military service and believing that you shouldn’t have to pay to avoid military service.
In the following issue, “W.G.” wrote in to chide the Intelligencer for calling this “a disputed point,” since it was a firmly-settled part of the Quaker discipline that Quakers could not “either openly or by connivance pay any fine, penalty, or tax in lieu of personal service for carrying on war.” The render-unto-Caesar episode, thinks W.G., doesn’t fit the case, since it did not involve a tax in lieu of personal service or one expressly for funding war.
, “H.S.K.” wrote in to dispute Richardson’s characterization of property as being solely an arbitrary creation of government and therefore the government’s to dispose of as it wills. H.S.K. argues that since it is easy to come up with examples in which the government enforces property rights justly or unjustly, there must be a law of justice regarding property ownership that precedes and supercedes the arbitrary decisions of government. Property may be defended (or threatened) by government, but it is not invented by government. Because of this, Richardson must be wrong when he says that government requests for money are not questionable on grounds of justice. My money, says H.S.K., “is an instrument of power just as certainly as is my right arm,” and I’m responsible for how I use that instrument.
H.S.K. also disputes Richardson’s lawsuit-settling analogy, saying that settling a lawsuit to avoid the expense of a court battle is a qualitatively different decision than paying a commutation tax to purchase a substitute to fight a war in your place, because avoiding expenses is a morally neutral thing while purchasing a substitute is not. “What would we think of the moral rectitude of that man who would pay for the support of crime, merely to avoid litigation?”
Meanwhile, the draft proved to be very unpopular. In mid-July, the New York City draft riots broke out. One of the frequent complaints about the draft was that the $300 commutation fee allowed rich people to buy themselves out of the war, leaving the poor to fight their battle for them.
Gideon Frost continued the debate in the first issue of the Intelligencer. He starts by saying that the published discipline of the Society of Friends is explicit and unambiguous about not permitting Friends to pay military exemption taxes. It’s one thing to say that maybe Quakers ought to reconsider that part of their discipline, but it is improper, says Frost, to do as Richardson did and encourage Quakers to disregard it. Frost thinks it is extremely unlikely that the U.S. government would actually shoot a Quaker for desertion because he refused to enlist, hire a substitute, or pay a commutation tax, so Richardson’s panic is unwarranted. Frost also wonders if Richardson suggests Quakers who can afford to do so go ahead and pay the $300, what does he suggest for Quakers who cannot afford it?
Frost also disputes Richardson’s reading of the render-unto-Caesar episode. He denies that Jesus’s reply suggested that all money belongs to Caesar, or that it has anything to do with a tax in lieu of government service or a tax to pay for war (after all, he suggests, the reign of the Caesar in question was “rather a pacific one”), or that what Jesus had to say about Caesar specifically can necessarily be extrapolated into a teaching about government in general.
“C.O.N.” then writes in, saying, in part, that the property the government seizes from tax resisters by distraint and then sells is just as useful to it in carrying out its war policy as cash money would be, so the practical effect is the same, with the only difference being in the resister’s conscience. He recalls an episode from his youth when a tax collector came to seize property for such a military tax and, “out of what he professed to be a humane charitable feeling” confiscated money from an unlocked cash drawer instead, so as to cause “the least trouble and distress.”
“W.G.” wrote in again and put the argument this way: Quakers happily render unto Caesar what Caesar is due, but they have determined that Caesar is never due their military service. Therefore, Caesar cannot be due the monetary equivalent of military service either.
A draftee wrote in next, saying that in spite of his sympathy for the Union cause, he cannot join in the war or pay the commutation money “or even the hundredth part of it” for this “would be bartering my conscience, a gift from heaven… it would be purchasing an ‘indulgence’ for the right of enjoying a divine principle. It would be giving the means to others to purchase flesh and blood to take my place. No! the ‘filthy lucre’ proposition on the score of principle is hypocrisy of the worst kind.”
“R.H.” put it this way: “If Friends cannot themselves fight, it is wholly inconsistent for them to pay a fine or tax in lieu of it, as that would be an acknowledgment that the demand is just, and that liberty of conscience is not our due… Shall we pay our money, to save ourselves, our sons, or our friends, from going to the battle-field to slay, or to be slain, and lay down our testimony against this awful evil, war?”
Nathaniel Richardson then responded to his critics. In his view, when someone asks us for money, he says, the primary moral consideration is always, do you owe the money or not. If you do owe it, you must pay it, and there is no reason to investigate further and try to decide whether the recipient will spend the money wisely or not before you hand it over. So when the government asks us to pay a tax, all we should do is ask whether the law requires this tax from us, and if it does, we should pay it without inquiring further. By doing this we in no way violate the laws of Christianity because “we make no contract, exercise no influence, and are in no respect accountable: we sacrifice no right of conscience.”
That added fresh fuel to the fire. “Y.T.” replied next, warning that “to allow our money to be made use of to procure substitutes — for that is its meaning — would permit the taunt to be hurled at us that we were too cowardly to fight ourselves, but allowed others to be hired to fight in our places.”
“A.H.L.” noted that the Conscription Act explicitly says that the $300 commutation money is meant “for the procuration of [a] substitute,” and so to pay the money is just an indirect way of hiring a substitute to fight in your place, which everybody agrees is against Quaker principles. He also disputes Richardson’s argument that the government can create an unquestionable monetary obligation by fiat. Furthermore, he says there’s something rotten about trying to purchase a conscientious stand — “such a conscience as can be purchased with money and for an advertised price is not worth having.”
He then alludes to a “late decision” that if a conscientious objector refused to fight, hire a substitute, or pay a commutation fine, the amount of the fine would “be made a lien against the Society of which he may be a member.” That, he says, puts Quakers in quite a spot, and he thinks that either they will stick by their principles, or, by abandoning them to save their meetings they will end up killing “the Society itself, as a true religious body.”
I later found that I’d overlooked some other exchanges in this debate. See The Picket Line for 26 December 2011 for some additions.