Why it is your duty to stop supporting the government → the danger of “feel-good” protests → “symbolic” tax protests? → the “Peace Tax Fund,” legal conscientious objection to military taxation → 1837 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention debate concerning

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

In 1837, a convention met in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to rewrite the state constitution. The previous constitution had been enacted in 1790, and had contained a section reading:

The freemen of this commonwealth shall be armed and disciplined for its defence. Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms shall not be compelled to do so, but shall pay an equivalent for personal service.

Whether to retain, omit, or alter this section was a hot point of debate over the course of the convention. This debate is a valuable record of how people of the time who were not Quaker pacifists or war tax resisters tried to come to grips with the arguments for conscientious objection and conscientious objection to military taxation.

I’ve reproduced excerpts from this debate in the following pages:

Dramatis Personæ

Introducing the people engaged in the debate

11 July 1837

Meet Colonel Pluck; also: Thomas Cope makes the case of the Society of Friends

20 October 1837, part one

James Biddle and John Porter take the Quaker side, William Smyth disagrees

20 October 1837, part two

John Cummin attacks the scriptural basis for Quaker pacifism

20 October 1837, part three

Joseph Chandler, Benjamin Martin, and William Darlington defend the Friends, John Fuller disagrees, and Charles Brown tries to bring things down to earth

21 October 1837

John Cummin says William Penn did not found a pacifist state, Ephraim Banks makes a curious Shakespeare allusion, John M’Cahen and Emanuel Reigart stand up for government prerogatives, James Porter puts in his two cents, and Benjamin Martin tries to calm them down

23 October 1837

Benjamin Martin and John M’Cahen continue to disagree about the proposed amendment

24 October 1837, part one

James Dunlop wonders where the Mennonites fit in, and expresses doubts about conscience as an excuse for legal exemptions

24 October 1837, part two

Thomas Bell proposes a compromise, which George Woodward attacks; also: is it a fine or a tax?

24 October 1837, part three

William Darlington and James Biddle stand up for Quaker consciences and cite precedent, John Fuller notes that the proposed compromise makes no sense on conscientious grounds, James Porter says that it does however jibe better with the U.S. Constitution, John Cummin expresses contempt for the Quaker peace testimony, Ebenezer Sturdevant lands a blow or two himself, Thomas Bell modifies his amendment, and Walter Forward defends the right of conscience

24 October 1837, part four

Walter Forward resumes his remarks, Ephraim Banks says conscience has been pushed too far, Emanuel Reigart says Quakers should not enjoy an exclusive state-granted privilege, James Merrill stands up for respecting conscience in the law

25 October 1837

Samuel Purviance says it’s a fine and not a tax, George Woodward unleashes the mighty power of his rhetoric (and who is this guy, anyway?), Walter Forward rises to defend himself, and Andrew Cline denies that there is such thing as a right of conscience

25 January 1838

Thomas Bell says maybe they should just leave it up to the legislature, but John Cummin isn’t buying that for a minute

26 January 1838

James Porter thinks Bell’s proposal is just fine, and Joseph Chandler agrees, but the amendment is rejected

2 February 1838

John Cummin can’t resist trying to get in the last word against the dastardly Quakers (and against his exasperated colleagues)

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

Along with the debate over whether (and if so how) conscientious objection to militia service was to be honored, was a parallel debate over whether the peacetime militia trainings had become ridiculous and ought to be abandoned entirely.

Frequent mentions are made of a “Colonel Pluck.” It was the practice, apparently, for regions to elect their own militia officers. Philadelphia elected a local buffoon, “Colonel Pluck,” according to one account:

…to make [the militia] odious and more unpopular, with a view of abolishing the law and its penalties.… Colonel Pluck made his first parade fantastically dressed and mounted on an old crippled horse, supported by guards to keep the poor animal on his feet, followed by the fantastic Corntoppers, who paraded through the streets with a comic band to the Purple and Blue, and went through burlesque field movements and company drill, to the greatest joy, shouting, and laughing of the militia-men and lookers-on.

An 1825 caricature of Colonel Pluck

I’ve tried to disentangle this part of the debate and present mostly the arguments for and against the practice of demanding militia exemption fines from conscientious objectors (and the related issue of whether any exemption for conscientious objectors should be allowed).

On 11 July 1837, Thomas P. Cope, a Quaker and a delegate to the convention, opened the debate:

Mr. Cope, of Philadelphia, presented a memorial from the Society of Friends, asking the Convention to insert in the Constitution, a provision exempting them from the payment of fines imposed for the non-performance of militia duty.

On presenting this memorial, Mr. Cope said — I have not occupied much time in making speeches in the Convention, being rather desirous to improve by the wisdom of others, than to be heard myself, but the Convention will excuse me for submitting a few explanatory remarks on the present occasion.

I am not disposed to invited a discussion on the mooted question — whether war is allowable to the Christian — but this I can say in all sincerity, that the religious society, of which I am a member, do most conscientiously believe, that war is inconsistent with the spirit of the gospel. — They cannot, therefore, bear arms.

The society of Friends originated in Great Britain, a short time antecedent to the Commonwealth, during period of great civil, political, and religious excitement, in which they suffered much for their principle, in property, in liberty, and in life. To escape from these scenes of tumult, and to enjoy those conscientious privileges which were denied to them in the country of their birth, William Penn, and his associates, fled to the wilds of America. They were preceded by the Pilgrim fathers, who landed from the Mayflower, on the rock of Plymouth, and who, escaping from persecution, nevertheless, preserved the government in their hands down to the Revolution. Our forefathers, like theirs, also fled from persecution; but, they invited the persecuted of all nations to seek protection under their mild sway, and to participate with them equally in the blessings of civil, political, and religious liberty. They arrived, and, in process of time, becoming the most numerous, they assumed the Government, and the reins fell from the hands of Friends.

But here permit me to remark, that, while in Massachusetts, peopled by the descendants of the Pilgrim fathers, it now is, and for half a century has been, sufficient for a Quaker to produce a certificate of membership, to exempt him from military service, and from all penalties for a non-compliance — in Pennsylvania, founded by the society on the most liberal principles, designed to secure to all the enjoyment of the rights of conscience, in the land of Penn, the Quaker has been deprived of his conscientious privileges. For many years the society suffered but little on account of their principles; but, the Revolutionary war at length broke out, and then commenced his sufferings. From that period to the present time, the members have had taken from them, property to the amount of between three and four hundred thousand dollars, and that from members of the Philadelphia yearly meeting alone; and, there are at least seven other yearly meetings on this continent. What has been the amount of these exactions on them, I am not prepared to say, nor is it material here that I should. Can any one tell what portion of this large sum has reached the public treasury? Not a tithe — perhaps not the tithing of a tithe.

But it is alleged, that if the Quakers will not fight, they should pay an equivalent. Now, will any casuist here or elsewhere, tell me the difference between my shooting a man myself, and hiring another to shoot him! It is because Friends cannot perceive this difference, that they seek relief at your hands.

But do not the members of the society render an equivalent? In the first place, they contribute equally with others to the public burdens. — They pay their full share in support of the common poor, and the public schools: they join others in works of charity and public utility. They have not spared their money, nor their personal services, in the erecting of your hospitals, your libraries, the asylum for the deaf and dumb, for the blind, the orphans’ asylum, widows’ asylum, house of refuge, and other works of Christian benevolence. Well then, besides these, they educate and support their own poor exclusively. Tell me, which of you has known a Quaker to knock at your door for charity? It would not be allowed — this society would not permit it. To say nothing of their houses for worship and appendages scattered over town and country, and which may be valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars. I may mention the two institutions, lately established in the city by the legacies of two individuals, for the relief of suffering humanity, costing upwards of three hundred thousand dollars. These institutions are not intended for the use of members of the society, but for persons of all other denominations — not that members have been excluded by the liberal donors, but because they are otherwise provided for.

I may next mention the asylum for the insane, established on a farm of seventy acres near Frankford, which, with the buildings, cost seventy thousand dollars. This asylum is open to persons of all societies, and I ought, perhaps, in justice to the physicians and others who have the immediate supervision of it, to say that no similar institution, within my knowledge, either in this or any other country, has been more successful in the cure of that dreadful malady, as the records of the asylum will fully prove.

Next is Westown school and farm of six hundred acres, situated about twenty miles from the city. The land was purchased low, and, with the buildings, cost between seventy and eighty thousand dollars. About two hundred children of both sexes receive here a good English education, and such as choose may acquire a knowledge of the learned languages. Then we have Haverford school, on a farm of about two hundred acres, eight miles from Philadelphia, in which between seventy and eighty boys receive an education believed to be equal to that taught in any of the best colleges in America. This school was chartered by the Legislature of Pennsylvania with a capital of one hundred thousand dollars.

We now arrive at the city itself — there the society have about twenty schools, two or three of which are exclusively appropriated to the children of their own members — all the rest are open to persons of every denomination. In these schools, from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty children are taught gratis, and the charge for others is kept purposely so low as to enable citizens in moderate circumstances to educate their children without the appearance of receiving charity.

Now, I have not made this enumeration with ostentatious views, but simply for the purpose of saying that while the society contribute equally with others in the common expenses, and while the Legislature of the State has appropriated large sums, and very properly so, to the endowment and support of colleges and other useful institutions from which the society receives no benefit, the public has not, in any shape or form, contributed one cent towards any of the institutions mentioned by me, nor a cent to the support or education of a single member of the Society of Friends — nor indeed have they ever asked it.

Have I not, then, made out my case? Have not the Quakers paid an ample equivalent for not mustering two or three times a year, to march through the streets for the amusement of our children? But it is not merely the pecuniary exactions of which the society has reason to complain; it is the insulting — may I not say the brutal manner in which these fines are sometimes collected. I have, myself, known the blankets to be stripped from the beds of children in a cold winter’s night, while they were left to suffer with no other covering than a linen sheet; and this not once or twice, but oft repeated on the same family, and that, too, when woolen clothing was exceedingly dear and difficult to be procured.

I have little knowledge of the kind of persons employed to collect militia fines in the counties — in Philadelphia we have had some experience in these matters. An individual was there employed for many years who rendered himself sufficiently notorious by his savage conduct. I will not wound the feelings of this House by a recital of many of his deeds: their recapitulation would employ hours. On or two instances, by way of sample, the Convention will excuse me for mentioning.

On one occasion, this man called at the house of a mechanic on whom he had a small demand for a militia fine. The occupant of the house was from home. Perceiving an infant slumbering in a cradle, this hero threw it on the floor and marched off triumphantly with the cradle and bedding. On another occasion he called for a fine on a lad who had been born blind. While this lad was standing at his father’s door, reasoning with the tax gatherer on the absurdity of the demand, he received, from the latter, repeated blows on the head from a bludgeon administered with so much severity as to endanger his life. Now, be it known, that although this lad, from his imperfect vision, could neither read nor write, he possessed a cultivated mind, was amiable and interesting, had been delicately brought up, and was the son of one of our most respectable citizens. I will merely add that I have no pleasure in these painful recitals, and will pursue the subject no further, as this miserable man was at length overtaken by the laws of his country, and now is, or lately was, a convict in the Eastern Penitentiary of Pennsylvania.

Why, then, continue a system which produces no advantage to the public, but which is so offensive and oppressing to an unoffending people?

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

On 11 July 1837, Thomas P. Cope presented a “Memorial” from the Society of Friends giving their stand on the issue. But the convention did not begin to debate the subject until October after a Summer recess. James C. Biddle then opened the debate over the proposed section of the constitution that would read “Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so, but shall pay an equivalent for personal service”:

The section is calculated to oppress the religious scruples of a particular portion of the community, who are pre-eminently entitled, if any class of the people can be so entitled, to protection. It bears hard on the society of Friends, who came out with William Penn, to teach and practice peace, good will and forbearance in all forms, and who had done more to introduce order and regularity throughout the Commonwealth, than any other set of men. Have these people suffered? Have they been oppressed by the operation of this system? It was only necessary to refer to the vivid picture presented to the Convention by his colleague, (Mr. Cope,) previous to the adjournment of the Convention for the late recess. The picture of the cradle torn from under the sleeping infant, by the barbarous hands of the collector of militia fines, was of itself, sufficient to make us determine not to continue this provision in the Constitution. He had not risen to make a speech, but he hoped we should never hereafter call on those who have religious scruples on the subject to bear arms, or to pay the penalty for exemption.

William Smyth disagreed:

The gentleman has adverted to the history of a case submitted to the Convention, by the gentleman from the city of Philadelphia, (Mr. Cope,) previous to our adjournment in July last. I have listened to that statement; I have also listened to the accounts which have been given of the good deeds of the society of Friends, and of the wealth which they have in their possession. Now is it, or is it not right that that wealth should be defended? If it is right, by whom should it be defended? Is it by him who earns his daily bread by the sweat of his brow, that the property of the society of Friends, is to be defended? They have undoubtedly rights as well as other men, but I apprehend it is not the duty of this Convention to enact laws which shall exempt them entirely from being called upon to defend the soil on which they live. I think it would be wrong to do so. There may be some cases of mal-conduct on the part of officers appointed to collect fines. But this is not the fault of the law; and if any thing is wrong, if any individual is convicted of improper conduct in his office, the law is open to the injured party, and will redress his wrongs. It is right that the law should do so, but I cannot consent to surrender or set aside the fundamental law of the State.

James M. Porter added:

The memorial of the Society of Friends, which I had the honor to present, states, what is no doubt the fact — that this provision was intended by the framers of the Constitution for their benefit, whereas in fact it does not so operate, nor do they desire the exemption conferred upon the terms stated. They cannot conscientiously bear arms, considering it wrong to do so; and so believing, they can no more buy an exemption therefrom by paying an equivalent, than they can do the act itself. To retain that provision, holds out to the world that a privilege is given to them which is denied to other citizens, thus subjecting them to invidious reflections, whilst in fact the provision is perfectly nugatory to such as are really conscientious. No man more sincerely respects the rights of conscience than I do; and when that subject is reached, I may trouble this body with my views upon it. But I think the adoption of this amendment does not affect that question one way or the other, and leaves all classes of our citizens upon a footing of equality: And if the Legislature, under the discretionary power which the remainder of the section gives them, shall dispense with the involuntary militia musters, those who are really conscientious will have gained in practice an important end in being called on to pay fines for not doing that which their consciences will not permit them to do.

Then, John Cummin went on at some length, which I’ll save for the next entry.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

On 20 October 1837 the debate had begun in earnest, with some brief statements of the case from delegates James C. Biddle, William Smyth, and James M. Porter. Then John Cummin began his address, which went on at greater length — trying not only to address the proposed constitutional amendment but to refute the Quaker position on pacifism and its scriptural basis — and which will constitute the rest of this entry:

Mr. Cummin, of Juniata said, that he rose to give his views on the amendment which had been proposed by the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia, (Mr. Brown,) in reference to religious privileges. He had before him the memorial which had been presented from the society of friends, praying not only for exemption from military duty, but from the payment of all equivalent for it. It was his object to wipe away the stain which was thus cast on the bill of rights, which declared that we were all equally free; that no distinction should be made; and that no religious privilege should be granted to any one over another. Neither conscience, nor the principles of conscience were well construed in this memorial. The memorialists set forth that all wars and fightings were anti christian; or, in their own words “that all wars and fightings are adverse to the peaceable principles taught by the holy promulgation of the christian religion.” He did not doubt that this Convention would do its duty to the whole people of the State and to the nation; and it was his intention to submit a few arguments, which might not be very familiar to the members of the Convention, but which he thought would establish the obvious fallacy of the positions assumed by these memorialists.

It was laid down in the memorial, that all wars were anti-christian. — Now, he would ask what member of this Convention would desire to record his name as an infidel? And yet there were but two alternatives presented. That which was not christian was infidel; as in the olden times, there were only two denominations of people, and those who were not Jews were Gentiles. Thus there were but two classes in ancient days, and there were only two classes now.

The memorialists undertook to shew that all wars were anti-christian, and they claimed an exemption on several grounds. First, that they had a charter from William Penn. But William Penn, Mr. C. contended, made no such grant, and had no power to make it. The petitioners had misconstrued the rule of conscience. They could never say that they were interrupted in the full exercise of their consciences, until their church doors were invaded, or until they were prevented from enjoying those religious professions and practices which were the objects of their own peculiar choice. He did not know, nor did he believe that they had ever been interrupted in their mode of worship, or even called to account for any act, having reference to their peculiar faith. They claimed themselves to be the followers of the Prince of Peace, and therefore, they said that all wars were anti-christian. We all knew what was the character of the Prince of Peace; at least all of us knew, who had looked to his principles as the only rule and guide, not only in the things of time, but of eternity. They were some of them principles which the memorialist had overlooked. Abram kept 318 trained militia men, born in his own house, and led them on to battle. And, when he, (Mr. Cummin,) spoke of the grounds on which the memorialists based their claim, looking as they did, to the Prince of Peace as their great polar star, might he not refer to the acts of the government of the Prince of Peace, to ascertain what analogy there was between the two? He would not now touch upon the glory of the acts of the Prince of Peace, although he might do so hereafter. On examination, it would be found that those who had fought the battles of their country in all ages, were a people highly favored. — The first battle we read of in history, was that of the four kings who went up against Sodom and Gomorrah, and slew five kings. And then took with them the goods of Sodom and Gomorrah, and took Lot the nephew of Abram, who resided in Sodom, and took away all his goods. Abram was told of the capture of his nephew, mustered his 318 men; divided his army; followed the enemy for upwards of a hundred miles, near to Damascus; and subdued the four kings who had subdued five kings. Was this a stain upon the character of that great man, the father of the faithful? Surely not; it was a great honor and glory. He saved their property, and Melchizedek went out to meet him, and there called him “Abram of the most high God — the possessor of Heaven and earth.” — This was the first battle recorded, either in holy or profane history; and this went to establish the point, that those who fought the battles of their country were the eminent favorites of God; and indeed we had the authority of the King of Heaven and earth for saying so. Again: Look at the overthrow of Pharaoh and all his host in the midst of the Red sea! Was it not one of the greatest wonders ever known in the world? The Almighty directed his own peculiar people through that land of wilderness! and how soon were they called upon to muster their armies? I believe, said Mr. C., in one year and two months after their passage out of the land of Egypt; and in the first chapter of the book of Numbers, it will be found, that the word “war” is mentioned no less than sixteen times. The Almighty not only directed them to number the people to go forth to war, but Himself appointed the officers that should rule over them. What, was the language of the Most High?

Take ye the sum of all the congregation of the children of Israel, after their families, by the house of their fathers, with the number of their names, every male by their polls.

From twenty years old and upwards, all that are able to go forth to war in Israel; you and Aaron shall number them by their armies.

And with you there shall be a man of every tribe; every one head of the house of his fathers.

How, said Mr. C., will this language compare with the prayer of these memorialists, or how can they reconcile their conduct to such acts as these?

In the second chapter of the same book, these tribes are all marshalled and stationed. And by whom? By this same Prince of Peace. He was a leader and commander over the people. He designated those who should be the commanders of the tribes; pointed out their stations; and had the whole twelve tribes marshalled in battle array. This was done under the immediate direction of the Great Prince of Peace, a mightier general than ever entered the field of battle. The tribes were attacked by the Amalekites; and the priests of the Lord led them on to battle. And Moses and Aaron and Herr, sat upon the mountains holding up the hands of Moses, for it so came to pass, that whilst Moses held up his hands, the children of Israel prevailed, and when he let down his hands, the Amalekites prevailed. And the children of Israel conquered the Amalekites, and put them to flight. And the Lord then spoke with Moses and said: “Write this for a memorial in a book, and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua; for I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under Heaven.”

And Moses built an altar, and called the name of it Jehovah — nissi.

For he said, because the Lord has sworn that the Lord will have war with Amalek, from generation to generation.

But, Mr. C. said, he would now leave this part, and advert for a moment to the conduct of Saul, who disobeyed the voice of the Lord in saving the life of the king of the Amalekites, and in refusing to destroy their sheep and their oxen. For this, Saul was dethroned. And in all those ages, we found that the Almighty said that his angels should go forth before his own peculiar people, armed to destroy the heathen nations and to claim the land before them.

These points, Mr. C. said, were incontrovertible. No human being would attempt to deny that the Lord was their judge, their law giver, and the captain of their armies. He would now proceed to show what Joshua had done when he crossed over Jordan into Canaan, for the purpose of subduing the inhabitants of that country. Was any general ever able to do what he accomplished? Was Cæsar or Napoleon capable of beating down the walls of a great city like that of Jericho with the sound of a rams horn? It appeared that when Joshua was near Jericho, he went out to amuse himself, and he saw a man armed with a sword. He was somewhat taken by surprise, but he went up to him and said, “Are you for us, or for our adversaries?” The man replied, “Nay; but as captain of the host of the Lord, am I now come.” Who, he asked, would undertake to contradict these historical truths? And, how did they contrast with the prayer of the petitioners? Men who seemed to think it anti-christian to fight the battles of the Most High. These men went so far as to contend that they were not bound to protect themselves and their country. He (Mr. Cummin) would insist on the contrary, that they were. The fact was placed beyond all cavil and dispute, as he thought he had already shown. These people should be compelled to pay for their defense; and there was no good reason that could be urged why they should be excused. We all knew that after the Israelites were defeated at Ai, Joshua threw himself on the ground and kept his face fixed upon the ark of the Lord until the evening, and lamented bitterly that his God should have brought the enemies of the Israelites against them. The Lord tells Joshua to rise, and having done so, he tells him of the transgressions of the Israelites, and promises them pardon, and gives him directions as to how he shall divide his army and the manner in which he may take the city. Mr. C. would ask if that which the Almighty had done was anti-christian? Would those belonging to the denomination of Quakers say this? Why, then, was it, that a portion of the people of this State should ask to be exempted from the general duties of the whole community? Was ever such a thing known as a government making this distinction? Mary, the mother of our blessed Redeemer had to pay a tax, and she paid it without a murmur. What, he would inquire, was recorded in the book of Judges? Why, that Sisera, the captain of king Tobias’ army, was delivered by the Lord into the hands of Jael, who slew him by nailing him to the ground when asleep. “So God,” in the language of Scripture, “subdued on that day Jabin the king of Canaan before the children of Israel.” Here, then, was another instance of the assistance of the Almighty being rendered to the people of Israel. What did gentlemen here say to the song of Deborah? In his opinion, it was a most delightful song. It was full of praises to the King of Israel, and of praises to those who fought the battles of the Lord. “Curse ye Meroz,” said the angel of the Lord, “curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof; because they came not to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty.” The case of Samson, slaying the Philistines, (Mr. C. proceeded to remark,) was a memorable instance of God’s interference for the protection of his servants. Samson was a man of war, for “the dead which he slew at his death, were more than they which he slew in his life.” And, he had previously slain a thousand of his enemies with the jaw bone of an ass. But, said the petitioners, “it is anti-christian to fight!” He thought, however, that they should be satisfied to be on an equal footing with their fellow citizens. They should be careful, too, how they cast reproaches upon men who would fight the battles of their country — who deemed it to be their duty to do so, and who did not think it anti-christian. He would refer to some other passages in the scriptures for the purpose of showing that God had sanctioned and aided his people in their battles against the wicked. In the 13^th chapter of the second book of Chronicles, it would be found that Abijah, king of Judah, with his 400,000 men, fought and obtained a triumphant victory over king Jeroboam, killing 500,000 men of the 800,000, which he brought into the field of battle. The Lord was the captain of the army of the children of Judah, who thus prevailed, “because they relied upon the Lord God of their fathers.” It was recorded also, of Asa, who succeeded to the throne of Judah, on the death of his father Abijah, that he most signally defeated the army of Zerah, the Ethiopian, because God was with him, and approved of the acts of his reign. Of king Hezekiah it is related in Holy Writ, that when Senacherib, the king of the Assyrians, was marching against him, the Lord sent an angel which destroyed 185,000 of his camp in one night. This, (Mr. C. remarked,) was another instance of the Almighty’s interference in behalf of those who serve him. We found that the military achievements, concerning which, so much is said in the sacred volume, were usually preceded by a prayer, and praises sung to the Most High, and that victory was given to those who best deserved it. The Prince of Peace was humble and inoffensive, but was a terror to the wicked. He (Mr. Cummin,) maintained that fighting was not forbidden by the Scriptures — that is, fighting in a just cause — fighting in defense of a man’s country.

Mr. C. said, he would turn to the New Testament for the purpose of showing what was the character of the fighting men there spoken of. He referred to the third chapter of Luke, 14^th verse: “And the soldiers likewise demanded of John the Baptist, saying, and what shall we do? And he said to them, do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages.”

How different, (continued Mr. C.) is the advice of John the Baptist, from that of the language held by the petitioners. They say that no soldier can be a christian — that all wars and fightings are anti-christian: consequently it follows, according to the Quaker doctrine, that they who fight the battles of their country, put themselves beyond the reach of Divine mercy.

He would say a word or two in regard to the centurion, who went to our Saviour and prayed him to restore his servant to health. He had the most implicit faith in the Redeemer, and knew the miraculous powers which he possessed. The centurion, after asking that his servant should be healed, used this language: “I also am a man set under authority, having under me soldiers, and I say to one, go, and he goes; and to another, come, and he comes; and to my servant, do this, and he does it.” The sick man, (Mr. C. said,) was immediately made whole, was completely cured. How different was the conduct of the centurion as contrasted with that of the petitioners. He was kind, gentle and confiding in his manner, and uttered not a syllable calculated to wound the feelings of the most sensitive. He (Mr. C.) wished he could say as much in reference to the character of the memorial from the society of Friends.

He next related the particulars as connected with the Centurion’s having sent for Peter, the apostle, in order to show that neither Christ nor his apostle, ever gave the slightest rebuke to any man, because he happened to be a soldier.

Having said a great deal in relation to the military character, he would now throw out a few observations as to the duty which every citizen owes to his government. In all countries, no distinction is made between men in regard to contributions for the support of the government. The memorial, however, which had been presented from the friends, contained a strong argument against calling upon them for their aid in defending the country when necessity requires. They contend that it is anti-christian to fight, and are themselves unwilling to do so, but do not object to pay an equivalent. Now, he would ask gentlemen here, what was the difference, in a moral point of view, between a man fighting himself and getting another to fight for him? For his own part, he must declare that he could not perceive any distinction whatsoever. The gentleman (Mr. Cope,) had gone into a detailed account of the enormous sums which they had paid for taxes, paid three times the amount of other denominations, that they had been distrained for it. He said that they supported their own poor. Well, (remarked Mr. C.) what have we to do with that? They have a right to pay their share towards the support of the poor of all denominations. — Some of the Friends estimated their property at $300,000, and some at 200,000. This was a matter entirely under their own control. Why should they, then, refuse to serve as militia men, or to pay towards its support? They say they will not pay nor they will not fight, but they have no objection, when the hour of necessity shall arrive, to pay others for shooting down their fellow men. The gentleman who presented the memorial of the society of friends, considered that there was no moral difference between paying a man for shooting another, and doing the act yourself: and on this ground he desired to be exempted from any pecuniary or personal obligation.

Are not the Quakers on an equal footing with the rest of the community in regard to rights and privileges? Certainly they are, and yet they refuse to do those things, which, according to the bill of rights, they ought to do, to be entitled to partake of the rights and privileges guaranteed by that instrument. He would relate an anecdote by way of parallel. Gen. Jackson understood how to manage matters of this sort. Just before the siege of New Orleans, when the General was putting that city in a state of defense, he seized some cotton bags; and a Frenchman came to look for his cotton, and he remarked to the General “you have got my cotton bags — that is my cotton.” “Well then,” replied the General, “if that is the case, you are just the man to fight for it, and I will put you in my band.” So, therefore, (said Mr. Cummin) ought these Quakers to fight for their property — ought to be made to defend it. If those who were denounced in this memorial had acted upon the principles laid down by the society of Friends during the revolution, and had refused to fight the battles of their country, we should have been slaves to Great Britain to this day. During the revolutionary war, there were more traitors by ten to one, of Americans than of foreigners. He asked if there was a man present who had a relative in that war, who would support the prayer of the petitioners. He contended (and he admitted that he was using strong language) that any man who would go for granting the prayer of the petitioners, wrote himself down an infidel. If they did not comply with those requisitions upon which the bill of rights was predicated, and which entitled them to all the rights and privileges therein set forth, the members of the society of Friends certainly ought to give up their seats in this Hall. It might be considered bold in him to speak in the presence of those who were interested in this matter, but he could not help expressing his sincere hope that when the question should come up for the final decision of this body, that the Friends would not vote for it. And, if they should set up that they are the followers of the Prince of the Peace, he (Mr. C.) would undertake to show that they are not. He maintained that every one was in duty bound to support the government under which he lived, and he referred to the conduct of Christ as illustrative of what was the duty of all good citizens. It was recorded in the Gospel of St. Luke that spies were sent out by the chief priests and scribes to watch Christ, and they addressed him in this language: “Master, we know that you say and teach rightly, neither accept you the person of any, but teach the way of God truly. Is it lawful for us to give tribute to Cæsar or no? But, he perceived their craftiness, and said to them why tempt you me? Show me a penny. Whose image and subscription has it? They answered and said, Cæsar’s. And he said to them, render, therefore, to Cæsar the things which be Cæsar’s, and to God the things which be God’s.” No man (said (Mr. Cummin) can contradict the truth of this. It was, then, as clear as the sun that shines at noonday, that every man being under a government has a right to contribute to its support. This was a universal understanding throughout the world.

He would refer to another portion of Scripture. Mr. C. then read the following verse:

Let every soul be subject to the higher power, for there is no other power but of God, the persons that be are ordained of God. Whosoever resists power, resists the ordinance of God. And they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation.

Mr. C. asked what the petitioners would think of this authority. It was certainly strong and emphatic language, but it was, nevertheless, the language of Divine inspiration, introduced by the apostle. It was not an expression of his own private judgment, but that of the judgment of God, and his rules and his laws must be obeyed. The petitioners seemed not to regard this language, and they complained that their society in Philadelphia had had to pay $300,000 taxes. Now, this was their own fault, and occasioned by their rebellion to the government. And, so they admitted; then why not pay their share of taxes as other portions of the community do?

Mr. C. said that this was a denunciation against those who refused to contribute towards the support of the government, and every man who heard him knew that he spoke the truth. “For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Will you then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and you shall have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to you for good. But, if you do that which is evil, be afraid; for he bears not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that does evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For this cause pay ye tribute also; for they are God’s ministers, attending continually upon this very thing.”

As he had stated in the outset, were men ever interrupted from worshipping God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and where there were none to make them afraid? For, as the Scripture says in reference to obeying the rulers of the land: “Render, therefore, to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor.”

He, (Mr. C.) did not pretend to be an expounder of Scripture [emphasis mine — ♇], yet he conceived there was nothing plainer to be deduced from that book than that it was the duty of every man to contribute towards the support of his government. Why, then, he would ask, did the society of Friends suffer themselves to be levied on? Why did they not pay their taxes as other good citizens did? If they had done this, they would not have had their property seized, and about which they complained. If they were the friends of peace, as they professed themselves to be, why did they not comply with the requisitions of the land? Why did they not do those acts which would prove them to be the friends of peace? Conscience is a principle of the mind, a principle of the soul. It is God’s vicegerent in the heart. It approves what is right, and disapproves what is wrong.

Mr. C. contended that according to the language of the sixth verse of the 13^th chapter of Romans, which he had already read — men were bound to support the government which protects them, even though it be a heathen one, and ought to pray for its peace and prosperity, so long as they shall be allowed to exercise their rights and privileges like the rest of the community.

He (Mr. C.) asked if the petitioners had complied with any one of these requirements. Those who had sat in this Hall to form a Constitution for generations yet to come, and had not fulfilled the law, and held to the doctrine of equality, offered an insult to those who had complied with the requisitions by all, imposed upon them. It was quite evident that no human being could be exempted. Supposing that other citizens were to follow the example of the Friends, and refuse to contribute to the defense of the country, how could it be protected? And, what would be the consequence? Why, the enemy would overrun the country, annihilate the government, and murder men, women and children. Now, under such a state of circumstances, he would ask if the petitioners would contend that they, in common with every other citizen were not imperatively called upon by laws divine as well as human, to defend their country? He maintained that the Bible abounded in instances, many of which he had already cited, in which the Lord had encouraged and aided the people of one nation in defending themselves against the attacks of their enemies. He insisted that ever since there was any organized society in the world — taxes had always been paid for the support of government, and he who did not know that fact had read the Scriptures to little purpose. Why should these petitioners not submit to the law, do as others have and still do, and not set themselves above their neighbors? They should conform to a law by which others were governed, and in which the whole community was equally interested, for it was entirely fruitless to attempt to escape the payment of the militia tax.

My God what a blowhard. He picks a handful of obvious scriptural counterexamples to the idea of conscientious objection to war and declaims them as if he’d just come from decoding the very first translation of the Bible from the original hieroglyphics — “a few arguments, which might not be very familiar to the members of the Convention.” Then he can’t decide whether he’s denouncing pacifist Quakers as hypocrites for being willing to pay for substitutes to fight in their place, or denouncing them as unpatriotic for being unwilling to do so.

But this opened the floodgates, and from here on out the arguments — ostensibly about a Constitutional provision — included plenty of debate about what the Bible really means and whether or not pacifism is a reasonable position to take and whether or not the Quakers are good people and good citizens and so forth.

Which is what makes this all a little more valuable than a debate among lawyers about law would be. This is largely a story of people who are not war tax resisters or pacifists trying to come to grips with what war tax resistance is about and to what extent it’s reasonable — although, as this example showed, for “reasonable” you sometimes have to insert “supported by scripture,” which requires a flexible sanity.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

The debate continued. John Fuller “would make one or two remarks on the question of conferring exclusive privileges upon any class, or of making any distinction in the imposition of public burdens or taxes”:

With respect to exempting the members of the Society of Friends from bearing arms, it would, he thought, have a very injurious tendency. It might encourage other sects to start up and claim the same privilege. It was an oppressive burden upon all. It was found oppressive, no doubt, during the revolutionary war to bear arms. Men in poor circumstances were not able to support their families without attending to their daily labor, nor able to provide a substitute. This was often the case with many; but he could see no reason why opulent men should be exempted from bearing arms or providing a substitute. There could be no propriety in it. If they were scrupulous as to bearing arms, they must be equally so as to paying for those who do the service. It was just as wrong to pay one for killing a man as to kill him one’s self. There was also just as much reason for exempting these men from all contributions to the support of the government and the defense of the country, from which they enjoyed equal benefits with others, as for exempting them from this particular burden. How could they claim exemption from the payment of their share towards the general tax? If they were sincere in their professions, and he could not doubt it, — though so unreasonable were they that he could scarcely believe it, notwithstanding the number of men of probity whom he knew to be among them, — it was still a matter of predominant importance that the national defense should be provided for, and no set of men, however sincere, could set up a claim to be exempt from rendering their aid in the defense of the country.

Joseph R. Chandler took up the debate next, and said in part:

In regard to the exemption of the Friends from military duty, if any class of citizens were entitled to such a privilege, they were. A military government was not one of their choice. If it had been made so, it was by those who had come into the State, since they acquired it, not by arms, but fair purchase from the original lords of the soil. They may truly say to those who call upon them to bear arms, — we need no defense; we wish none; we made none of these laws; and you that come since our fathers came, have no right to coerce us to obey them, whatever you may do among yourselves.

Then Benjamin Martin “rose, he said, to correct a statement made by the gentleman from Fayette, (Mr. Fuller,) whom he understood to say that the Friends asked to be exempt from the payment of taxes” and then he played the chickenhawk card on the bloviating Mr. Cummin:

If the gentleman had paid a little closer attention to the language of the memorial of the Friends, he would have known that there was never an instance in which they asked to be exempted from the payment of their full share towards the expenses of the government. They never asked the government to go to any greater extent than to exonerate them from the payment of militia fines. They required exemption from personal service in the militia, and from the payment of an equivalent for that service. They never asked us to go to any greater extent. As to the gentleman from Juniata, who had carried us through half of the history of Jewish wars, to prove that war was acceptable to the Almighty; he was himself exempt from the service in the militia into which he seemed to be so anxious to press others. Notwithstanding the gentleman’s earnest defense of war, he had not, he believed, fought any battles, and probably never would. But he would pass that over; he had risen only to bring to the view of the committee the real question, and what was asked by the Friends. He hoped gentlemen would not branch out upon what was not asked.

John Fuller responded:

The gentleman from the country thinks that I have fallen into an error in intimating that more was claimed by the society of Friends, than exemption from paying an equivalent for personal service. But I inferred this from their principles, which, if carried out in sincerity, would lead to that absurdity. It follows, as a matter of course, that on the same principles on which they claim exemption for the militia fines, they may claim a like exemption from the payment of any general tax which goes into the public treasury, for the common defense. Why might they not as well resist the payment of a tax which goes to the support of the army or navy of the United States? If they have any conscientious scruples at all upon the subject, they must be carried out, or they are good for nothing. What difference is there, in principle, between killing a fellow man in war, and paying another man to kill him? And, again, do not the Friends pay one man to kill another, when they pay their share of the general tax towards the support of the government, and the means of national defense?

Charles Brown tried to bring things back to earth:

[He] said that the amendment he had proposed was not so objectionable as many gentlemen supposed. The proposition was a plain and simple one. The clause proposed to be stricken out was introduced in the beginning, to relieve a worthy class of citizens who were conscientiously scrupulous about bearing arms, but what was the relief it proposed? Why it proposed that those who were conscientiously scrupulous about bearing arms should pay an equivalent in money for such personal service. It was found, however, that this was as objectionable as the other. If they were conscientious in relation to the bearing of arms, they were equally so in relation to the payment of money for personal services. It was, therefore, no relief at all. If it was intended to afford this class of citizens relief, afford that relief which was proper and expedient but not hold out to them this provision as a measure of relief, when it was no relief. The clause was objectionable on this ground, but he was opposed to it on other grounds. He was opposed to it because it created distinctions in the different classes in this Commonwealth, and distinctions which were calculated to create in the minds of the people, dissatisfaction with their form of Government.

William Darlington continued the debate:

[He] said that this subject had been treated as if it was a matter peculiarly asked for by the society of friends, as an exclusive benefit to themselves and themselves alone. This was the light in which it appeared to have been received and treated by the gentleman from Fayette, (Mr. Fuller,) and the gentleman from Juniata, (Mr. Cummin.) Now by the memorial first presented to this Convention, it would be seen that they placed the prayer upon the broad basis of human rights: they asked nothing peculiar for themselves, but for every individual in the community who had conscientious scruples about bearing arms for the purpose of destroying his fellow man. This was what they asked, and nothing more. The second memorial which was presented by the gentleman from the city of Philadelphia, (Mr. Cope,) and which was brought to this place by a delegation from the society of friends, he held in his hand, and it contained the following language: “we therefore hope you will make such provision for the religious scruples of tender consciences as shall be evident, it is merely a concession to christian principle, and not limited to any classes or persons.”

Now, if both of these memorials are examined it will be found that nothing exclusive was asked for by the society of friends. That society, it is true, is the only one which has asked this at the hands of the Convention; but, if it is adopted, it will extend to other individuals and classes of the community, equally respectable with that society. It will apply to a highly respectable denomination, who were known by the name of Menonists. They too hold it as a part of their creed, that it is improper to bear arms; and it may be that there are other societies who hold these peculiar tenets and principles. There are many individuals too who do not belong to any society, but who hold to the same principles. With regard to the argument of the gentleman from Juniata, (Mr. Cummin,) he had only to say that it would be more likely to produce an impression unfavorable to religion in the minds of sceptics than otherwise. He had been brought up and taught in the doctrines of the christian religion, and he always understood it to be the tenets of the christian church to produce peace on earth, and good will among men. He had no desire to go into a scriptural argument to prove this, as he knew himself to be incompetent to do the subject that justice which ought to be done to it. It was sufficient for his purpose to know that this was the belief of the society of friends, and of other religious denominations and individuals. It was known that these persons were conscientious, and if it was known to be a part of their creed, let us enquire whether we should not respect it. Let us look for a moment into the Constitution of 1789, which was adopted at a time when perhaps there was more of the military spirit infused into the minds of men, than at any other time since the foundation of this Government. The framers of that instrument were many of them fresh from the fields of the revolution, and all Europe was convulsed with the exploits of armies. Notwithstanding, however, that the people of that day were infected with a military spirit, we see them adopting the principle in the Constitution, that government has no power nor right to control the consciences of men. Now, if that people at that time regarded the right of conscience by a constitutional provision, how much more ought we now to regard it? Shall we now in times of peace, when almost the whole world are engaged in peaceful occupations, say that we will not respect the rights of conscience? Shall we say that because the minority differs from the majority, that they cannot be permitted to enjoy the freedom of conscience? Shall we be told that the minority, and the conscientious minority, are less entitled to the regard of the majority than when the present Constitution was adopted. If the right of conscience was then worth protection, it is equally so now. If you look into the legislation of all countries, you will find conscientious scruples regarded. You will find in England and America religious scruples tolerated, and provisions made to meet the case. In the courts of justice, where the lives and the property of our citizens depend upon the evidence there given, conscientious scruples, in relation to taking oaths are regarded, they are exempted from the obligation of the oath, and are permitted to give testimony in the manner most congenial to their own consciences. Our laws all go more or less to respect the rights of conscience, and why introduce provisions here at this day denying of a respectable class of citizens the free exercise of the right of conscience.

The debating continued the following day.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

John Cummin again:

Mr. Cummin… said it was the belief of the Society of Friends, that all wars are anti-Christian. Then he had said in his comment on this belief, that in this view all who voted for wars are infidels, because there could be no third party. There could only be Christians and infidels. It was wrong to charge him with applying the word infidel to any. These memorialists used the language themselves, and he must stand acquitted of the charge. The charter of William Penn, contradicted what these petitioners advanced and expressed what he (Mr. C.) had said. The State of Pennsylvania was established on warlike principles. The grant was made to William Penn, on account of warlike exploits achieved by himself and his family. [Here Mr. C. read the first section of the grant.]

This was a grant from Charles Ⅱ of England that read, in part: “…we, favoring the petition and good purpose of the said William Penn, and having regard to the memory and merits of his late father in diverse services, and particularly to his conduct, courage, and discretion under our dearest brother James, Duke of York, in that signal battle and victory fought and obtained against the Dutch fleet, commanded by the Heer Van Opdam, in the year one thousand six hundred and sixty-five…” Cummin continues:

The Society of Friends had pleaded under the grant of William Penn, and they were unable to show from a single sentence in that grant that he intended that any portion of the people should be exempted from paying their just dues to the government. Pennsylvania being a military State, they who were the descendants from its founder ought not to be contending for any such principles as these petitioners asked. Mr. C. then read a further extract, being the 16^th section of the grant, in order to refute the idea that there was intended to be any exception granted to any class from paying an equivalent for personal service.

Section ⅩⅥ reads:

Nor shall the said William Penn, or his heirs, or any other inhabitants of the said province, make war or do any act of hostility against any other king, prince, or state, or any of their subjects, who shall then be in league or amity with us, our heirs, or successors. And because in so remote a country, and situated near many barbarous nations, the incursions as well of the savages themselves, as of other enemies, pirates, and robbers, may probably be feared. Therefore, we have given and for us, our heirs, and successors, do give power by these presents to the said William Penn, his heirs and assignees, by themselves or their captains or other, their officers to levy, muster, and train all sorts of men, of what condition, or wheresoever born, in the said province of Pennsylvania, for the time being, and to make war and pursue the enemies and robbers aforesaid, as well by sea as by land, yea, even without the limits of the said province, and by God’s assistance, to vanquish and take them, and being taken, to put them to death by the law of war, or to save them at their pleasure, and to do all and every other act and thing, which to the charge and office of a captain general of an army belongs or has accustomed to belong, as fully and freely as any captain general of an army, has ever had the same.

Back to Mr. Cummin:

It was considered enough if the society who had conscientious scruples got rid of the personal service. There was not a word in the law to support them in their claim to be released from the payment of this equivalent.

What will the petitioners say to this clause? Can they get over it with all their sanctity of pretensions to be elevated above the other citizens of America and Europe? Their pretensions are unfounded, and it is a shame for them to ask for that which is denied to all our other citizens. Common sense should teach them otherwise than to ask such privileges. By the 16^th section of this charter, power is given to “William Penn, his heirs, and assigns, by themselves or their captains, or officers, to levy, muster and train all sorts of men, of what condition, or wheresoever born in the Province of Pennsylvania, for the time being, and to make war, and pursue the enemies and robbers aforesaid, as well by sea as by land; yea, even without the limits of the said Province, and by God’s assistance, to vanquish and take them, and being taken, to put them to death by the laws of war, or to save them at their pleasure; and to do all and every other act and thing which to the charge and office of a Captain General of an army belongs or has accustomed to belong, as fully and freely as any Captain General of an army has ever had the same.” It will be seen therefore by this paper that William Penn never took such a ground as is now taken by these petitioners; and as he had said before, he would say now, that until their men can show that an attempt has been made to prevent them from worshipping God according to the dictates of their own consciences, they have no right to complain, and certainly we have never made any such attempt as that to interfere with their conscientious belief. The power is granted in this charter to William Penn to act as Captain General, and to train all men — pursue the enemies of the State, — vanquish and take them, and put them to death by the laws of war. Is this not a contradiction of these petitioners to all intents and purposes? He should like to know how gentlemen would get out of this. It was just, right, and proper that all men should be subjected to the laws, and that all should pay their proportion toward the maintenance of the government and the defense of the Commonwealth. We had the highest authority for this, yea, even authority from on high. The scriptures said “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers,” and “they that resist shall receive damnation.” These men, then, ought to submit to the powers of the government and the laws of their country, if they wish to be the followers of the Prince of Peace. Their resistance is rebellion against the laws of the land, which is worse than witchcraft. The language of the Scripture was strong and emphatic, and in direct contradiction of the prayer of these petitioners. The language of the charter, too, was in contradiction of their prayer. William Penn never gave them the grant which they here contend for. — It was not to be found in any of the engagements of the Government of England with him, nor was it to be found in any engagements of his with the people of Pennsylvania. War was lawful and justifiable, and he had clearly proven on a former occasion that the followers of the Prince of Peace fought the battles of their country. It was clear, therefore, that all persons should be held to defend their country, and upon their failing to do so, let them pay an equivalent.

Ephraim Banks “regretted very much that there had been an attack made on any class of persons, because of their conscientious scruples in relation to bearing arms.” Furthermore:

He regretted also that any class of persons should ask to be relieved from doing service to their country in time of need. He regretted it because of the opportunity it gave for abusing the privilege. He knew that conscience made cowards of us all. He knew some would avail themselves of the plea of conscience for the purpose of relieving them from the performance of military service in defense of their country…

That “conscience makes cowards of us all” quote is an odd one to deploy by critics of conscientious objection. Ebenezer W. Sturdevant will also use it later on in the debate. It comes from Hamlet’s soliloquy when he complains that fear of possible consequences in the afterlife keeps a verklempt fellow like himself from slitting his wrists. It’s also often inserted into (or falsely remembered as being from) Richard Ⅲ, although the wicked Richard’s actual quote is either this bit of Nietzschean realpolitik:

For Conscience is a word that Cowards use,
Devised at first to keep the strong in awe,
Our strong arms be our Conscience; Swords our Law.

Or this last bit as his final battle nears:

O coward Conscience? how dost thou afflict me?

Richard was one of Shakespeare’s great villains, and the play is a magnificent story of someone trying to evade the voice of conscience in order to relentlessly and mercilessly pursue power and military glory. By evading his conscience, he splits himself, until right at the end, right after that “O coward Conscience” bit, as his conscience is catching up to him, he argues with himself about himself, Gollum-like:

Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh.
What? do I fear my Self? There’s none else by,
Richard loves Richard, that is, I am I.
Is there a Murderer here? No; Yes, I am:
Then fly; What from my Self? Great reason: why?
Lest I Revenge. What? my Self upon my Self?
Alack, I love my Self. Wherefore? For any good
That I my Self, have done unto my Self?
O no. Alas, I rather hate my Self,
For hateful Deeds committed by my Self.
I am a Villain: yet I Lie, I am not.
Fool, of thy Self speak well: Fool, do not flatter.
My Conscience hath a thousand several Tongues,
And every Tongue brings in a several Tale,
And every Tale condemns me for a Villain;
Perjury, in the highest Degree,
Murder, stern murder, in the direst degree,
All several sins, all used in each degree,
Throng all to the Bar, crying all, Guilty, Guilty.
I shall despair, there is no Creature loves me;
And if I die, no soul shall pity me.
Nay, wherefore should they? Since that I my Self,
Find in my Self, no pity to my Self.

John J. M’Cahen said “that after listening to the argument of the gentleman from Mifflin, (Mr. Banks,) he was at a loss to know how to vote upon the amendment”:

From the turn which this discussion had taken, it appeared to him that the better course would be for the Convention to resolve itself into a court of conscience, and enquire how far conscience was to be respected and what was to be regarded as conscientious scruples. It is impossible for us to tell what is the wish of all our fellow citizens on this subject.… Conscience is a matter that lies in every man’s bosom, and it is for him to determine how far his conscience will allow him to go. A man may be conscientious, scrupulous about paying taxes, or about obeying the law of the Commonwealth, but it does not follow that his conscience is entitled to respect. Every man is bound to respect the laws. Every man’s property is protected, and every man is bound to contribute his share for the common defense of the country. The government protects every man in his rights, and allows him to employ his industry in such manner as to be of most advantage to himself, and why should any man ask to be relieved from defending that government?

…In all matters relating to the public defense, and to the general concerns of our government, all men should be participants. Every man was bound to defend his home and his fireside, and every man who claimed the enjoyment of political rights ought to defend them. He believed that the respectable Society, who petitioned to be relieved from military duty, did not ask to be relieved from the enjoyment of any political rights. They did not find these rights burdensome, nor opposed to the scruples of their consciences. Even on election days, when there were many causes of excitement, they still participated in those scenes; and although he esteemed the Society of Friends as highly as any other class of men, yet, on election days, they were as forward as any in the assertion of their rights. They knew what those rights were and were determined to maintain them. If they could be found exercising their rights on election ground, they ought also to be required to defend their country when assailed by a foreign foe.

Emanuel C. Reigart commented on the latest proposed amendment, which would be worded: “Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms shall not be compelled to do so, nor pay an equivalent therefor, except in times of exigency or war.” This was an attempt at a compromise — let the Quakers be exempt from militia service or paying an equivalent, unless there’s a real war on, in which case it will be necessary for everyone to put their scruples aside to meet with the emergency.

This compromise had the fatal flaw of being ridiculous. What kind of conscientious objection is it that makes you scrupulous of supporting the militia when it isn’t engaged in war, but then allows you to drop your scruples right at the moment when supporting the militia means bloodshed? Later in the debate, critics of the Quakers will (unfairly) seize on this as evidence of the hypocrisy of the Quaker position. Reigart:

To the Bill of Rights the people look with great jealousy; and any alteration in it at this time would be viewed as though this body had legislated for a particular class of the people. Whilst I entertain a proper respect for conscientious scruples, I will not vote for raising up a privileged class in this Commonwealth; though I do not suppose that such is the design of the friends of this measure. If it is so, we had better know it at once. Among my constituents there are Menonists, Ominists and Dunkers; and I have myself sprung from the Menonists; yet not a word have you heard from them. They have always paid their fines. They scruple indeed to bear arms, but they are not chary of their purse.

I do not understand that we are asked by the Society of Friends to create a privileged order; but we are called on to refer the entire matter to the Legislature, and to say that the Society of Friends shall neither bear arms nor pay an equivalent therefor, except in times of exigency or war. This is leaving too much to the Legislature, and I cannot go so far. This report is in strong directory language; it is an invitation, nay, it is a command held out to the Legislature, which says, you must not impose any fines nor enact any laws to bear on those who have conscientious scruples, unless the enemy is at your door or fighting in the town. Such will be held to be the meaning of this sentence if ever it should come before the legislative body. I am unwilling that any doubt should remain; I wish the whole matter to be left clear and intelligible. It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen to receive protection at the hands of his country for his person and property; but this protection must be reciprocal. I receive protection from my country, and I am bound to protect her in return.

But here it is said, perhaps justly, that conscience interferes and says you must not bear arms, you must not take the life of a fellow-creature; it is not in accordance with the principles of Christianity to do so. It may be so: nay, I go farther, and say that I believe it is not in strict accordance with the doctrines of Christianity, yet such is the infirmity of our natures that we do not practice its peaceful precepts. But while I say this, I say to those who hold these conscientious scruples, you must pay an equivalent for personal services. It is not right that I should bear arms, and that you should refuse either to bear arms, or pay an equivalent. It would be holding out an invitation to all to come and say they had conscientious scruples against bearing arms. I do not believe that the friends of the petitioners intended the measure to bear such a construction; but a strong inference might be drawn, on which the Legislature might dispense with the matter altogether except in cases of actual invasion or war. I therefore hope that the amendment of the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia will be agreed to; and that the friends of the measure will pledge themselves here, that when they come to the ninth article, no attempt shall be made to put any thing of this kind into it.

James M. Porter said

…[t]he effect of that report would be simply this; that although you might enroll, officer, and make ready your militia for the defense of the country, yet where a man entertained conscientious scruples as to bearing arms, he should not be compelled to pay a fine as an equivalent in time of peace, when it would be supposed the mustering of men, reluctantly compelled to attend the trainings, could not result in any public good.

But as to conscientious scruples, he confessed that this was a most difficult question. No law could be enacted of which a bad man might not avail himself, and here lay the difficulty and delicacy of the subject. No man more sincerely respected conscientious scruples than he did, and where a man sincerely entertained such scruples, the principles of our Government said that they should be respected. He knew that many men would avail themselves of the exemption who were not entitled to it, and here the great difficulty lay. But it was not possible for a man who did not entertain these scruples, properly to feel and appreciate the motives of the man who did entertain them. For himself, he had no such conscientious scruples. He never had; but the sect, said Mr. P., to which I and my forefathers, and you and your forefathers belonged, had held these conscientious feelings, and they became exiles from the land of their birth in order that they might enjoy the rights of conscience unmolested. I therefore cannot but feel and respect these scruples in others, although I may differ from them; and whilst I cannot accord in sentiment with them, I will at least give them credit for honesty and sincerity in their faith. I do not think it becomes any member of this body, whatever his own feelings may be, to find fault with the consciences of others. As to the effect which such a provision might have upon the interests of the country, that is a fair subject for discussion; but whether their scruples are right or wrong is to me a matter of no consequence. If they are sincere in what they believe, they are entitled to respect. How far protection should be extended to them, it is for this body to determine; but that you are bound to extend protection to them, so far as can be done without injury to the body politic, I am free to allow. — These, sir, are the principles which have governed me; and I declare myself willing to adopt any measure which can safely be adopted to protect them in the enjoyment of these rights of conscience.

Benjamin Martin “said he did not suppose that he could add any thing to what had already been said, calculated to have a beneficial effect on the minds of this committee. But…”:

…he would offer a few remarks with a view to bring the committee back to a right understanding of that which the Society of Friends had asked, and that of which they had complained so that the committee might not, as had heretofore been the case, run into mistaken ideas as to the real nature of the question before them.

The Society of Friends, in the memorial presented here, complained of mistaken views which had been adopted in reference to themselves by the Convention which framed the existing Constitution. This mistake, which had crept into the second section of the sixth article of the present Constitution, was a mistake of a very serious character, yet doubtless originated in the most pure and good intentions. The section provided that the Society of Friends should not be compelled to bear arms, but that they should be compelled to pay an equivalent for personal services. — Now the Society of Friends complained, in the petition, that that which was no doubt intended to be a relief and to prevent oppression, had actually become oppressive in its operations. Such was precisely the fact. The Convention which framed the present Constitution intended to benefit the society by the provision therein inserted; but the practical operation of the provision had been oppressive and had led to all the difficulties and prejudices, fears, and jealousies which have existed. They had not asked to be made a privileged class, to be exempted from the payment of their proportion of the burdens of the Government. It had been stated that if this precedent was established, they would refuse to contribute towards the expenses of the Government. Let us not fall into a mistake in this respect. If the Friends were right in objecting to bear arms, and they chose to abide the consequences, why not let the consequences fall upon them? Why single them out and say that they shall be the objects of plunder and robbery, as they had been under the existing Constitution? He thought that no man who would examine the memorial could doubt that the second section of the sixth article of the Constitution, which provided that they who had conscientious scruples against bearing arms should pay an equivalent for personal service, instead of being, as it was designed to be, a remedy, had proved deeply injurious. And whilst an idea went abroad from this Convention that the Society of Friends was to be a privileged class, it had a great tendency to work injury to that class. They made no such request; they simply asked that no provisions might be inserted on the subject.

It might not become him to say much on this subject, particularly at the present time. He had merely risen to urge upon the committee not to misconceive the real object which the Society of Friends had in view, and to insist that, in acting on the question now under discussion, it should be kept distinct from all consequences which might follow in relation to the Bill of Rights.

The convention took Sunday off and then continued the debate on Monday.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

Benjamin Martin wondered if they could turn down the heat a bit:

This whole objection to the existing Constitution was removed by the vote striking out that clause which, though intended to relieve the members of the Society of Friends, had, as they represented to us, resulted in their oppression. That clause placed them in a very unpleasant position. They were made to appear as a privileged class, or being exempted for military service, while other people had to fight for them; but yet they were subjected by the non-performance of the duty, to the most odious, fraudulent, and oppressive exactions, from the collectors of militia fines. This was a system which worked badly as to all citizens, but more in regard to the Friends than any other class.

John J. M’Cahen said he “was sorry to hear [Martin] say that the Society of Friends had made a complaint which was nothing more than a justifiable complaint of oppression and plunder”:

The laws of the State, he believed, protected the rights of every citizen of the Commonwealth. Then if these people have been plundered, they have the law for their redress. But if he understood the matter rightly, these people rebelled against the law. Instead of remaining good citizens, and acknowledging and obeying the laws, they chose to rebel against them, and therefore they have no right to claim the protection of the laws of the Commonwealth which they had set at defiance. The State of South Carolina had conscientious scruples about paying certain taxes in the form of duties levied by the General Government, and they rebelled against the laws of that government; but they were compelled to submit and obey the laws. This goes to prove that neither a State of the confederacy nor an individual had a right to set the laws at defiance. The doctrine that the supremacy of the laws must be maintained is a good and wholesome doctrine, and every citizen of the Commonwealth ought to obey the mandates of the laws of the Commonwealth. If these people have been oppressed, the proper mode would have been for them to petition the Legislature, or this Convention, as they have now done for redress — obeying the laws of the Commonwealth in the mean time, and not to rebel against those laws and refuse to submit to them until compelled to do so.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

The next day James Dunlop took up the debate. He noticed a difficulty in the idea of legal conscientious objection. If you grant that the government should be empowered to order its citizens to do some thing or another or to suffer certain exactions, regardless of their own preferences, and then someone asks you to make an exception for certain citizens on the grounds of their conscientious objection — how do you distinguish “conscientious” objection from just the ordinary objection of people who would rather choose for themselves what activities to engage in or what causes to support?

If you say “everyone must do this, unless they’re conscientiously opposed” you might as well be saying “everyone must do this, unless they don’t want to” which means you might as well just not say anything at all. The alternative is to come up with some sort of test as to who is being “conscientious” and who is just being contrary, which puts your legislator or bureaucrat into the disreputable position of an inquisitor into the fathomless mysteries of human faith.

Dunlop nonetheless “hoped that the Friends and Mennonists would be exempted on account of their conscientious scruples from personal service”:

All who were scrupulous on this score, might, without inconvenience, be exempted upon the payment of an equivalent. We could spare them all; for we had an abundance of men and vast facilities for communication. We could now transport troops and munitions of war from the interior to the seaboard at the rate of thirty miles an hour. There were hundreds of thousands of men who would be ready and eager to rush into the field for the defense of the country. We need not look to the Friends and the Mennonists in the time of real danger; and we could easily frame our laws so as to save the consciences of all our fellow citizens who felt any scruples in regard to bearing arms.

He had voted for striking out the latter clause of the amendment reported, exempting the conscientiously scrupulous from personal service, upon the payment of an equivalent; but, if it were to go over again, he did not know that he should vote in the same way. But he was willing to exempt these persons upon the payment of an equivalent. The Mennonists had never refused to pay an equivalent, and all they wished was to be exempted from actual and personal attendance at the militia musters; and they were perfectly content with the provision of the Constitution as it now stood. But if this provision should be stricken out then they would be left to the mercy of the Legislature, who might withdraw from them the protection which they now enjoyed. The Friends stood in a different position in regard to this matter. Though willing to discharge all their civil duties strictly, fully, and promptly, they revolted from military service. They were good, liberal, and public-spirited citizens and would discharge any duty imposed upon them which was not against their consciences; and it was against their consciences’ either personally to repel force by force or to aid others in the strife of arms by paying an equivalent for personal service.

Now, he would ask, was it right and proper for us, who represented a large body of Mennonists, to give our consent to the possible withdrawal from them of the protection from personal duty which they now enjoyed by the payment of an equivalent? They would complain of such treatment and with great reason. The Mennonists, in his part of the State, were numerous, and they were sober, quiet, and industrious citizens. They had nothing to do with public affairs, and it was very difficult to prevail upon them even to exercise the right of suffrage, except at those times when they believe the bulwarks of the Constitution to be assailed, when they will come to its defense. This sect originated in Triesland in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty. Their great founder was Mennon, who was a man of piety and learning — of so great learning, that among his sect, he was considered as an oracle. His influence was very great in suppressing the ferocious and furious quarrels excited by the Anabaptists, and ultimately his principles spread very far through the country. At length, some portion of them, in consequence of religious persecution, came to this country, where they have always been esteemed useful, respectable, and quiet citizens. They maintained the character of their founder, were quiet and industrious, and indifferent to every thing except the cultivation and display of the unobtrusive virtues of Christianity. Would it be right to expose these men to the caprices of legislation, through which in a moment of alarm and excitement they might be deprived of the freedom of conscience which they now enjoyed, whereas they now have a bulwark in the Constitution which exempts them upon the payment of an equivalent from bearing arms against their consciences?

Why should any particular sect be exempted from the discharge of public duties? When men were by the operation of government protected in their persons and property, it was going beyond the limits of moderation for them to ask that they should be relieved from their proper share of the burden of public defense, either by personal service or by the payment of an equivalent. It was said to be productive of great hardships and oppression to the Society of Friends. But it was because they preferred to endure these hardships — to have their houses invaded — their property seized and sold — and their persons imprisoned, to the payment of the tax imposed by law as an equivalent for the service from which they were offered conditional exemption.

If we should say that every man who conscientiously scruples to bear arms shall be exempted, and without the payment of any equivalent, where shall we stop? We shall, by such a provision, hold out a boon to the traitor and the convict, and afford them an opportunity upon a false pretext to evade the performance of their duties as citizens. How many would say in reply to the summons of their country, I have married a wife, or I am building a house and cannot come. It must be left to their own conscience to determine whether they are sincere or not. You cannot through any earthly tribunal, ascertain whether any man has a conscientious scruple or not. Be he ever so profligate in his life, all he will have to do will be to say that he has a scruple of conscience. Suppose you tell him that his life contradicts his declaration, he can still say that his mind has been changed since he entered the door of the house where he is, and claim the benefit of the exemption. No period of time can be assigned within which the scruple shall be possessed, or a man’s mind changed upon the subject. If no human tribunal can judge of his conscience you must take his word, you cannot even swear him, for he may have scruples against taking the oath. You might, in fact, as well tell your officer not to enrol any man who will allege any scruples of conscience, as to have a general provision for exemption. No men would be enrolled but those of a strict sense of honor and duty, and your troops would soon dwindle down to a remnant, like those of Gideon, though they would not be so effective.

If we do not insist upon the payment of an equivalent, every fellow that chooses, may relieve himself of the duty by saying that he has scruples of conscience. We might just as well say at once, that every man who chooses may fight for his country and that if he does not choose he may let it alone. He would be very glad to accord all indulgence to the scruples of the Friends. As a class of citizens, they deserved the highest praise for their industry, economy, moderation, and public spirit. They were at the head of all our works of benevolence, and to them we owed, in a great measure, the amelioration of our institutions and laws. He had warm friendships among them, and for all whom he had known he entertained the highest respect. But they must permit him to say that it is impossible to penetrate men’s consciences and to draw a line of distinction between those who have sincere scruples and those who only affect to have them. Would it not be to grant an exclusive privilege to extend the exemption specially and exclusively to them? They were [aware] of this, and did not wish to have their name as a sect specially mentioned. They wished to be relieved and at the same time to have their denomination and their scruples left out of the question. We cannot, without granting an exclusive privilege, designate any particular society; and, if we make the exemption general, then we open the door for the escape of every coward and scoundrel who may wish to hold himself back from his country’s service in the time of peril.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

Then Thomas S. Bell moved to amend the proposed section by inserting the following:

Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms shall not be compelled to do so, nor shall they be compelled to pay an equivalent therefor, except in times of exigency, or war.

This was that compromise that would have freed conscientious objectors from militia service or militia exemption fines — except when such things would be most directly and immediately related to war and bloodshed, that is, except when their consciences would be most likely to be repulsed. Here’s how Bell defended this strange proposal:

Mr. Bell of Chester said that it was with reluctance he rose to renew the consideration of this important, though vexed question. But representing as he did a large class of persons who were deeply interested in its fate, he deemed it to be his duty seriously to discuss the subject, and to ask for it a fair, candid, and impartial examination. It was now fairly before the committee. So prominently had it presented itself to the attention of this body that the consideration of it had been anticipated. It had been incidentally discussed — when other questions were more immediately under consideration. Every gentleman had then felt sooner or later he should have to meet it, discuss it, and decide upon it. It was a question of vast magnitude, as it affected rights immeasurable, except by that standard which is implanted in the breast of man by the Creator: rights, not merely civil and political, but resulting from that allegiance which is due from humanity to God. Regarding it in this point of view, he would ask whether it ought not to be approached solemnly, and whether we should not cast away all prejudices, and eschew all passions and everything calculated to mislead the understanding? Whether we were not to look at the question, no matter what had been said on the subject, fairly and honestly, and in the hope of at least coming to a righteous judgment?

Such prejudices, he was aware he would have to encounter. Such prejudices — if he was correct in applying them, — but perhaps it was too harsh a one; and if so, he begged pardon of the committee. However, to use the word in its mildest sense, he would say that prejudices were held by some of the members of this committee, resulting either from education, or their habits and morals, and which made it difficult for them to appreciate the sentiments of those who were conscientiously scrupulous against bearing arms at any time.

What, he would enquire, was the question? It was simply this: Whether those forming a part and parcel of the people of Pennsylvania who entertain religious scruples against bearing arms should be placed on an equality with our fellow citizens, who do not? We had heard something here relative to privileged classes, and it had been intimated that the memorialists asked for privileges and to be placed above the mass of their fellow citizens. This is not the fact. The Friends sought only to be put on the same terms as other persons of the community. Why did he say so? Because by the fundamental law of Pennsylvania, as it exists, the religious scruples of all men were respected, except in reference to the defense of the State. If gentlemen would refer to the Bill of Rights, they would find that such was the fact. He considered that those who had memorialized us had made nothing more than a reasonable request. They wished to be protected equally with the rest of their fellow citizens. Nor was this peculiar scruple relative to bearing arms confined to one class of religionists. It had been asserted in the course of the discussion that the large and respectable Society of Friends were the only body that was demanding the right which they claimed. This was not the fact, for a large society called Mennonists also asked it. The amendment now on the table embraced all classes of men, all sects, all religious denominations. It extended protection to the whole community. Besides those two societies which he had named as claiming this right, there were many others. There was a large number of people in Lancaster and other places who entertained conscientious scruples against bearing arms. A class existed, calling themselves German and United Brethren, which would rather surrender all their worldly wealth than give up their notions in respect to bearing arms. He did not in the least object to the wide scope of the amendment. He much preferred it in its present shape than if it were less general in its character.

What did we ask? He said we, because he felt the honor of standing on this floor as the advocate of the memorialists; not that he entertained the scruples which they did. What, then, he repeated, did we ask? Liberty — religious liberty — liberty of conscience. Nothing more than this. — Freedom of conscience — to pursue the dictates of our hearts, with a religious intent — to worship God in our own way. We asked to be placed on the same foundation as we are in regard to liberty of speech — to the right of acquiring property and to the right of pursuing our own happiness — all which rights are secured to us by the Constitution of Pennsylvania. He would repeat that the memorialists asked nothing more. The right of conscience was of more importance than any other which he had mentioned, because the latter sprung from the institutions of society, whilst the former originated from the connection which exists between the Deity and man.

And shall this protection, asked for in this enlightened age, be refused on the ground that the feeling which originated the request is not entertained by the whole community? A meritorious, well-deserving, and highly respectable portion of the people had asked for it, and why should we not grant them it? It had been said that this was a right subordinate to the right of self-defense, — an indefeasible right as it had been called by the gentleman from the city of Philadelphia. It is implanted in the very nature of man, and accordingly we were struggling for this right from the first dawn of religious liberty. Yes, whenever and wherever a ray of light had succeeded the gloom which had overshadowed the world — men had yielded up their lives in thousands as martyrs in the cause of religious liberty. History was full of examples of the obstinate firmness with which men had fought for this natural right. Look to France — to the Waldenses and the Huguenot, who turned every house into a fortress, and every site into a battle field. In Ireland, the best blood had been poured out like water in the sacred cause. It had every where crimsoned the green fields of the Emerald Isle. In England, the martyr had yielded up his life at the stake rather than surrender his religious belief. In Scotland, the Presbyterians waged an obstinate and exterminating war in defense of their creed and to free themselves of the fetters which their English neighbors sought to bind upon them. Men there fled from their homes, deserted the cottages of their affections, and abandoned the protection of an organized government, because that protection was accompanied by the assertion of a right to control the conscience of the subject. All this was overwhelming proof that religious liberty was felt to be dearer than life, and would only be surrendered with it. But among the great illustrations of this truth might be instanced the facts attending the first settlement of Northern America. Under the most discouraging circumstances, thousands who had partaken of the advantages of civilization left the land of their fathers, and abandoning the luxuries of polished life, withdrew from the baleful shade of an oppressive government to seek a howling wilderness and such safety as they might find at the hand of the rude savage, rather than endure the desecration of a right which they insisted on as sacred. Among the glories of the early history of the liberties of this country was that here freedom of conscience was first proclaimed as among the fundamental principles of its governments. In the reign of Charles Ⅱ of England, Roger Williams, actuated by a liberality of feeling in advance of the age, and which sheds lustre on his memory, established religious liberty as one of the prominent characteristics of the government he founded.

This was so early as the fourteenth century, Charles Ⅱ, and from that time to the present this feature of our polity, had been every where cherished and fostered in this country. The same principle was promulgated by William Penn, shortly before he left England for America. In the imperishable instrument in which he delineated the “frame” of the government he was about to establish, he taught as a grand truth which admitted of no contradiction, “That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can, of right, be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishments or modes of worship.” The absence of all right to “control or interfere with the rights of conscience,” under any circumstances, is here as strenuously and emphatically denied as is the position, not disputed anywhere within the broad borders of Pennsylvania, that “no man can, of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent.” This great principle, thus proclaimed by Penn and insisted upon by his friends and followers, had been fully carried out and never violated, except so far as it may be impaired by that clause in the existing Constitution of Pennsylvania under consideration, and keeping this in view he might assert, without fear of contradiction, that no authority can or ought to be tolerated by which men may be deprived of the right to follow the dictates of their own consciences.

The memorialists asked for no privilege — no franchise — as had been alleged. They demanded but a bare right, the possession of which their great leader — the founder of this Commonwealth — had guaranteed to them. If they were here importuning for the grant of an exclusive privilege, for something not possessed by other citizens, he would be the last man to stand here as their advocate; but they desired nothing more than the introduction of a clause to some extent prohibiting the enactment of laws interfering with the religious scruples they entertained, and this was nothing more than was already secured to their fellows. This was asserted as a principle in the Constitution of 1776, and repeated in the existing Bill of Rights. It was, perhaps, sufficient merely to call attention to the fact that from the first settlement of Pennsylvania down to the present moment, it had been observed as a rule not to be controverted that no law should be made having the slightest tendency to interfere with or control freedom of conscience, except in the particular instance of which, as seemed to him, the memorialists so justly complained.

The principle, he therefore contended, was at the foundation of our institutions, that there was no power in our government to interfere with the rights of conscience. If this principle was correct, and none here would deny it, what was the question for this Convention to decide? Simply this: do any portion of our fellow citizens entertain conscientious scruples against performing military duty, or is it merely an affectation of a scruple on their part to avoid the burden and hazard of bearing arms? When we looked to this question, we would find that it was one merely of veracity. Were their professions sincere? Have those who have given us, for so many years, proof upon proof of their sincerity, and who have suffered themselves, for the sake of their religious scruples, to be reviled and oppressed, been all this time practicing deceit? If their scruple was an honest one, they had a right to maintain it, and we were obliged to secure them in the right by the aid of the law.

Sir, said Mr. B. in asking for the insertion of this protective provision in the Constitution, it is not necessary that I should refer to the character of the largest society which claims exemption from military service. If they were here for an exclusive favor, it might be necessary to speak of their moral and social worth, and of the great benefits which they had conferred upon Pennsylvania, and the important part they had acted in the establishment of our free institutions. It might, too, be necessary to follow them into the friendly and benevolent circle of their domestic retirement. But it was a right and not a privilege which they asked, and he, therefore, forbore. Had we any evidence, he asked, except our own assertions, that they are insincere in the scruples which they profess to entertain? In the Constitution, as it now stood, there was at least a practical recognition of the principle for which he contended, and though it did not go so far as was demanded, yet it furnished a proof that respect had been paid to the fact that a portion of our fellow citizens entertained an honest scruple in regard to bearing arms.

It remained to inquire, what was the extent of this scruple. Did it go beyond mere personal service? If it did, it was entitled to our respectful consideration. If gentlemen would turn to the memorial, they would find that their scruples extended to the payment of an equivalent for service, and they put it on the natural ground that, being averse to war, they were opposed to the means by which a state of war might be created and maintained. They asked to be relieved not only from the duty of bearing arms, but from the equally odious necessity of paying an equivalent for it. Was it for us to say that this scruple was affected? Should we set up a standard for other men’s consciences, and pronounce that this or that scruple of conscience is unreasonable? The members of this religious, worthy, and respectable society say that they entertain scruples of conscience equally strong against paying an equivalent as against bearing arms. Now, the principle which he had before indicated was strong enough to protect every scruple which might be professed. It extended to one case as well as to the other. If the scruple was sincere we were bound to recognize it and protect them in it; and we had no right to pronounce that it is unreasonable. He might perhaps ask, but he did not do it, that any society or individual should be exempt under the rights of conscience, in time of danger and of war, from personal service or the payment of an equivalent. They had a right to come in and demand this, but that question was surrounded with so many difficulties that they waived it altogether, and only asked to be exempted in time of profound peace. But, when the exigencies of war should require it, they remain like other citizens, subject to the demand of the government upon them for personal service or its equivalent. If the question was between convenience and inconvenience, who would hesitate in his decision? If the question be between right on the one side and mere inconvenience on the other, would the argument resulting from inconvenience defeat the prayer of the petitioners, and deprive them of a right which from the origin of our Constitution had been held sacred?

As to the frauds which were anticipated by some gentlemen, no man would, in time of peace, resort to fraud for the purpose of procuring an exemption, and in time of war it would not avail. Then, all classes would be on the same footing, and be compelled to render personal service or an equivalent. All they asked was freedom from the burden and vexation of this duty in time of peace when their exemption could be productive of no ill effects. What though one half or three-fourths of the people should, in time of peace, affect a scruple in order to avoid militia training. Would the country lose any thing by it? What advantage would be derived from the continuance of the militia trainings, even though every citizen attended them? In time of war when their services were wanted, there would be no room for fraud or the allegation of any scruples, — for no one will be exempted, except upon the payment of an equivalent. This feature was not a novel one in our Constitution. This was not the only State in the Union which had set an example of freeing from the burden of militia service, the tender consciences of their citizens. The Constitution of Vermont, provides that “Quakers and Shakers, the Judges of the Supreme Judicial Court, and the ministers of the Gospel,” may be exempted from militia duty. The Constitution of New Hampshire, says: “No person who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be compelled thereto, provided he will pay an equivalent.”

We find, therefore, that other States recognize the existence of these scruples and protect them. Should we then, whose State was founded by this very sect which demands the exemption, and who see everywhere around them the evidences of their patriotism and worth, should we be behind others in maintaining the sacred principle of freedom of conscience, which by this society was laid at the foundation of our institutions? Should the proposition which he had offered succeed, any defect which might arise in its operation might be remedied by the Legislature. If fraudulent evasions were practiced under it, the law would provide means for their detection and punishment. Mere inconvenience ought not to be urged as an obstacle to the adoption of the proposition.

George W. Woodward then complained that “now we are asked to go further and to exonerate those professing conscientious scruples, from all military taxation.” Taxation? I thought it was a fine, not a tax. This distinction became a battle over framing the debate. Are Quakers petitioning to be freed from a provision that unfairly fines their conscientious scruples, or are they petitioning to be given the privilege of a tax break? Woodward said:

He called it taxation, because it was a mode of compelling men to contribute to public burdens.

Sir, said Mr. W. I have always been taught that peace is the time to prepare for war, but how can you prepare for war without money, which is its sinew? We are called on to exempt a body of people from the payment of the taxes in a time of peace, which are necessary not only to prepare for war but to prevent it.

These military fines or taxes, as he called them, went into the Treasury for the use of the Government, and he was opposed to exempting any class of citizens from their payment. It seemed to him we should be doing great injustice to our citizens at large, and violence to our best interests, should we yield to any class or portion of the people, however respectable, entire exemption both from military service and its pecuniary equivalent. During the progress of the debate, we had heard a great deal of the freedom of conscience. He concurred in all that gentleman had said of the freedom of conscience and the sacredness of conscience, and he was unwilling in any manner to interfere with the full enjoyment of his rights of conscience to which every human being was entitled, but it struck him that the rights of conscience were well enough secured by the Constitution as it stands, and that this demand for further provision in behalf of conscience, which the Friends are now pressing on us as a matter of right — for the gentleman from Chester demands it in their name as a matter of right — is quite unnecessary and a novelty in Pennsylvania. I can understand how a man may have conscientious scruples against bearing arms for the purpose of taking away the lives of his fellow men, and there is much reason for being asked to excuse that peaceful sect from such a duty; but, when Government asks an annual contribution either in services or money for the purpose of preventing all necessity for violence and force, I can not, sir, understand how it is a case for tender consciences, nor why both money and services should be forbid by conscience. It is a new case — to me a novelty.

There’s that old canard: Armies, arms, military training, and military spending aren’t for war — on the contrary, they’re all to prevent war! Therefore pacifists ought to be the first to support military measures. War is peace! Freedom is slavery! Ignorance is strength!

Woodward continued:

Gentlemen have referred to Penn’s Charter, wherein, as in our bill of rights, the freedom of conscience is abundantly guarantied. Every man is permitted to adopt whatever religion and creed he pleases, and to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his conscience, and no man is permitted to molest or make him afraid; but nowhere in Penn’s Charter, in our Constitution or laws, do you find the principle recognized which is now sought to be introduced. Exemption from taxation is the last thing he would ever have expected the Quakers to ask for. Their history informs me, sir, that they have always regarded it as a religious duty to contribute to the support of the Government under which they lived, and that conscience, instead of interposing to shield them from the demands of Government, has bound them to a strict and faithful discharge of all the obligations of good citizens. In Proud’s History of Pennsylvania, gentlemen will find the following account of the ideas which this sect used to entertain, if they do not still, of their duties to Government.

Their great care and strictness, in rendering to Cæsar, according to their manner of expression, that is to the Government, its dues; in the punctual payment of taxes, customs, and discouraging all illicit and clandestine trade; and in being at a word in their dealings: — Insomuch, that, in their particular advices to their brethren they say: — “As the blessed truth we profess, teaches us to do justly to all men, in all things; even so more especially, in a faithful subjection to the Government, in all godliness and honesty; continuing to render to the King what is his due, in taxes and customs, payable to him according to law.” — “For our ancient testimony has ever been, and still is against defrauding the King of any of the above mentioned particulars, and against buying goods reasonably suspected to be run” — “or doing any other thing whatsoever to the injury of the King’s revenue, or of the common good, or to the hurt of the fair trader; so, if any person or persons, under our name or profession, shall be known to be guilty of these, or any other such crimes or offences, we do earnestly advise the respective monthly meetings (hereafter explained) to which such offenders belong, that they severely reprimand, and testify against such offender, and their unwarrantable, clandestine and unlawful actions” — “we being under great obligations of gratitude, as well as duty, to manifest, that we are as truly conscientious to render to Cæsar, the things that are Cæsar’s, as to support any other branch of our Christian testimony.” And so great was the importance of this affair with them, that an annual enquiry was regularly made through all parts of the British dominions, where they had members of society, whether the purport of these advices were duly put in practice, or not, and to enforce the same.

I have always supposed that these people were to be looked to for good examples of citizenship as well as for all the other virtues, and never before did I hear that conscience had taken alarm at the ordinary and reasonable demands of the kind and paternal Government we enjoy. Why, sir, where is this principle of exemption, if once adopted, to stop? The Legislature of this State may think it necessary in times of profound peace to buy arms and munitions of war — to organize and drill the militia — to encourage volunteer corps and to make large preparations against the hour of need and peril. All this will require money, and who shall contribute it? Since these preparations point to war, the Friends cannot conscientiously contribute and they must be exempted, you say. But another and another class of community come forward with the same plea of conscience, and, on the same principle, they too must be exempted from all participation in these arrangements — this peace establishment — and finally it is discovered that the State cannot be armed and put into an attitude of defense at all. What then is to become of her? Why, sir, war would be inevitable. Our feeble condition would attract assaults and that greatest of human calamities would be certainly brought on us by the tender consciences of the Commonwealth, which refused to keep up an ability of defense. True humanity might dictate the preparations I have supposed or more, and they would have the effect to deter hostility, prevent bloodshed, and preserve peace. The gentleman from the city of Philadelphia, (Mr. Scott) has shown conclusively how extensively the fact of an organized military force had operated with the enemy during the last war and how salutary such impressions may prove in future. But you lose the benefit of such impressions on the mind of an enemy when you deny to the government the means of making the requisite preparations, and if you excuse those who are conscientiously scrupulous, not the Quakers only, but the Menonists, the Dunkers and perhaps every man of any religious creed, may claim the benefit of the exemption, so that your government will become defenseless and powerless.

Without a formal renunciation of its authority, and without open resistance to its demands, it will be left at the mercy of any foe who may choose to attack it from without, or of any enemy within its bosom who may desire to rend and overthrow it. Now, sir, I have shown from Proud’s History what the opinions of the Society of Friends are in respect to public contributions; and I find, in the Constitution of 1776, the principle adopted and recognized under which they seem always to have acted. The 8^th section of that Constitution is in these words: “Every member of society has a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property; and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expense of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto; but no part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent or that of his legal representatives; nor can any man, who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be compelled thereto; nor are the people bound by any laws but such as they have, in like manner, assented to for their common good.”

Mr. Chairman, this is wholesome doctrine, and these are the principles of Pennsylvania. They pervade all our institutions; and I had hoped they were cherished by all our people. I would respect conscientious scruples against bearing arms where they are sincerely entertained, and would not ask any man, in peace or war, to take up arms against his conscience; but then he should pay a pecuniary equivalent such as the government might assess. This is all that has ever been demanded; and this seems most reasonable and just. I have looked in vain in our own plans of government and Constitutions, and in the Constitutions of other States, for any such extraordinary immunity as is now asked for a part of our fellow citizens.

But we are told we must not undertake to judge of men’s consciences; and it is more than intimated that to argue against this “demand” of conscience is to trespass on holy ground. I agree that conscience is a sacred right; but when I am asked to vote for exempting a large class of our most opulent citizens from the contribution to public burdens which other citizens have to make, on the ground that conscience forbids them to contribute, may I not inquire if it is a case for conscience? If an enlightened conscience ought, or can, interpose a plea in bar in such a case? It seems to me to fall peculiarly within the scope of our duties; and I should feel that our constituents had reason to complain if we yielded to this mild “demand” without investigating it closely and severely.

I know the proposition is often stated in this form: “It is wrong to take human life. And it is the same thing to pay another for taking it as to take it ourselves;” and in this way it is supposed the argument is just as strong against paying pecuniary equivalents for military service as it is against performing the service. Now two things are forgotten by this argument: First, that the pecuniary equivalent is for the general purposes of the government; and, secondly, that all military service, as well as pecuniary equivalents, are designed to assist to preserve peace, and not to promote war. Peace is the state our country desires. War is a calamity, and government must be trusted with the means of averting it. If government finds military preparations to be the most effectual means, where is there room for conscientious scruples against cooperating with government?

That pious statement came less than a decade before the launch of the Mexican-American War.

Woodward continued:

There is another view of this matter to be taken. The people who have sent in their petitions here asking for this exemption are among our most opulent citizens, and have a large amount of property to be protected by the government. Can they conscientiously ask for protection when they refuse to furnish means? Protection and allegiance are reciprocal duties; and it seems to me that the law of allegiance binds every citizen to a discharge of all his obligations to the government which gives him protection, until he is ready to transfer himself to another asylum. Surely, while a body of men ask and enjoy protection from the government for their persons and property, it would be unwise to give them the power, by an affirmation of conscientious scruples, to absolve themselves from their reciprocal duties to the government.

I have an objection to the amendment, founded on its generality. Nobody but the Society of Friends is asking for this exemption; and if it is to be granted, let it be to them specially and alone. The amendment goes to exempt everybody who may profess conscientious scruples. Let us not outrun the expectations of the public by offering universal exemption from taxation; but if we are to have a select and privileged class among us, let us name and specify them in our Constitution, so it may be known who are intended to be benefitted. In the first establishment of a privileged order of men, we ought to be more exact and specific than the amendment is; and if gentlemen insist on pressing it, I hope they will make it so.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

William Darlington “requested the indulgence of the committee” and began to appeal to precedent:

The matter seemed to be narrowed down to the single question, whether conscientious scruples against bearing arms do exist in any class of our citizens; and if so, whether such scruples deserve respect at our hands. Could there be any doubt in the mind of any man as to the existence of such scruples? Was there any one who could bring himself to the belief that it was merely a fallacy and delusion? Was there any one who had read the history of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as it was to be found in the annals of her legislation, and could come to the conclusion that there existed no such thing as conscientious scruples? Was it not for this that our forefathers fled from a land of persecution and settled themselves down here? What was almost the first step which they took after their arrival in this country, but recognition of these conscientious scruples? In the charter of privileges granted by William Penn, this principle is recognized in the strongest terms. In the first proceeding of the Legislature of this Province, in 1705–6, we find a special enactment recognizing and tolerating this express right. By a reference to a law passed long before any other charter of rights but that granted to William Penn, the following enactment would be found.

Because no people can be truly happy though under the greatest enjoyment of civil liberties, if abridged of the freedom of their consciences as to their religious professions and worship: And Almighty God being the only Lord of conscience, father of lights and spirits, and the author as well as object of divine knowledge, faith, and worship, who only does enlighten the minds and persuade and convince the understandings of the people; I do hereby grant and declare, that no person or persons, inhabiting on the province or territories, who shall confess and acknowledge an Almighty God, the creator, upholder and ruler of the world, and profess him or themselves obliged to live peaceably under the civil government, shall be in any case molested or prejudiced in his or their person or estate, because of his or their conscientious persuasion or practice, nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious worship, place or ministry, contrary to his or their mind, nor do or suffer any other act or thing, contrary to their religious persuasion.

Did this provision mean anything or nothing? Could there be any doubt on the subject in the mind of any man? As to whether it be a part of the religious creed of the Society of Friends to bear their testimony against war and fighting, we are not called on to determine. There was not any question of that kind before us. It would be found that at so early a period of our history as 1705, the Legislature of Pennsylvania did conceive it proper to secure the inviolability of conscience to those who professed to be members of this society, as may be seen by the following extract from the law concerning liberty of consciences, passed in 1705.

No person who shall profess and declare that they will live peaceably under the civil government, shall in any case be molested or prejudiced for his or her conscientious persuasions, etc.

Shortly afterwards, in the year 1718, this principle was carried still further by the Legislature, in the act for the advancement of justice, section 3, wherein it is enacted as follows: — 

All and all manner of crimes and offences, etc. shall and may be enquired of, heard, tried, and determined by judges, justices, inquests and witnesses, qualifying themselves according to their conscientious persuasion respectively, either by taking a corporal oath, or by the solemn affirmation allowed by act of Parliament, to those called Quakers, in Great Britain, etc.

Here again the Legislature recognized this principle. Here it would be found that one hundred and twenty years ago the principle of conscientious scruples regarding the taking of oaths, in reference to the Friends alone or very few others, was scrupulously regarded by the Legislature of the Province and embodied into laws which have continued to this day to be landmarks; nor need we confine ourselves to these instances alone. In every step in the formation of our government the same principle is recognized. In the Constitution of 1770 we find it laid down in the declaration of rights as follows:

That all men have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding, and that no man ought, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to or against his own free will and consent; nor can any man who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship; and that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any person whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.

Now, it was thus laid down that no man should be deprived of any right on account of his religious sentiments. If he should fail to show that this conscientious scruple to bear arms was a religious sentiment in those who belonged to the Society of Friends, then his argument based on this declaration in the Constitution of 1776 could amount to nothing. But if he should succeed in showing that it was a religious sentiment, a part of the creed of this class of our citizens, then we must renounce all these principles which our fathers had laid down if we refuse to respect it. The same principle is again laid down in the Constitution of 1790. At every step thereupon we may trace the fact that conscientious scruples against bearing arms in those who profess to belong to the Society of Friends have been respected by those who have settled the government of the Commonwealth. In the Constitution of 1790 we have the sacred principle established: “That no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent, that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.” No man therefore can be compelled to any particular form of worship, or to support any which he does not conscientiously believe to be right. The Constitution of 1790 contained no such clause as the present. Mr. D. here made a reference to the memorial of the Friends, to show that in its language it entirely harmonized with that of the charter of privileges, and that therefore no objection could be urged against it to which the charter itself was not liable. To sustain that position, he read an extract from the memorial of Friends.

Now he would ask, what was the conscientious practice; what the conscientious persuasion of the Society of Friends? He spoke in reference to the Friends alone, because his argument would equally apply to any other sect, or to every other individual holding conscientious scruples. If then every individual in the community, no matter how low his station, since this colony was settled, had been considered as deserving of such regard, and had been protected in his conscientious privileges and practice, were we now about to retrace our steps to those dark and barbarous ages when no human right was recognized except the right of the strongest? He trusted there was no such disposition in this body. If there were any who entertained conscientious scruples, he hoped these scruples would be protected and respected unless they should come in competition with the public safety. He made this exception, because he felt free to admit that the public necessity was superior to all law. Conscientious scruples, in times of public danger, must give way to public necessity. The principles of toleration which he had explained was not only to be found in the Legislative history of Pennsylvania, and in her Constitutional code, but in the Constitution of every State, even where the Society of Friends were scarcely, if at all, known, those who entertained conscientious scruples had been exempted from military duty. There was but one instance to which he would refer, which would, he believed, convince the committee, if any thing would, of the propriety of continuing this principle of toleration. In Tennessee, where perhaps there was no such person as a Quaker known, it had been thought necessary by a special provision in her Constitution to make it imperative on the Legislature to exempt those who had conscientious scruples on the subject from the necessity of bearing arms. The 8^th article of the Constitution of Tennessee contained this clause on the subject: “Legislature shall pass laws exempting citizens belonging to any sect or denomination of religion, the tenets of which are known to be opposed to the bearing of arms, from attending private and general musters.”

Thus it would be seen that the Constitution of Tennessee did not even leave it discretionary with the Legislature, but made it imperative on that body to pass laws exempting from muster such persons as entertained religious scruples. This was going as far as any other Constitution had gone, if not farther. In many of the books he saw this principle of toleration recognized, although in our Constitution it is coupled with a clause — a dark spot in our organic law — compelling the Legislature to exact an equivalent.

The Constitution of Maine, article 7, section 5, runs thus: — “Persons of the denomination of Quakers and Shakers, justices of the supreme judicial court, and ministers of the gospel, may be exempted from military duty, but no other person of the age of eighteen, and under the age of forty-five years, excepting officers of the militia who have been honorably discharged, shall be so exempted, unless he shall pay an equivalent, to be fixed by law.”

Here the language makes it imperative, or at least holds out a strong invitation to the Legislature to make such exemption: but when such exemption is made, there is nothing said about an equivalent. Thus, Maine and Tennessee have adopted the same broad basis In Maine too, there were Quakers, and Shakers, and ministers. Perhaps only the Quakers and Shakers entertained conscientious scruples. But it was not left at the discretion of the Legislature to inflict any equivalent. Most of the other States recognized the principle of conscientious scruples but required an equivalent. It was not his purpose to go further than was proposed by the amendment of his colleague (Mr. Bell) to exempt those who professed scruples from actual service, and from paying an equivalent in time of peace; and, in war, from personal service, but requiring the payment of an equivalent, because no scruples could then be permitted to interfere with the public safety. Look one moment at the equivalent required. What was it? An equivalent in time of peace, when only one or two days training was required! What did it amount to? He wished it to be laid down as a principle that the conscientious scruples of individuals should be respected, unless some over-ruling circumstances rendered it necessary that these scruples should be disregarded. What were the services required in this case? To attend militia musters once or twice a year, under officers like the notorious Colonel Pluck. Are these the kind of services to be required of our citizens? The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania stands alone in the folly of her Legislature on this point. Did any one ever hear of an equivalent for standing in the street shouldering a corn-stalk? What was originally intended was that an equivalent should be given for actual service when such service was required. The militia laws had, on this point, never been in conformity with the Constitution. The Legislature had exempted some in disregard to the provision touching conscience, and had made others liable to service. Never, until they came to the point of arming and disciplining the militia, did the Legislature strictly comply with the provision in the Constitution as it now stands. There ought to be made evident some positive good — some over-ruling necessity, before we ventured to violate the conscientious scruples of any man. Gentlemen had told the committee of the exploits of militia in Europe, as well as in our country. He was astonished to hear the army of the great Napoleon designated as militia. He believed it to be a fact that Napoleon himself had said that the militia were only fit to stop a bullet until the regular troops could be brought up to action. He had therefore heard with astonishment that the whole army of Napoleon was merely militia. But it was not his purpose to take away the merits of any. In his part of the country there were no militia, there was no military spirit. He would now turn to an authority which he considered to be as great as that of Napoleon with every American. General Washington, in his letter to Congress in 1778, in the midst of the war, used this language:

To place any dependence upon militia, is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill; which, being followed by a want of confidence in themselves; when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed; superior in knowledge and superior in arms; makes them timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all; and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others.

Again, speaking of his preference for a standing army over the militia, he says: — “If I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter.”

With such evidence before us, he would ask, in the name of common sense, if to support such a system, the conscientious scruples of any of our citizens ought to be disregarded? Whether the right conferred by the Constitution ought to be violated to keep up an annual muster of men with corn-stalks? But it had been said by the gentleman from Franklin over the way, that if we open the door we shall allow the worthless to shield themselves from the duty of serving their country by setting up conscientious scruples, and thus make room for the escape of all who are cowards. It would be a singular spectacle to present to the world an army of cowards and traitors who, if they could, would shield themselves under the plea of conscientious scruples. It had been uniformly the military practice to drum such characters out of the corps. The argument therefore, defeated itself. The gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) had also said that the gentleman from Franklin had placed this question in a clear and unanswerable point of view, but was it likely that any one, merely to avoid the musters, would become a disciple of a creed which he did not believe and affect scruples which he did not feel? Was there any evidence of many having had resort to such fraudulent means to avoid service in time of war? But supposing it to be true that if we tolerated the scruples of one, we should open the door to others. Such a result was barely possible, but, because a few cowards or traitors, or both, might possibly shield themselves under such a pretext, was such a trifling and doubtful evil to be allowed to weigh against the feelings and religious opinions of so large and respectable a portion of our fellow citizens? All partial evil should be made to give way to a positive and a general good. He did not believe that this would be an evil at all. He did not think that it would be found to be the case that any citizens of Pennsylvania would shield themselves under the plea of conscientious scruples unless they seriously and religiously felt these scruples. It had been also said that if we allow this exemption it would be creating a privileged class among our citizens. But was this the fact? If so, your Legislature have already created a privileged class, because it is enacted that all who refuse to swear by the book may be allowed to affirm. Now was not this creating a privileged class? Why are they to be allowed, when called to testify on matters which involve life and death or important questions as to property, to evade the solemn form of an oath? Was not the exemption from this obligation erecting them into a privileged class? The only object now prayed for was a proper respect for these religious scruples which had been recognized and respected every where and at all times.

The gentleman from Luzerne had remarked upon a truism that in time of peace it was proper to prepare for war; and that it was also proper that taxes should be levied equally on all for the support of the war. He (Mr. D.) granted this position, that the tax should be levied equally; but had we ever heard of any individual in the community refusing, on account of his conscientious scruples, to pay a tax for the support of the government? No, it was not that this sect claimed any exemption from the ordinary burdens imposed on others. They had always been found among the best and most peaceable of our citizens; he would not say they were the best. They were always ready to pay their due proportion of the burdens of the government. It was certainly true that some of the money in the treasury might be applied to the purchase of arms for the defense of the country; but that money was levied by a general tax; it was not exclusively a military tax, and it was this alone to which they objected — namely, to levying a tax which was exclusively military — or to compelling them against the scruples of their conscience to bear arms, either in time of peace or war, or to pay an equivalent for personal service in time of peace. This, and this alone, was what the Friends objected to.

On a view of the whole case, he hoped that the Convention would act on the broad principle of human rights, and with a liberal respect for the rights of conscience in others; because no man should claim for himself what he is not willing to grant to others. He hoped that the Convention, feeling the force of the amendment, would this day affirm by its vote the sacred principles which was to be found in every Constitution in the United States, recognizing and favoring the sacred rights of conscience.

James C. Biddle joined him:

[I]t has been asked, should any class of the people of this country refuse to pay a tax for a great public purpose? Should they enjoy the blessings which are diffused among us, and refuse to give back their poor pittance towards the maintenance and support of that government which bestows all these blessings upon them? Sir, it appears to me that the learned gentleman, in his ingenuity, has mistaken the nature of duty imposed on the militiamen. The law requires that they shall parade at certain periods of the year for a certain length of time, and that, if they do not comply with the requisition of this law, they shall pay a fine. But, sir, this is not a tax levied for general purposes. My friend from Chester county, (Mr. Darlington) had said with great truth that there never had been a tax levied for general purposes which had not been most cheerfully paid by that class of our citizens who entertain these conscientious scruples. Probably no portion of our community has been more ready not only to pay taxes and bountifully to pour out their treasure for the support of the government, but to promote good and to ameliorate the condition of mankind in every form. Then they are not amenable to the charge of refusing to pay their portion towards the burdens of the government. But, sir, I assert again that this is not a tax; it is a fine, it is a penalty for not doing that which the law commands that they should do — it is like all other fines. We might as well say that a fine for an assault and battery was a tax. It is that which the law says they shall pay for neglecting to obey the command of the law, and you might with as much propriety say that any other fine imposed for the many numerous offences against the law was a tax, as say that this partakes of such a character. It has not a single characteristic of a tax; it is a fine — it is a penalty. Let me ask then, does not the argument we have heard as to a tax lose all its force? It is ingenious, however. Indeed the gentleman from whom it emanated never speaks without manifesting ingenuity; but we should not suffer ourselves on this account to be led astray from the plain matter of fact. Is the militia system itself a tax? If it is not, then neither is the equivalent for militia duty a tax. But it is said it is a great privilege — the privilege of bearing arms — that it is a right which all have to defend themselves. If, then, it is a great privilege of freemen, surely it is not to be designated as a tax; and if not a tax, how can its equivalent be called a tax?

I have thus endeavored, Mr. Chairman, to notice this argument of the gentleman from Luzerne; but he has proceeded further, and has entered into a learned inquiry whether the consciences of those who entertain these scruples were enlightened consciences or whether they are not ignorant, deceived, or mistaken. Sir, are we prepared to constitute ourselves here into judges of their consciences? The gentleman from Chester has truly said that no man doubts their sincerity. That they are numerous we all know — that they are intelligent we all know. The gentleman from Luzerne and myself differ in opinion with this class of our citizens, and we are ready at any moment to be led into the tented field to defend our country. But, because we differ from them, are we to say that all the light is ours and that they are groping in darkness, ignorance, and folly? We differ from them and that is all that can be said. But let us not mistake our course; let us not exalt our standard above theirs; and because they do not agree with us, let us not say that they shall yield their convictions to us. What is it? It is not giving them a privilege to protect themselves against wrong; it is an absolute command upon them to do that which they believe to be wrong. And would not we lose our respect for that society, if after struggling so long for conscience sake through every difficulty and every trial, by any act of uncalled for oppression we compel them to forsake their accustomed ways and to turn from the paths of peace, or lay a destructive grasp on their domestic joys and social happiness. Then, sir, I hope that we shall not undertake to set ourselves up as the judges of their consciences.

But, it is said that this is asked of us by the Friends as a class. And, it is asked, shall we, in this land of equal privileges, set up one class with privileges which another class of our fellow men are not permitted to enjoy? And thus, Mr. Chairman, by attacking our prejudices and by appealing to our feelings and our selfishness, we are asked to compel this body of men to do that which they believe they are forbidden by their Creator to do. But, sir, this boon is not asked by the Society of Friends as a class; it is asked for every human being who believes that the Almighty has forbidden him to bear arms. It is, then, only recognizing in this Commonwealth of Pennsylvania the principle that every man shall be entitled, not only in a place of worship to adore God as he pleases, but in all the walks of life to carry out and openly to illustrate the creed which he professes openly at his altar. And, sir, is it for the people of this Commonwealth, at this late day, to deny this great principle? What was it impelled our ancestors to forsake their homes, to abandon their firesides and the comforts and luxuries of European life — to cross the broad ocean and to come to this continent, which was then a wild wilderness of savages, where the war-whoop resounded in their ears? It was religious liberty; it was for that great blessing that every danger was braved and every peril fearlessly set at naught. Then they believed it was their duty, and that the voice which commanded them onward came from no human tongue; nothing could arrest their career — no tempest could appall them — the tomahawk lost its fears — they believed that the voice of God commanded them on and they went boldly forward. Are these the principles which governed them? Look at the laws agreed upon in England before they left their homes. One of the great principles to which they there pledged themselves, was the following, viz.:

35: LAW. That all persons living in this province, who confess and acknowledge the one Almighty and Eternal God to be the Creator, upholder and ruler of the world, and that hold themselves obliged in conscience to live peaceably and justly in civil society, shall in no way be molested or prejudiced for their religious persuasion or practice in matters of faith and worship, nor shall they be compelled at any time to frequent or maintain any religious worship-place or ministry whatever.

Then, continued Mr. B. the great doctrine which brought them across the ocean and peopled this Commonwealth was the right of conscience, the right to live peaceably in a civil State without molestation on account of their religious principles. Are we, their descendants, ashamed of that great principle on which this Commonwealth was settled? Are we prepared to say that we will abandon the good old ways of our fathers; that they who came among the savages, teaching peace, not robbing them of their soil but purchasing it, and teaching them justice and liberality — shall we, I ask, who are their peculiar descendants, declare at this time of day by a Convention of Pennsylvania, (if it should be ratified by the people) that this principle shall now be obliterated from our fundamental code?

But John Fuller “said he was opposed to the amendment and also to the report of the standing committee” and he pointed out the weird contradiction in the proposed compromise:

He was at a loss to conceive how those gentlemen who were friendly to the views of the Society of Friends could reconcile to themselves what they asked in this amendment. What did they ask for? They asked to be exempted from the obligation of bearing arms or of paying an equivalent in time of peace. In time of exigency or war they asked for no exemption whatever. Now, if conscientious scruples existed at all with the Society of Friends, those scruples would most certainly be doubly urgent upon them to ask an exemption from all equivalent in time of war; inasmuch as the money accruing must be applied to repel force by force — and would furnish the means by which human life might be taken. In time of peace they ask for exemption when, as had been justly observed by the gentleman from Luzerne, the money would be applied merely in making preparations against any foreign invasion or insurrection. It was simply to prevent war; and although an attempt had been made by the gentleman from the city of Philadelphia, (Mr. Biddle) to show that this was not a tax, yet all fines and forfeitures went into the general funds to be used in payment of all necessary preparations for defense. Where then was the difference? Could there be any? Had the gentleman from the city of Philadelphia shown that there was any? But that which was most novel to him (Mr. F.) was that these persons having conscientious scruples against bearing arms, and standing in the position of a privileged class, did not ask for any exemption in time of war. If they had conscientious scruples against taking human life, why not ask for an exemption at that time when the money in the public treasury must, of necessity, be applied to such purposes. He presumed that would be inconsistent with what they had heretofore claimed and with what they claimed at this time. When this question had first come up — when the Society of Friends as well as another portion of the citizens of our Commonwealth claimed a change in the Constitution in respect to the militia trainings — in order to meet them on a ground of compromise, and to settle a certain great fundamental principle of our State, that a well regulated militia should be organized, he had offered an amendment which was voted down yesterday. He well knew that it would be voted down, but still he had felt it to be his duty to place it upon record. By that amendment the militia was to be enrolled and organized; but the disciplining of them was left to the discretion of the Legislature. That, however, was not satisfactory. Yesterday, the gentleman from the city had preferred the words of the old Constitution. So also did he, (Mr. F.). They were admirably adapted to the purpose; they conveyed the proper idea, and that in terms so brief, yet comprehensive, that it was not possible for any man to misapprehend them. What were they? “The freemen of this Commonwealth shall be armed and disciplined for its defense.” This was the whole matter, excepting that in a subsequent paragraph were added the words, “Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so, but shall pay an equivalent for personal service.” How much preferable, continued Mr. F. were these words of the old Constitution to the words which the report of the committee proposed to substitute.

He should, therefore, vote against the amendment of the gentleman from Chester, because if he (Mr. F.) understood its purport it was irreconcilable with that which the Friends themselves desired to have. If the Friends did wish an exemption from fines in time of peace, they wanted a further exemption — and that was an exemption from the payment of an equivalent in money to pay men for killing their fellow men. If they wanted one, they wanted the other also. In the first case, no conscientious scruples can exist; but in the second case, the money was to be applied to a use which came in direct conflict with their conscientious scruples; and thus we were asking, in their behalf, for that which could not effect their conscientious scruples, whilst we passed altogether over that which appealed directly to those scruples. The Friends, as it appeared to him, complained of a burden imposed upon them by the old Constitution of 1790; and all they asked was to be exempted from that particular burden. Was this all they wanted? If so, why not be satisfied when the objectionable clause was struck out? But gentlemen on his right and on his left rise up with a further claim of a very strange character, and what was it? It was a claim not founded on conscientious scruples at all — it was a mere matter of dollars and cents. Conscience could have no concern in it. What! to claim exemption in time of peace from bearing arms or paying an equivalent therefor — and to be willing only in time of exigency or war to pay that equivalent, which they knew would be applied for the express purpose of taking the lives of their fellow men! This they were willing to pay for. Was not this the inference, and the only inference which could be drawn from the premises?

James M. Porter tried to explain this bizarre proposal that would exempt Quakers from connection with the military except in times of war — by appealing to the United States Constitution. The Constitution reserves to the U.S. Congress the authority “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States” but reserves to the individual States “the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress” [emphasis mine]. This seemed to take some of the discretion about how to organize the militia out of the hands of the State legislatures, particularly during such times when the militia is “employed in the service of the United States.”

This, Porter argued, was the reason why the Quakers were only asking for an exemption during peacetime. When the militia was under the command of the U.S. commander in chief, and employed in the service of the United States, it was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Congress, and not the Pennsylvania Constitution.

[T]he Society of Friends asked for… an entire exemption, as a matter of right and not of privilege, on the ground of the right of conscience, which was perfect and inalienable. The society required, not a partial but an absolute release from bearing arms. The committee had now the subject before them, and they could not run counter to the requirement of the Constitution of the United States. No exemption could be granted except in times of peace, and the committee was not willing to go farther. Now, this was not all that the society asked by the amendment under consideration; but it was all that would be granted to them. The chief purpose he had in view when he rose was to state what was the view entertained by the Society of Friends. If they should not get all they asked for, yet an exemption, as far as granted, would be a considerable relief to them, as all could not be demanded as a matter of right. So far as individually concerned, he stated, after having had a conversation with some gentlemen, that he supposed their advocates here would be satisfied if the clause should be stricken out which operated oppressively.

Good old John Cummin had to chime in, barely attempting to conceal his contempt for the Quaker peace testimony:

[He] read an extract from the memorial of the Society of Friends, which, he contended, went to show that the Friends are not only bent upon relieving themselves from all military duty, but that they are determined to exert all their influence for the purpose of “inculcating” their doctrines upon others. They admonish all others not to perform military service nor to pay an equivalent for it. They are not content with refusing themselves, but they encourage others to refuse to pay taxes. I took a book from the library the other day, — Gordon’s History of Pennsylvania, — which throws much light upon this subject. When I went to obtain it again, I found that a gentleman had taken it out, and upon further inquiry that he had mislaid it. So I cannot bring the book before you, but I carry enough of it for my purpose in this old brain of mine. This doctrine of “inculcating” their aversion to the defense of the country upon others, they begun to practice at a very early, and in a very interesting, period of our history. We may go back to the old French war, and shall find that the opposition of the Friends to the military system was then very conspicuous. They then opposed the preparations for the war, and endeavored to embarrass the province in its means of defense. The Friends, as they called themselves, — and they had done well to take that name, — and they may be friends to each other, — 

Meow!

 — proved themselves at that time enemies to the government to which they owed all their safety and protection. When the colony was at war with the French and their savage allies, they “inculcated” upon those around them, and under their influence, the duty of withdrawing themselves from the public service. It was argued by the gentleman from Philadelphia, (Mr. Chandler) that they once had the government of the State, and that others came and rooted them out. This is true, and even for themselves it is well that it was so. During the French war of which I speak, the Assembly of the colony, according to Gordon, consisted of thirty members, twenty-seven of whom were Friends as they called themselves but enemies as I denominate them. They voted against the bill for calling out the militia, and against the bill for raising supplies to carry on the war and to defend the colony, — to defend themselves and their own families and property. Twenty-seven of this family of Friends voted against these bills in a time of public calamity and danger, — in a time that tried men’s souls. They were obliged, in consequence, to resign their seats, many of them, and the Governor called another set of men, who passed a militia law and provided the means of equipping and supporting a militia force. Well, at this time, the Menonists had become a numerous sect. They would not fight, for they left enough of that behind them in the country from which they came. They had conscientious scruples against fighting as well as the Friends; and, for some time, they hesitated also about paying an equivalent. They, however, consulted with the Friends, and finally came to the conclusion that if they did not fight they ought to pay; and that, sir, was not a bad notion of the men with the long beard. But, upon their consultation with the Friends, what did the Friends say? They said — “If you establish a militia force, you will, in a short time, be reduced to the same condition of slavery under which you lived in the old world; and if you pay for those who fight it will produce the same result. It will lead you into bondage.” But what said the Mennonist leader? “If we do not fight, we think we should pay, because we must support the government under which we live and by which we are protected.”

The advocates for this exemption tell us that Christ, by his example, discouraged war. But what said Christ to Peter? The tax gatherer came to Peter and said, Peter, does your master pay tribute to Cæsar? And Peter, in a great flurry, answered “Yes.” And when the Savior himself was applied to, was not his reply — “Render tribute to whom tribute is due.” I should like to know what the memorialists make of this? Will they say that Christ rebelled against, or refused to support the government under which he lived? Does not this government depend upon the payment of taxes? And is not the payment of taxes the very sinew of war [emphasis mine — ♇], as the gentleman from Luzerne (Mr. Woodward) so ably argued yesterday? If one refuse to pay, all may refuse, and the country and government be left without any support. Never was there a claim made in the whole world so unreasonable as this — to be exempted from a fair proportion of the public taxes. No learning can dispute this, and any argument against the payment of taxes I can meet with the aid of this book which was dictated by divine wisdom.

I am surprised, sir, that gentlemen of so much learning and ability, should fall into so great an error in relation to the character of Penn’s grant. It was, as I have shown, a grant of religious freedom, and not of freedom or immunity from the support of the government. Why should we create an odious distinction in society?

Ebenezer W. Sturdevant agreed. He said he “could not vote for the amendment of the gentleman from Chester, because it conferred an exclusive privilege upon a particular class of our fellow citizens, and one which we would not dare to extend alike to every citizen of the State”:

He would not recognize their claim to exemption as a right; and though he would go as far as any to protect all men in the right of worshipping God after the dictates of their conscience, yet he would go no further.

He would not say to his neighbor who was of a different opinion with him and who held to a different faith, that he should be excused not only from being armed in defence of his country, but likewise from paying an equivalent to defend that country. He could not say to any class of men that they should receive protection from a government, while they were relieved from paying an equivalent for that protection. He looked upon this equivalent required to be paid under the existing Constitution as a tax, and to ask to excuse any class of persons from the payment of this equivalent, was absolutely and in fact asking that a portion of our citizens should be exempt from the payment of a tax which goes like all other taxes, directly into the treasury of the State. You will find by the act of the 11^th of April, 1825, that all funds, collected as militia fines are directed to be placed directly in the treasury. The third section of that act provides “that the brigade inspectors, and persons appointed in the place of brigade inspectors, as aforesaid, shall keep an accurate account of all moneys received by them for the fines aforesaid, and shall annually in the month of January, in every year, settle with the Auditor General, who is hereby required to adjust their accounts, and shall pay into the State treasury any surplus arising from said fines.”

These fines therefore are a species of taxes which go directly into the State treasury, and are precisely on the same footing of other taxes. Now how can the society of Quakers ask us, on account of their conscientious scruples, to protect them from the payment of these taxes in time of peace, when they are not only willing to pay them in times of exigency and war, but to go into the battle field, as some gentleman has asserted?

They are willing to make their payments in time of war, and fight the battles of their country when it may become necessary, yet they ask us in time of peace to exempt them on account of conscientious scruples, from paying a tax which goes directly into the treasury of the Commonwealth. It appeared to him that gentlemen were asking a very great deal when they asked of us to exempt a class of our citizens, who received equal protection from the government with all our other citizens, from contributing their portion of the taxes necessary to be contributed in order that we might in time of peace be the better prepared for the hour of trial and difficulty and danger.… There are but few who would not take advantage of this provision in time of peace, and as “conscience makes cowards of us all,” many might avail themselves of it in times of danger.… A large majority of your citizens may be conscientious both in bearing arms and contributing money, so that the hands of the Legislature would be tied, and the storm of war would be upon you before the sinews of war were prepared to withstand it. If it is a fact, as has been asserted by some gentlemen in this debate, that the Quakers would be the first to shoulder their musket in defense of their country in time of invasion, why was it that in time of peace they were desirous of sheltering themselves behind conscientious scruples, from paying that small remuneration which was required of them by the government, to enable it to prepare for those emergencies.… Again, can it be expected that men will go and learn military tactics, losing some three or four days in the year, at an expense of perhaps fifty dollars, to support a system which their more wealthy favored and conscientious neighbor is entirely free from? If this was not to be expected, and certainly it was not, he thought we ought to be exceedingly cautious in altering the old Constitution in this particular.

This was taking things to unbelievable extremes. “[T]he Quakers would be the first to shoulder their musket in defense of their country in time of invasion?” Really. And there’s that “conscience makes cowards of us all” quote again.

Thomas Bell then modified his proposed amendment slightly:

Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so, nor, except in times of exigency or war, to pay an equivalent therefor.

If you compare this to his proposed amendment from the previous day, you’ll see that the wording is changed somewhat to emphasize that the “except in times of exigency or war” is meant only to apply to the “pay an equivalent” part and not to both that and the “be compelled to [bear arms]” part.

Walter Forward “would beg the indulgence of the committee, for a few minutes, while he laid before them some of the views which he entertained on this subject” on the subject of social contract theory and the theoretical basis of democraticish governments:

Sir, when men come into society and are parties to a compact or government, it is obvious that they must surrender some of their natural rights, otherwise government could not be organized, and if organized, could not be held together. What are the natural rights of men which must be surrendered, and what may be reserved consistently with the stability and safety of the government — what is the right of conscience? Is it a right which must be surrendered up to the government on entering into compact with it? No sir — it is a natural right which is reserved to the citizen, one which he never surrenders to government, one which he holds to in all forms of government and never gives up. Is liberty of conscience a natural right? Who denies it? Then is it open now for discussion? Liberty of conscience was not denied by anybody to be a natural right; this was conceded on all hands. Then why do gentlemen not trace to the sources of this right and see what it is? Why it is the right of worshipping God as every man may see fit, and this right is not to be infringed in this country. We call it a natural right because men acknowledging the Supreme Being as their ruler and guide hold themselves accountable to him in certain respects, and when they do this they feel that they owe a duty to that Being which cannot be dispensed with. This is the right of conscience. Is this then not to be tolerated? When men feel that there are obligations and duties which they owe to their Creator which are paramount to all others, is it to be said that this shall not be sanctioned by government? Is there a doubt on this subject, as to what all should do? When men believe in the Supreme Being, are accountable to Him, believe Him to be the moral Governor of the Universe, or take his revelation to be the guide of their conduct and believe it a part of their duty to obey his behests as they understood them; will any man say that this is not the right of conscience? Does any man doubt it? Is not this the same as the right of worshipping God according to the dictates of conscience? The whole matter rests upon the fact of a man’s acknowledging the Supreme Ruler of the Universe as his guide, and refusing to do any thing which he believed was not approved by that being.

The right of conscience in relation to bearing arms is a sacred right. It is equally sacred with that of the right of self-defense. They were both equally high and sacred rights, and when he heard gentlemen stand up here and call this liberty of conscience a privilege, he was astonished. If he understood some of the gentlemen who had spoken on this subject, they called it a privilege and hesitated whether it deserved the name of a right. While speaking of those rights which we are required to yield to a certain extent to the government for its perpetuity and safety, he should like gentlemen to show him the necessity for yielding this right; could gentlemen show wherein it was essential to the existence and perpetuity of the government to yield this right? When he was called upon to yield any of his rights he wished gentlemen to show him some reason why he should yield them. Show him that it was necessary, show him that the government could not exist without it, and he yielded the right. He had a natural right to self-defense, but he yielded that right in certain cases, and why? Because the government could not exist without it. The sheriff came to him with a capias, and laid his hand upon his shoulder, and perhaps might take him to prison, and unjustly too, and he had to yield to this, because civil society and the government could not be held together if every man had the right to rebel and not obey the officers of the law. There must be a common arbiter in society, and every man must yield to that arbiter. He may have been perfectly innocent of the charge brought against him, he may have committed no crime, he may have owed no money, and the man who brought the suit may have been the villain; yet, notwithstanding his innocence, he might be arrested and taken to prison, and he was obliged to submit to this, because the government and society demanded it at his hands. He must yield his natural right of self-defense, otherwise he would have knocked down the officer or repelled him from his house by force. This was the ground on which this matter stood. He found a class of men in the community who believed in God, and believed that they owed a duty to God paramount to all other duties. They believe it is their duty not to bear arms, and they owe it as a duty to the God that made them not to do so; and that if they do this they will be accountable at the judgment seat of heaven; it is blended with their hopes and their fears, with those hopes of enjoyment which lie anchored beyond the stars. This has been the belief of these people from the foundation of the government to the present time, and all their acts show it; then why should we be asked if this right was to be allowed them, which is here asked for? Are we to step in between these principles and the throne of God and rest his claim upon them? He for one would not do it, unless some imperious and high necessity could be shown to exist which required that this natural right should be given up. He hoped now that those gentlemen who were scrupulous about their indulgences to the Society of Friends, and had addressed the Convention on the subject, would meet on this principle. Let them come up to the mark and deny that this was a natural right. If they did so, he called for the proof; they must prove that it was not a natural right, and if they failed in that, they yielded all. If they failed, all was yielded and the right must be sustained because it was sacred; and he would ask any Christian community on earth where toleration was practiced; he would ask any individual in the country; he would ask the atheist who had no God, if any such there are, whether it was not our duty to grant this claim to all who sincerely asked it. It is as plain as day that there is a principle in this thing — it has been acknowledged in the Constitution itself, and in the Constitution of 1776. This principle was then acknowledged when our soil was stained with hostile blood; when the country was agitated by fear and all were ready to acknowledge that there was a Supreme Being to be looked up to. The principle was acknowledged in the Constitution of 1776 as follows: “No part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives, nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms be justly compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent.” Sir, the right is secured here and they are left merely to pay the equivalent. In Tennessee it is regarded only in time of war, and in Maine the Constitution provides that the Legislature may exempt these classes. But he recurred to the principle and he desired that it should be yielded, except in case of imperious necessity. If that ground was established and proven, he yielded the matter. This matter had been argued in regard to certain facts which had been brought to the notice of the committee. Then taking it on this ground, what were the facts of the case, what necessity was there to call upon these men to surrender up their natural rights? The militia trainings. There is the necessity, and the only necessity for it. Let this matter be expatiated upon; let it be examined and see whether they are of such great importance as to demand the surrender of a right like this to them. Are the militia trainings in time of peace of that importance as to require the surrender of a part of a man’s natural rights? Why, the matter was yielded — it was given up. It was given up by the gentleman from Fayette that they were not of such importance. The whole of the gentleman’s argument went to yield the point.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

Later that same day, Walter Forward “resumed his remarks”:

But the gentleman from Luzerne said here was a tax. Would gentlemen compel the payment of a tax? Would any set of men interpose between the collector and the Constitution to the wants of the country? No. If it was a tax, he would yield it. But what was the nature of the tax? A tax on a tender conscience. We are to tax men’s consciences, for giving way to feelings not to be resisted. He would yield the argument there, but it was a tax on conscience. We lay a penalty on a man because he is in default and is censurable or criminal. We make him pay — for what? For enjoying his own conscience; and what was the difference between this and adoring the Creator according to the dictates of conscience? In both cases it was a scruple — a duty. We come to make it penal in this land of liberty, if it was not profane to use the name of liberty in such case, to enjoy the rights of conscience. There was no man who could stand before his fellow man, or before his Creator, with this argument. We may call it exaction, penalty for scruples, or what we will, here is the fact.

He agreed with the learned judge from Philadelphia, (Mr. Hopkinson,) that there might be a period when if government could not enforce a tribute for emergencies, it could not exist. We might impel citizens into the ranks, under the influence of a grand and public necessity. The citizen must then yield his rights. So it was as to those who held religious scruples. They must yield to the majority for the purpose of maintaining the government. But they were not bound to yield further than the existence of this necessity. The language of the amendment was this: “Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms shall not be compelled to do so, nor, except in times of exigency or war, to pay an equivalent therefor.” “Exigency in war!” What was the meaning of the words? Who were to judge of the exigency? Were the Legislature to judge? Were we to submit it to Legislative decision to say when an exigency would exist? What was an exigency? It was contra-distinguished from war? It was the threat of war. The exigency arose with the threat. The militia were then to be prepared, enrolled, drawn out, because the country required their services. They were required to be ready in arms. This was the exigency intended, and not the calm, halcyon days of peace. He agreed with those who insisted that we ought to be prepared in times of exigency to be equipped and mustered for war. In this he entirely agreed. And in a case of war, or exigency, which would induce these preparations, there ought to be an equivalent paid because a natural right must be surrendered. But in peace, in a state of profound peace, where was the necessity, where the expedience, which would justify such a call?

He had heard sentiments which ought to be repudiated everywhere: that the rights of conscience were not natural rights, that any exemption on account of scruples was the creation of improper distinctions, and that there should be personal service without equivalent. He was not to be caught by such arguments. No nation had ever suffered by adopting the policy of toleration. What country ever did? He had heard it said that there could be no mode of testing consciences, and that any man might claim exemption with equal justice. This would be obviated by adopting the system of voluntary service. There could exist no difficulty in drawing the line. Let the gentleman from Franklin look back to the history of Pennsylvania, and he would find that there had never been any difficulty in determining who were those entitled to exemption on account of their conscientious scruples. It had been construed to extend to Quakers, Menonists and others, whose tenets were well known, and who could not be suspected of pretending to possess tender consciences merely for the purpose of evading a further duty. He who would set up such pretext from such a motive might well be dispensed with in the service, for he would prove a traitor there. No such charge could attach to that large class of citizens, void of self reproach, who had adopted the peaceful creed as the guide of their actions.

But it had been said that a man would start up and claim this privilege when his neighbors all around him can say that he did not believe in those scruples; that he would come to claim the privilege, not upon religious grounds, because he was not a religious man, but just because he chose to claim it, and that, too, in the presence of men who would brand him as a base hypocrite. Would any man dare to meet the infamy which might fall upon him for such a course of conduct as this? There was no argument could be built on this ground. In point of fact, the discrimination was easy and certain. There were not ten men who would incur the infamy, under pretenses which were known to be false. A man of no religion claim an exemption on the score of a tender conscience! No: he would not dare to invoke the scowl of society and the hootings of his neighbors.

He (Mr. F.) would now come back to the point from which he had started; namely, that those who were in favor of abridging the rights of conscience could only do so on the ground of public necessity. He affirmed that the existence of this public necessity had not been shown, and that therefore, this class of our citizens might rightfully claim this exemption. Every exigency which could justify a claim on them had been provided for in the amendment. The class by whom this exemption was asked was renowned for its love of order — for its obedience to the laws — for its charity. Was this aristocratic? Was this odious? Was this criminal? Look at the history of the world, and who could deny that to this little community, mankind were more indebted for liberal principles than any nation in the world. How long was it since toleration had been known on the earth? Probably, we might go back to the age of William Penn, but not much further. Where did it arise? Among religious men. It was a religious principle which had been engrafted on free government after the example of William Penn and others. But let us go back for two centuries and what should we find? We found men taxing other men’s consciences upon the very ground taken here; that was to say, should a man set up his conscience against a tax gatherer?

In other countries, a tax was paid for keeping up a national church; taxes were annually collected for that purpose. In such countries, a man might say he had conscientious scruples, and he would be asked, shall a man set up his conscience against the tax gatherer? For, after all, it was but a tax for the maintenance of an established church. That was the argument, and the same argument might be found in this Hall.

Again, we found gentlemen here doubting the sincerity of these persons. We had the charter, and we had the conditions of the charter. We still found gentlemen doubting whether these scruples were sincere or not. This was the argument of the 15^th century, when men went to the stake to be burnt, and all sects, except the Quakers, were persecuted. They went to the stake and they met death unflinchingly; it was said their opinions were so absurd that they ought to suffer for entertaining such scruples. And this was just the argument which had been urged here — that they were setting up their consciences against the defense of their country. How absurd! It was the old chapter of tyranny and intolerance. What right had he, or any other man, to substitute his own opinions for the consciences of other men, and to bring charges of fraud and deceit against them, simply because their opinions differed from his own?

In conclusion, he was of opinion that the Convention could not misunderstand the nature of this request. The principle was clear to his mind that public necessity alone could justify the Convention in calling upon this class of men. Let it be shown that such a necessity existed, and he (Mr. F.) would go cheerfully as far as that necessity required. If it could be shown that these trainings were actually necessary for the defense of the country, or as a preparation against emergency or war; if, he repeated, this necessity could be made clear to his mind, he would go with the gentlemen who opposed the wishes of these individuals. But, said Mr. F., till you show that necessity, the argument is mine, and the conclusion is mine.

Ephraim Banks had his own ideas of the legal ramifications of conscientious belief. He…

…knew what the argument was which had been used, and very forcibly used, by the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. Forward) that conscience might interpose its authority and save one man from doing that which all others were bound to do under the laws of the Commonwealth. That gentleman contended that you taxed a man’s conscience when you charge him with the payment of public dues or of taxes to support your government. Tax his conscience! No — you tax his property, and if his conscience interferes and says that it is wrong, would you call that taxing his conscience? All of us, under this plea, when taxed for the support of the government in any of its branches, might say it was improper because we thought the legislation wrong and our consciences disapproved it. Would it be right for us to say we would not pay because legislators were mistaken in their views, in putting upon the people charges which were not called for or expedient? And were not our rights the same in regard to toleration?

Did any man ever hear of the species of toleration which has been urged upon the attention of the committee in the course of this argument? Exempt a man from bearing arms if he chooses to pay an equivalent for personal service, and do you not thus tolerate him to choose that which he prefers? You put no compulsion on such a man. If you leave the legislature free to say that all men should bear arms when the exigencies of their country required, he (Mr. B.) contended that no imposition was thus placed upon the consciences of men. No such thing. Every man chose that which he preferred; namely, whether he would carry arms, the country requiring his services, or whether he would pay an equivalent for personal service, and for that protection which others gave him by marching to the tented field and by baring their bosoms to the bayonets of the enemy.

Government had in view the good of the whole people; and all Legislatures, and all enactments by Legislatures, had certain avowed objects in view: of giving protection to all and prescribing rules of action for all with an equal and impartial hand. The desire of all was that they should have protection, and it was right that every man should contribute from his means, as his neighbors did, to the maintenance of that protection. Would we not, by the very act of exempting one portion of our citizens from this necessary burden, place them above their neighbors and fellow citizens in relation to the matter of military service? He knew that this class of citizens believed it to be wrong to take up arms to defend their country, their persons, or property, or their neighbor’s property; but what of that; while I, in my person, protect them and their property, they are bound in justice to support me. What was remarked yesterday by the gentleman from the city of Philadelphia, (Mr. Hopkinson) that he did not choose to stand at his neighbor’s door with a musket to defend him, whilst he was packing up his plate, must have left an impression on the minds of those who heard, not to be effaced. This was a forcible allusion to the condition in which the country had been placed, and might be placed again. That being the case, was it not right that these individuals should contribute their portion to the support of the government? The portion of Proud’s History which had been read yesterday by the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) was sufficient certainly to satisfy us that this doctrine was right. If they did not contribute to the support of their government, they were not acting like good citizens. If they allowed the Legislature to pass acts of assembly authorizing these militia trainings, and did not choose either to give their personal services or to pay an equivalent, were they acting in good faith to the Commonwealth? Certainly not. And if they would not so contribute was it not proper to coerce payment — to take their property if they possessed any? Might he not go further and say, that the collectors of militia dues should lay their hands on their persons, and to dispose of them, or to compel payment of these just demands? He would not go so far as to say they should be tied to dead bodies for punishment, as was sometimes done in ancient Rome; nor did he think that they should be sold, as debtors were according to the provisions of the civil law. But he did think that they should be compelled to pay in the same way as the law compels the payment of all other dues. Surely, if one portion of our fellow citizens ought to be compelled to pay, every other portion should.

…In his humble opinion, it was the bounden duty of every man to do all in his power to aid and support the government under which he lives, and to further the welfare of his fellow men. Every man who refused to do this ought not to be entitled to, and certainly was not worthy of, the protection of the government.…

The delegate from Allegheny had spoken of conscience as being a natural right. Now, he (Mr. Banks) did not understand it to be a natural right, but his belief was that conscience was a moral sense. If he was not mistaken, it was the celebrated Locke who said “Conscience is to the judgment what the understanding is to the will.” Somewhere else, too, he had read “what conscience dictates to be done or teaches not to do.” But in all governments — whether in the government of the United States, or any other well regulated government, as in that of Pennsylvania, inconveniences must be endured by the few for the benefit of the whole.

Nothing at all was sought to be imposed upon any portion of the Commonwealth which would not operate on all alike. Then why should we be asked to exclude the Quakers from the operation of a general law? Now, the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. Forward) and others, knew just as well as he did, that it would be wrong and unfair to grant any privilege to one body of men over another. He would ask the delegate from Allegheny whether he could, consistently with his sense of duty to the country, do any thing which should not induce every citizen, in the time of danger, to come forward and repel the foreign invader? No man, he believed, that had ever thought for one moment on the subject, could believe it. He might agree to it, in a time of peace, on account of the tender consciences of those who refuse to bear arms. He might agree to it, because the exigencies of the country are not such as to require that he should repair to the tented field. But money was no equivalent, in a time of war, to a man for risking his life. Would all the money that the Society of Friends could collect be any equivalent to me, (said Mr. B.) if I should lose my life in saving their property and persons? Would it be an equivalent to my wife and children if I should be so cut off from them? No such thing. And such would be the opinion of every properly constituted and correct mind.… No man who desired the perpetuation of the free institutions under which he had lived and been instructed, and which he ought to cherish as his life, would object to sacrifice some of his means and his comfort in order that military trainings might be kept up, so that in the hour of danger we should be the better prepared to defend our homes, our firesides, and our liberties.

Emanuel C. Reigart “resumed”:

The gentleman from Allegheny had referred to the Constitution of ’76 as giving greater privileges to those who scruple to bear arms than the present Constitution. The sixth section of the first chapter of the Declaration of the Rights to which he refers, provides that “every member of society has a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property; and therefore is bound to contribute to the expense of that protection and yield his personal service, when necessary, or an equivalent thereto.” This did not mean, in his opinion, an equivalent in money, but in personal service; so, in the next clause, it is declared that “no man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms can be justly compelled thereto if he will pay such equivalent:” — that is, if he will furnish a substitute, who will render the personal service required of him, and who would fight the battles of the country in the manner in which a free citizen is expected to do. The new Constitution was more indulgent to the scruples of citizens than the old one, and it went so far as expressly to exonerate them from personal service in the militia on the payment of an equivalent in money. The same people now come to us and demand that they shall go scot free. We admitted liberty of conscience to be a natural right. The right claimed by the friends was that, being conscientiously scrupulous of shedding blood, they should be free from the burden of militia duty on paying an equivalent for it in time of peace. That was the extent of the right claimed. But if there was any principle of consistency in the claim, would it not extend also to time of war? The right of conscience, in this case, was limited to a conscientious scruple to shed blood in time of peace, but not upon an aversion to war. This inconsistency upset the whole of the argument which the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. Forward) in his able and ingenious speech, founded upon the freedom of conscience as a natural right. It was admitted that, in the emergencies of war, the right claimed for the scrupulous must yield to the necessity of the case, and in this view of the matter the whole question ended.

It was related in one of the histories of this Commonwealth that in 1721 James Amon, the founder of the sect called the Amonists, petitioned the proprietary government to be relieved from the payment of all taxes. He represented that he had no occasion for the aid of the courts nor of the civil power; that he had no suits, and no quarrels with anybody, and needed no protection. But the proprietary government said no. You are under the same protection of the government that every other citizen is and you must contribute your share of the tax levied for the support of the government. So here, in answer to the demand made upon us by the Friends, we say you must pay an equivalent. They reply, we will meet you half way. We will pay the equivalent in time of war if you will relieve us from it in time of peace.

The gentleman from Philadelphia asked what brought our ancestors here? It was a desire to enjoy freedom of conscience. They fled from the intolerance and bigotry of the old world, where they were persecuted like felons for the crime of worshipping God after their own consciences; there they were not permitted to enjoy any religious freedom. The two cases were not parallel. There they would gladly have paid an equivalent for the sake of enjoying their own mode of worship and their own religious opinions. They came to the wilds of America to get clear of religious restraint, and here they and their descendants, to this hour, are free to worship in their own way without any restraint. The only question was whether one portion of them should be exempted from the military taxation, while the other was not. It was the exclusive privileges of the old countries which was the cause of all their persecution and suffering, and the object of all their complaints and aversion. Carrying out the principles of the gentlemen from Allegheny they fall to the ground. The argument is over and the contention is over.

Let us see what other states have done on this subject. In Massachusetts, the Friends and others who were exempted from personal service in the militia pay an equivalent, and so every New England State except Maine. The Constitution of Tennessee has a remarkable expression in relation to this subject: “non-resistance,” it says, “is absurd.” That is the argument of the Constitution of Tennessee, and it is one that cannot be got over.…

James Merrill then tried to address the many criticisms of conscientious objection and of the reasonableness of legislators trying to respect it:

That freedom of conscience is the very foundation of our institutions, no one would doubt. It would be perceived by reference to almost every fundamental law, and to the proceedings of almost every public body. A strict observance of the rights of conscience was insisted upon by all the founders of our institutions. The very clause of the present Constitution which was now under debate recognized this principle. The third section of the ninth article of the same instrument was still more explicit. It declared that “no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.” That was the declaration of 1790, which was then authorized by the people of Pennsylvania, and had since been acted on for forty-seven years — that “no human authority can control the rights of conscience.” Is that true or is it not? Is this principle held and believed in Pennsylvania? I cannot doubt it.

One question arises, how far is the principle to be acquiesced in? — and another is, how far are those who profess conscientious scruples sincere in their professions? Though there had been no positive declarations that the Friends are insincere in their professions, yet there had been indications of distrust in their sincerity. On this point the question must rest. Do you believe that those who profess conscientious scruples are sincere? Who makes those scruples? What is their character and tenor of life? Are they men who would report one thing while they believed another? If they were sincere, then “no human power can interfere” with them. Then had these scruples been assumed to mean some bad and wicked purpose, or are those who profess them men of such character and deportment as to afford a guaranty of their sincerity? That there are men among them who may act from the paltry motive of advantage is probable; but does such a motive operate upon the whole sect? They are sober, quiet, industrious, and benevolent, and their mode of worship and belief holds out no allurements of any sort. Theirs is not a popular belief in this State. It never was, nor could it ever be, the popular and predominant mode of belief anywhere. Do you believe that those people have separated themselves from the popular belief for an interested motive? Would they make more money by it than by any other faith? No. Their belief was unpopular, and it was held against the sentiments of a vast majority of the people of the State. That was the strongest possible proof that we could have of their sincerity. Who professed their religion in early times for the sake of interest? Those who first began to profess it were persecuted to imprisonment and death. Are we to be told that they were not sincere? What better evidence can man give of his sincerity, than his willingness to stake his life and his reputation upon his professions? What evidence can we have of the sincerity of any political man, that is stronger than we have in this case? These scruples then being in sincerity entertained, our fundamental laws declare that “no human power can control” them. Are we now going to subvert this principle, and to say that the rights of conscience shall be protected only so far as suits our convenience? Shall we say that no one has a right to claim protection in matters of conscience; that his protection shall depend upon the discretion of the Legislature; that the rights of the minority shall be left to the decision of a fluctuating majority; and that every thing which the minority does shall be wrong, and every thing done by the majority shall be right? Can we not go a step further and invade personal rights and rights of property, with as much reason as we do those of conscience? If one be doomed to destruction, how long will it be before the other is offered up a sacrifice?

I believe, said Mr. Merrill, that the right of conscience is as sacred a right and as perfect a right as any other; while at the same time it is less capable of being protected, and more liable to abuse than any other. It is a perfect right and is to be enjoyed as we enjoy all other rights. In time of peace there should be full and free toleration of these scruples; in war, those who profess them and those who do not must share alike the common hazard. In this way, all will be put on a common footing. Every thing will be tolerated in peace; but in war, all must partake of the common burden and hazard. Is it not fair and proper that we should put this matter to the Friends in this way? They can ask no more; we can offer no less. I have no doubt, sir, said Mr. M. that the conscientious scruples of the Friends are as great in time of war as in peace; perhaps much greater; but we say to them that in that emergency you must partake with us in the common danger.

The gentleman from Susquehanna says that granting them this is putting them on a different footing from our other citizens. This he denied. He had no idea of placing them on a different footing, and did not ask it, and he would not grant it. He would tell them that in time of peace, their conscientious scruples should be regarded; but in time of war, he would tell them that they had a stake in the community, and that they must help to maintain it, or lose it: he would tell them that they received equal protection with all other citizens, and they must return equal services to the country; therefore, this was only securing equal and exact justice to all our fellow citizens. Then, if the scruples of these people are honest and sincere, which none can doubt, we will regard them when the exigencies of the country does not require their services. Could we do less than this? He thought every consideration demanded this of us. They at one time were the inheritors of this land, and they practised toleration to all mankind; we are now in the majority and we ought to practise toleration to them — they had a right to expect this. When they were in the majority in this State, they might have excluded the Presbyterians and Lutherans and other religious sects, but they did not do this. We came here by their indulgence in the first place, perhaps by their invitation, he did not know, but we enjoyed their indulgence and their protection, and now when we are in the ascendancy, we should practice the same kind of toleration to them.

He was sorry to hear the truth and sincerity of the professions of these people doubted. The first doubt in relation to their conscientious scruples was raised by the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward.) He could not understand the conscientious scruples of the Society of Friends — they were totally incomprehensible to him. Why, other men may not understand his conscientious scruples; and does he expect all other men to give way to him. Certainly not. He does not allow his word to be doubted in relation to any matter — why then does he doubt the word of others when they tell him they have conscientious scruples. But he does not understand their conscientious scruples, therefore, he would allow them no liberty at all. Why, where would this thing lead us to if carried out. The king of Babylon could not understand Daniel’s conscientious scruples; He could not see the necessity of any man’s praying three times a day — and therefore he threw Daniel into the lion’s den. Charles the Fifth could not understand the conscientious scruples of Martin Luther. Henry the Eighth could not understand anybody’s conscientious scruples who did not profess the same faith with himself, let that be what it might; and the government of England at one time could not understand any man’s conscientious scruples who would not contribute to their church; and how many ministers were sacrificed, and how much ruin was brought upon that country, because many individuals would not conform to this doctrine. He might not be able to make the Quakers understand why he preferred the Presbyterian church or the Lutheran church to theirs. You, Mr. Chairman, might not be able to make the Episcopalians understand why you preferred the Presbyterian church, but that did not say that his doctrine was any the less correct, because they could not understand it. His duty was a matter with his own conscience, and he was not to be controlled or driven from his belief because others could not understand it. Again, gentlemen might recollect that in Scotland, Knox and a large portion of the reformers of that day wished to appropriate certain lands to the education of the children of the kingdom — but those in the possession of them could not understand any such doctrines, so they divided them among themselves. The laws of England required every man to pay tithe for the support of the established church, and the rulers of that country could not understand the consciences of any person who was not willing to do this. They must pay tithes to a church which they never enter. Suppose such a law was to be passed in this country, would not gentlemen have conscientious scruples about paying it? Would not they ask to be relieved from this burden? There would be no difficulty then in understanding where gentlemen’s consciences were. All he asked then of gentlemen now, was to do what they would expect to receive under similar circumstances.

Let us go one step further. If conscience is a thing that is to be judged of by other men, those who are least informed and take least pains to examine into matters of conscience are to be the judges: and those who take great pains to come to right conclusions, are to be the victims. All any man has to say is that he don’t understand another man’s conscience, and on this principle you can justify every persecution which has ever been practised in the world. Are we to follow the example of the dark ages of Europe, or are we to be governed by the light of modern reform? Are we to go back to those ages when no man could understand the conscience of those who did not believe with him, or are we to practice upon the blessed doctrine of toleration to all? It is right and proper that every man should be left to judge for himself in relation to conscience; and if gentlemen who could not understand the consciences of others would examine their own breasts, they would see that this should be the case. It was to be observed that they who had but little sympathy for other men’s consciences, had generally a very great determination to stand by their own and not yield it up to any person or on any occasions. The Presbyterians, when the attempt was made to force Episcopacy upon them, were most strenuous in resisting it. Their consciences would not permit of their receiving the doctrine; they could not come to the same conclusion, and they rejected the doctrine. This matter then, of judging of the consciences of men, is a dangerous matter, for it will always happen that the less informed, the more ignorant, and those who have never taken any pains to inquire into the scruples of conscience, will be the judges.

It has been objected to this amendment, that it will raise up privileged classes and create inequalities in society, and that we must not make exemptions from a general law. Why, there are more exemptions now from this militia law than any other general law in the State; all who are over forty-five years are exempted; all who have served seven years in a volunteer corps are exempted; and men are exempted by name or title. Judges of courts, ministers of the Gospel, justices of the peace, postmasters, and others are exempted. Then this argument that there must be no exemption from general law went for nothing.

He wished now to say a word with regard to the cry “exemption from taxes” which are levied for the support of the government. Now it was easy to call every thing by a name, but he wanted to have every thing called by its right name. Moneys demanded and collected from men for a failure to perform certain duties was not a tax, it could not be looked upon as a tax. It was declared in the law to be a fine, and to turn round and say it was a tax, and say that the Friends ought not to be excused from paying this fine because it was a tax, was a perversion of terms. It was wholly absurd to call these fines a tax. It is true that both take money from the purse, and in this light alone could it be viewed as a tax. But were they both for the same object? No sir; one is in aid of the government, and the other is a penalty for a delinquency in the performance of certain duties. It was nothing more nor less than what it professed to be, a fine.

Now he would ask whether by any implication in the world there was any ground to suppose that when conscience would not allow a man to do one thing, it would allow him to do another in precisely the same form. He could see no reason for any such supposition. He himself had none of these conscientious scruples, nor did he know that he had a half dozen of constituents who had; or who desired this change to be made; but he desired to grant the Friends this right. He had no doubt that they had conscientious scruples; it was not to be doubted by any one — no man could doubt it. Do you suppose if they had no conscientious scruples about paying an equivalent for personal service, that they would allow their property to be levied upon to pay this fine? Would they allow their most necessary furniture to be taken and sold? Would they allow such men as the collector of fines referred to by the gentleman from the city, (Mr. Cope) to enter their houses and take away their property when they had the money in their pockets to pay the fine? Would they subject themselves to the scoffs of ruffians if they were not conscientiously scrupulous against paying this equivalent? It was not to be doubted then for a moment that they were sincere in their pretensions. All their acts prove it, and we have not the least room to doubt it.

He then asked gentlemen to consider this matter solemnly and seriously, and endeavor to remove all prejudices from their minds, before they give their votes. He would ask the gentlemen to examine themselves and see if they were not acting on this matter from some selfish consideration; whether it was not possible that some political feeling, some old grudge, something which may have existed in their minds for years, might improperly influence them in this matter. He would ask gentlemen to view this question in all its bearings, and examine well the danger of disregarding the right of conscience. If we do not hold the right of conscience sacred, we have nothing to recommend our institutions to the oppressed of other nations. On it rests our only hope, and if it is given up, there is nothing in our institutions worth preserving. It is a sacred right and must be held sacred by the freemen of America, if we would recommend republican institutions to the rest of the world.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

The next day, Samuel A. Purviance “would say a word further in relation to this question of conscience, and then he had done”:

Gentlemen had treated this subject as an application on the part of the Society of Friends to be exempted from the payment of a tax. Now he trusted that the committee would not be misled on this idea of its being a tax. What do they ask? Do they ask to be relieved from the payment of a tax for the support of the government? By no means. They merely ask to be relieved from the payment of a fine. What is a fine? What is the legal acceptation of the word? — because it has a legal meaning. What does it imply? It implies a degree of neglect on the part of the person who pays the fine; and hence it is that the Society of Friends believe that, in applying the word fine to them, you throw upon them a degree of censure for a supposed neglect. The Society of Friends never fail to perform their duties to the government. He asked the committee when it was, that the Society of Friends ever refused to contribute taxes to the support of the government. Why, sir, adopt this proposition and you do not relieve them from the payment of taxes. They pay their taxes as before, and those taxes go into the treasury of the State, and whenever your Legislature may see proper to levy a tax for carrying on a war, you will hear no complaints from the Quakers, because they hold it as a part of their creed to pay all necessary taxes to the government under which they live — to render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s. He could not regard this question in any other light than as a question of toleration, and on that ground and that alone, he hoped the amendment might be agreed to which would grant them the relief which they asked.

George W. Woodward thought it was ridiculous to compare demanding conscientious objectors to pay a fine to burning heretics at the stake, and asserted that if you free conscientious objectors from this fine on the basis of conscience pretty soon they’ll be demanding to be freed from any tax that pays for anything they conscientiously object to, and then what will happen to government?:

[T]here is a body of men in this Commonwealth who have conscientious scruples against bearing arms; conscientious scruples against conforming to the laws providing for keeping up this necessary military establishment. Such a body of men he knew existed, and he admired and respected them for their many virtues, and believed them to deserve all the high wrought eulogies which had been pronounced upon their characters. There was no man who respected these people more than he did, and he believed them sincere in the professions they make on this subject. He would therefore place in the Constitution a protection for their consciences, by relieving them from doing military duty. He would take precisely the same ground taken in the Constitution of 1790 by the fathers of our republican institutions. The framers of the Constitution had precisely the same application made to them from the same source, and they took the ground that no man should do military duty who had conscientious scruples against bearing arms, but that the allegiance which he owed to the Commonwealth should be preserved by the payment of a small contribution or tax; that he should pay something in lieu of the military service from which he was exempted. This was the ground then taken; this was the tolerance then practised; and such was the proposition that our fathers inserted in the Constitution, and which had been expunged from it on the motion of the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia.… But what are we told by the gentleman from Allegheny (Mr. Forward)? What are all told who stand by the broad principle of toleration as asserted in the Constitution of 1790? We are told that it is a revival of the fierce spirit of persecution of former ages; that it is the same spirit which planted the stake and kindled the fagot; that we are returning to the dark ages of barbarity; and that we are unmooring those hopes that have their anchorage beyond the stars. Why, any persons listening to these remarks would have thought that we were introducing some monstrous and unheard of doctrine into the Constitution. Who are they against whom this argument is addressed? Individuals who, acting upon their sense of propriety, are in favor of retaining in the Constitution the very tolerance principle that has distinguished this Commonwealth and all other free governments upon earth. A principle which has always secured to all men the right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience and to be exempt from the bearing of arms upon the payment of an equivalent. He submitted to the committee and to the country, whether the gentleman from Allegheny, in the warmth of his zeal in favor of these petitioners, had not imputed to others more than the question demanded or the circumstances of the case required. Whom do we propose to persecute? What is the system of persecution complained of? Who had brought forward a proposition for the persecution of anyone? What amendment have we brought forward to persecute the friends? Yet the gentleman from Allegheny had made the insinuation that we desired to return to the practices of the dark ages.…

The gentleman has told us in the course of his observation that this was indeed a tax; differing from other gentlemen on that side of the question — he tells us that it is a tax, but that it is a tax upon tender consciences. Now Mr. W. denied this. He denied that it was a tax on tender consciences. It is not the conscience that is taxed, but the purse; and does the gentleman from Allegheny mistake the one for the other? He trusted not.

It is the purse that is taxed for the relief of the conscience. The purse is taxed out of respect for the conscience; and this is the kind of toleration which the people of Pennsylvania are always willing to regard; and this principle has been engrafted on our Constitution and become the law of the land, upon the ground that the consciences of these people are against the performance of military duty. This was the doctrine that he cherished: but who ever heard in this discussion the consciences of these people assailed, or who ever heard that this was a persecuting tax upon conscience? There may have been force in the gentleman’s declamation, but there was no force in the argument. The Constitution of 1790 respects the scruples of those conscientious against bearing arms; but the man having conscientious scruples pays such tax as the government enforces upon him.

The Legislature of Pennsylvania had always decided that the militia establishment is necessary, and will always continue to do so. Now, sir, if the Legislature of Pennsylvania decided that the militia system was necessary for the safety, the security, and the defense of the Commonwealth, how is it to be sustained without some kind of preparation, and where is that preparation to be made? Contributions are to be made for the purpose of purchasing arms, erecting of arsenals, and paying the expenses of the militia, and when is all this to be done? It is to be done in time of peace. Then if conscientious scruples are to protect one class of men from making this contribution, it may another, and another, and when it becomes necessary to make these preparations, there will be nobody to call upon to contribute, for all will be protected by their consciences. Once say that conscience shall protect men from making these contributions, and you will have but few contributors in time of peace. There will be nobody to take the field, and there will be nobody on whom to call for means to make the preparations necessary for the defense of the country. Carry out this principle, establish this plea of conscience, and where will it end? A whole Commonwealth may shield themselves under this plea of conscience from contributing to the militia service for the purpose of keeping up your militia establishment. Your State becomes defenseless, feeble, and contemptible in the eyes of the world, your military spirit has fled, there is no protection for your citizens, you become the scorn and derision of the nation, and stand inviting aggression from abroad and encouraging sedition and rebellion in the bosom of your own State.

If these gentlemen’s doctrines become the law, where is the security for the citizens of this great Commonwealth? Where is the security for the property of the Quakers? Where the security for your homes, your firesides, your wives, and your children? On what arm will the gentlemen themselves lean for protection in the hour of trouble and danger? You become at once prostrate, feeble, contemptible, and a prey to every nation who choose to prey upon you. But carry this principle further. Once adopt it and excuse this class of men from paying what he contended was strictly a tax; excuse them from paying a militia tax, when all along the Legislature has deemed it necessary to the well being and safety of the government that the militia should be preserved, and what will be the next step you will be asked to take? Why, you will next be asked to excuse them from all taxes that go to sustain your judiciary establishment. If militia taxes are yielded, judicial taxes must be on the same ground. The argument will tell with the same force against these, but with the advantage of a precedent. The Quaker never sues anybody — he has no occasion for your judiciary — he is conscientiously scrupulous against employing it and of course against sustaining it. Every dollar he pays to sustain this expensive establishment is a tax on tender consciences; and, as the Constitution has taken them into its keeping, and relieved them from military taxes which are indispensable to the existence of the government, a fortiori, these judicial taxes must also be forgiven. This will be the argument, and how will you escape from it? Adopt the principle, and conscience may become arrayed against one tax after another until your government becomes a thing more contemptible even than a “corn-stalk militia” — a mere rope of sand. Aye, sir, the Keystone State is to be without the power of collecting taxes for any purpose, because conscience chooses to step in and arrest the arm of the collector. This was the first step to an entire and utter dissolution of our government and prostration of our Commonwealth.

They might disguise it as they pleased; they might ridicule their fellow citizens when acting in a military capacity under laws of the State, but he proclaimed that the moment the power of the Commonwealth was set at defiance, when, in the judgment of the Commonwealth, that power ought to be exercised either in relation to the militia, to the judiciary, or to any other State object — its sovereignty would be destroyed — the State would be deemed contemptible and would be split to atoms. He, for one, would never give his sanction to a step which he believed, if followed up, would inevitably lead to a dissolution of that government to which we all looked for protection, for our lives and our property.

But, he had been told that this was no tax. One gentleman had said that it was no more a tax than was a fine for an assault and battery — it had been called a penalty — an amercement — any thing but a tax. He, (Mr. W.) did not contend that these military fines were called taxes in our Constitution, or in our acts of Assembly, or probably in common parlance. He was not, however, to be cheated by names. “The rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” He looked at the substance of the thing, and he saw in this all the essentials of a tax. What was a tax? He would read its definition from Webster’s dictionary.

“Tax;” derived from the Greek root “tago,” is defined by Noah Webster, to be “to set, to throw on.”

“A tax,” says that author, “is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by government, for the use of the nation or State. Taxes, in free governments, are usually laid upon the property of citizens according to their income, or the value of their estates. Tax, is a term of general import, including almost every specie of impositions on persons or property, for supplying the public treasury, as tolls, tributes, subsidy, excise, imposts or exactions.”

This, then, continued Mr. W. was the definition of a tax; an imposition either upon the person or property for State objects. This was the general idea which we had of all taxes. He supposed that when a man was fined for an assault and battery, he had committed an offence which required punishment in some form, and this was the form which had been prescribed by the law. But, he would ask, what law had that man violated who chose to pay a fine instead of performing military service? Did not the law and the Constitution allow it? Did not every act of Assembly secure the right? And, when a man paid his tax to the collector, did he not act in conformity to the law? Was there any violation of the law? Did he become amenable to any legal tribunal? Not at all. He had simply accepted the compromise offered to him by the law of the land; either to do military duty or to pay a sum of money in lieu of it. And he had chosen the latter alternative. As well might we say that a man was punishable by fine for not working on the highways, as for not performing military duty. We have laws which compel every citizen to work upon the highway of the township in which he lived; but if a man chose not to march with his shovel and spade over his shoulder on the day on which he was notified by the supervisors to do so, he might pay a money equivalent or tax in lieu of performing personal service. Any man might do so. Was this like a fine upon a culprit — upon a man who had committed assault and battery? No — it was a tax — strictly a tax. The law had said to him, in advance, that he need not work if he choose to pay a tax. And so the law said in the present case; you need not do military duty unless you choose. You need not do military duty, but you shall pay an equivalent for it.

It was a contribution for a public object. What was that object? The defense of the State; to make preparations for defense in such manner as the law of our State might prescribe. This was the high and paramount object to which all men were bound to contribute, either by personal services or by the payment of a pecuniary equivalent. This was the high and paramount object for which this burden was laid upon the mass of our citizens. And was he not then correct in saying it was a tax, and in comparing it to all other taxes assessed for State purposes? He was well aware that it was not called a tax; but, in his view, this, as he had before stated, was a matter of no importance. He looked at the essential quality of this thing. He saw that it was money to be paid for a great public object — namely, public defense against a foreign enemy or domestic insurrection; and hence it was that he inferred it was a tax and nothing but a tax.

Standing then on this ground, let me ask if this amendment is not calculated to describe a circle round a certain portion of our fellow citizens and to erect them into a privileged party — a non-taxpaying party? It throws over them a Constitutional shield from the demands of the public, because their consciences are tender. And what would be the apology of the members of that Convention to their constituents, when they went home to the industrious farmers of the land and told them, “we compel you to pay a tax for military service while we have excused the most wealthy of our citizens from doing so.” What answer should we make, when asked the reason of this fanaticism? We should answer, their consciences forbid them to pay and we excused them.

But our yeomanry would see and feel the injustice and outrage, and if they did not pour upon us their contempt and indignation, he mistook much the character of the people of whom he spoke.

Never, until he was prepared to cut loose from all those sacred republican principles which constituted at once our pride and our security — never, until he was prepared for a privileged church establishment in this land, would he vote for an amendment which involved results such as these. There was no escape here. Gentlemen might talk as much as they pleased about taxes or their conscience. He would refer again to the authority which he had introduced the other day — he alluded to Proud’s History of Pennsylvania — a work in which all the tenets of this respectable sect of Christians were fully displayed; and it would there be found, in so many words, that their consciences required from them the payment of every tax which the public authorities might require. Talk of taxes being against conscience, while here it was expressly declared that it was the duty of every good Christian to pay such taxes as the Legislature might impose. And the high authority for this principle is recorded in the language of our Savior, when he commanded that tribute should be paid to Cæsar: — “Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” And, continued Mr. W., who was Cæsar but the personification of the power employed in persecuting the followers of the Christian faith? Is it lawful, our Savior was asked, to pay tribute to Cæsar, when mighty engines of power were engaged in overthrowing Christianity and in unloosing the faith of those whose hopes are moored beyond the stars? And what was the answer? “Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” This was the reply of our Blessed Redeemer, and this was the principle on which the Quakers placed their argument when they paid, that duty to the State and duty to conscience required them to pay all the taxes which the State, whose protection they enjoyed, might impose upon them.

This was mainly the argument taken here; and he was not to be stopped in his course by being told that we could not dive into the depths of the human heart, and construe the consciences of men according to our own opinions. It was his duty to look at this matter according to the sense which he had. He knew that it was not for him to explore the hearts and the consciences of others. But when a class of men come before a body such as this and asked extraordinary privileges — when they asked an entire exemption from the ordinary burdens of the government, he should take the liberty to inquire into their title to these privileges, and to look into the principle upon which they justified their demands — and he should never be deterred from the performance of this duty by being told that the subject was sacred. He had before explicitly stated and he now repeated that he did not doubt the sincerity of professions which were made of conscientious scruples; but when, in his representative capacity, as a delegate acting under the solemn responsibility which he owed to the people, he inquired whether the payment of this tax was a fit object to which to apply this matter of conscience by constitutional provision, it was necessary for him to discard all personal considerations. So inquiring anxiously, and conscientiously seeking to arrive at correct results, he could not find that the payment of this tax was a subject to which he could constitutionally apply this matter of conscience; nor could he see that the subject involved in any degree the question of religious toleration.

He had listened with much delight to the many rhapsodies which had been poured into the ears of this committee, on the subject of toleration of conscience. He listened at all times with pleasure to eloquence on such a topic. But whilst he admitted that toleration of conscience should ever be held a sacred and inviolable principle, he still contended that conscience had nothing under Heaven to do with the matter now under consideration. The great question was whether we should sustain or abandon our government — whether it was worthy of receiving our contributions for its defense — or, whether it had become so much a matter of indifference to us that it might be left a wreck on the ocean, at the mercy of the tempest and the storm. He repeated that it was no question of toleration of conscience. When the Convention, in the due progress of its labors, should come to that part of the Constitution which declares that no man shall be molested in worshipping Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience, the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. Forward) would find him willing to go as far as anybody in sustaining that great principle of our Constitution. But he protested against every endeavor to connect this question of taxation with the subject of toleration of conscience. It was not so; the two matters were entirely distinct.

The object was the defense of our State. Was it unconscionable to defend our families, our homes, our rights, and our liberties? Surely it was not so. The Quakers of other days did not judge that it was so. That man who spoke “as never man spoke” did not judge so. When the State in which we lived, and which protects us in the enjoyment of all our earthly possessions, imposed a tax upon us, it was right we should meet it. He granted, indeed, that the people might rebel; for this was one of their first and most inalienable rights. But on no other pretext, save that of rebellion, could we justify resistance against the payment of a tax. You must either be for us or against us. You must either assert your allegiance by the payment of your taxes, or you must rebel and overthrow the government; and he granted, of course, that when the government became oppressive, tyrannical, and intolerable, rebellion was a sacred and indefeasible right, and in such case he would himself join in it. But it was a question of payment or rebellion; and if gentlemen could show him that our government was no longer worthy the support of honest and Christian men, he would join them in the effort to overthrow it. But, he would do it manfully, by open and direct attack, and not by secret or insidious attempts to undermine it. He would not do it by interposing his conscience between him and his duty, and thus making it the apology for every dereliction from duty.

The payment of this tax he held to be necessary. If not necessary, it would never have been imposed; and, if necessary, should it not be paid? How could gentlemen justify a refusal to pay it? Upon what principle was it to be withheld? On the principle of religious toleration! Were we to be frightened by thus laying it to the score of religious toleration, and to be told that this was the ground on which the justification rested? He denied it; he denied most emphatically that there was any question of religious toleration here. It was simply a question of supporting the government. And if the necessities of our government rendered such a tax necessary, where was the conscience in all this Commonwealth which would refuse to pay it for the defense of our State, of our homes and our altars.

[T]he gentleman from Allegheny had stated that it would be intolerant to require, from this particular class of men, either the performance of military duty or the payment of an equivalent for it, unless in the event of some great and over-ruling public necessity — in the existence of which he (Mr. F.) would not excuse any man. This was his, (Mr. W’s,) understanding of the general sense of the argument, and he now proposed to examine it. Let us look for a moment, not at what the Society of Friends ask us to yield to them, but at what is asked in their behalf by the gentleman from Allegheny. In time of peace, that gentleman asked that they should not be called upon either to perform military service nor to pay an equivalent for it, because their consciences were opposed to every measure of the kind. But then, he (Mr. W.) took the ground that this tax which was thus applied to preparations for defense in time of peace, was the very way to keep off a war. But this, it appeared, was against the consciences of these individuals. It was against their conscience to do that which would, in all probability, render the effective employment of military force unnecessary; but when the hour of difficulty and danger was at hand, when the foeman’s foot was planted on our soil, when “the dogs of war” had slipped, then the conscience of the Quaker is to yield; and his scruples against bearing arms are to be regarded no more than if they had never existed. And it should here be observed that the whole force of the argument lay in the fact that these particular individuals held conscientious scruples against the taking away of human life. This this was the “pith and marrow” of the argument; they would neither take away human life themselves, nor would they be instrumental in having others to take it away. And yet the argument of the gentleman from Allegheny would compel them to do so; for, the very moment an enemy landed on our coast, the gentleman’s argument required that they should smother the voice of their consciences; that they should march to the tented field in common with their fellow-citizens; and that there, whatever extremity was required, the still small voice of conscience should be hushed in the din and roar of bloody battle.

But “in these piping times of peace” where there was no danger to be apprehended, and when all those preparations might be made which would push off the danger of war, it might be, “to the last syllable of recorded time,” conscience stepped in and forbade them to do any thing which was calculated to sustain and perpetuate this happy reign of peace, this millennium of the Commonwealth. This was the strangest position in which he had ever seen so solemn a question placed by those voluntary advocates who came forward to vindicate it against that fierce and blood-thirsty spirit of the fifteenth century, which, if we were to believe what we were told, had found its way, at this late period of the history of the world, into the deliberations of this Convention. Conscience! sir, said Mr. W., I can not understand it if such be conscience. I thought I had some knowledge of it; I thought I felt its monitions; but if it be made of such stuff as some gentlemen seem to think it is, I confess myself a stranger to it. If its purpose is to seal men’s purses against taxation, it will not be wanting popularity, and the pulpit need not longer exhort to its cultivation. Conscience will flourish whatever else decays, and this amendment will plant it in many a bosom where it was never before suspected to exist.

But, continued Mr. W., it was to be remarked, as he believed it had already been remarked, that the Legislature of the State was the judge and the only judge of the necessity of these military preparations. It was to be remarked, as it already had been also remarked, that all these fines were to go into the treasury of the Commonwealth, there to become subject to distribution by the law making power in such way as that power might choose to direct. And who was that law making power? Were those persons who entertained these scruples of conscience excluded from participation in that power? Were they not fully represented therein? Was not their voice equally as potent as the voice of other classes of our citizens in judging of the necessity which existed for this military establishment, as it was in judging of appropriations of money for any other purpose? Surely it was so. One gentleman had remarked in the course of this debate, that this class of our people was always to be found on election ground like other men; that they were fully as active and fully as jealous of the preservation of their rights as any other men. There were no interpositions of conscience on such occasions. And he believed, so far as his (Mr. W’s.) knowledge extended, that these men were always abundantly represented in our legislative assembly. Where then was their grievance? On what ground had they any right to complain? By whom was injustice done to them? Their peace and security, their lives, their liberties, and their property were amply guarded by that legislative body of which they themselves were a component part. They had, in common with others, a voice in deciding at what time this military establishment was not necessary, and when necessary, whether the actual emergency had arisen or not. He said that these men were the judges of the matter because they were fairly represented in the body whose judgment was to control it. Of the time when defensive measures should be taken for the common weal, and of the extent to which they should be carried, and the character they should be of, were all questions for legislative decision, and these petitioners are fully represented in the Legislature. Where then, he would once more ask, was the source of complaint here? What more had any set of men a right to expect at the hands of our government? Where was the ground on which gentlemen in this body were to be pronounced unreasonable, intolerant, and opposed to the free exercise of the rights of conscience? Was there any foundation for such charges? Was there any class of our citizens, whatever might be their peculiar opinions on religious or other matters, who were mourning because they were taxed without representation? Was there any class of our citizens mourning that they were enslaved? that they were oppressed? that they were weighed down by the burdens which our government imposed upon them, and which they had no voice in imposing? He had heard of none such; nor did he believe that any such were to be found within our borders. He believed that all classes of our citizens enjoyed their privileges alike — that they were all equally taxed and all equally protected; and he could see no manner of reason for complaint from any quarter.

This same Constitutional Convention would formally restrict voting rights to white men. (Before this, it was an open question whether black men could legally vote in Pennsylvania.)

Woodward was an unapologetic white supremacist who was very much opposed to letting black people vote — indeed he thought that slavery itself was probably in the best interests of both the “inferior” and “superior” races — and he would fight a losing battle against “negro suffrage” in the United States Congress after the U.S. Civil War.

It wasn’t until the next Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 1873 that the word “white” was taken out of the list of qualifications. The question of women’s suffrage was a hot issue at that convention, which Woodward also attended. He called it a “loathsome question” on a “miserable subject” and did his best to keep the convention from even considering it.

But those little details aside…

It appeared to him that these men were represented everywhere; and if they could come to the Legislature and could succeed in convincing the Legislature that no militia was necessary, that no trainings were necessary, and that, therefore, it was not necessary to impose any fines, let them do so. The door was open to them — and he proposed to throw no impediment in their way. But when, in the judgment of that legislative body, it might be necessary to insist on this performance of militia duty, and to exact a tax or fine as an equivalent for its non-performance, then he would say that no man in this Commonwealth, be his opinions what they might, had the right to interpose his conscience in open defiance of the law-making power, on the plea that compliance with the law involved a violation of religious toleration or the freedom of conscience. Let them be allowed to convince the Legislature of Pennsylvania, if they could do so, that no man should arm himself with a corn-stalk to appear on training days at a militia muster. He was content with this. But when the day of emergency came, when peril was near, when a necessity for action had become apparent, he entered his protest against excusing one portion of citizens from the performance of duties necessarily imposed upon others. He desired that the blessings of our free government should be equally felt; he desired that its genial influences should descend like the dews of Heaven equally on all, guarding, protecting, and blessing all men of all conditions — the high and low — the rich and the poor alike. He would never consent to draw a sacred line of distinction around particular bodies of men: to say to those who have been so fortunate as to range themselves within that circle “you are free from taxation because you entertain conscientious scruples,” and to say to those without it, “you are not free because you do not entertain these scruples, you have not conscience enough — but cultivate its tenderness and it will entitle you to receive the especial favor of your government.” Here indeed would be inducements held out to every coward and hypocrite — to every miser and traitor in the land — inducements which would tend directly to the destruction of the moral character of the State of Pennsylvania and to the entire surrender of all the great bulwarks of our independence and our glory. To such results he, for one, would never contribute by his voice or vote.

He had said, however, that he was unwilling to set himself up as a judge upon the conscience of any man. He had also said, when he had before addressed the committee on the same subject, that one objection which he had to the amendment was its universality. He would endeavor to show to this committee that the power thus bestowed might be greatly abused — that it might protect many men who were utterly unworthy of protection. How utterly ridiculous, as well as criminal, might the operation of this amendment prove to be! Every mean coward who desired to shield himself from personal service or responsibility might say to the collector that he entertained conscientious scruples. True, it might be that he had been engaged during the whole of his life in dissipation and vice; true it might be that his character was in every respect low and degraded; true it might be that he was in every sense a pest to the country in which he lived; — still, under this amendment, he had the power to throw himself upon the reserved rights of conscience against the operation of this military tax — to say that he had a tender conscience, and that therefore he must beg to be excused. Such would be the operation of this amendment if it met with the sanction of this Convention. So soon as the fines were levied, we should find one man after another evading and nullifying the operation of our laws, and stopping up our resources by thrusting between the treasury and its sources, a conscience of the existence of which nothing had ever been heard before. This was the character and description of men who might abuse such a provision as was now proposed to be inserted in our fundamental law. It was not his intention, however, to apply these remarks to the Society of Friends; he merely intended to argue that this provision, from the fact of its universality, might be made to comprehend and to shield every worthless renegade in the land, who was either too cowardly to perform military duty when required to do so or too miserly to pay an equivalent for it. And he would much rather vote at once in favor of any provision which would go to exempt the Society of Friends from all responsibility in the matter, than he would vote in favor of a provision which might cover not only that society, but a mass of men much less worthy of the consideration and respect of this body. Nay, he would go even further — he declared he would vote for a constitutional recognition and establishment of that society and church, infinitely sooner than he would vote for an amendment which went to overturn the foundation of our government and to the absolute prostration of all those great principles which lay at the very base of our institutions.

But he would ask this committee whether they had any design to take such a step? Was it sincerely the intention of this body to recognize one church to the exclusion of all others? He could not for a moment believe that it was. The other sects, numerous as they were in our Commonwealth, had asked no such constitutional provision to be made in their favor. The methodists, a denomination of Christians composing men of as pure and exalted principles as were to be found in this land — a denomination of which the country was full, though not so full as he would desire — had preferred no such request. To this sect a large body of his constituents belonged. They were men, too, of tender and enlighted consciences, and as much opposed to the wanton sacrifice of human life as any other portion of our people. But not a syllable had been heard from that intelligent and growing body of men. They had not come forward to vex the cares and harass the deliberations of this Convention by petitions of such a character. Then, again, there were the Menonists — a large and highly respectable body of men; men, too, who entertained conscientious scruples against taking away the life of their fellow men equally as strong as those entertained by the Society of Friends. But they saw — they knew — that the surest way to avoid taking away life was to place ourselves in an attitude of defense by making some kind of preparation against an attack. They therefore had been silent. They had not harassed this Convention with petitions to be excused from the burdens imposed on others; they had not attempted to derive at the hands of this Convention some great political privilege that should for ever hereafter characterize and distinguish them. The Society of Friends was the only body which had sent forth its petitions.

Let that petition be treated respectfully; let it receive all the consideration to which the respectability of the source from which it emanated entitled it; let it be deliberately and candidly weighed; let those who favored the prayer of the petition be heard in its favor. But, when all this had been done, then let him (Mr. W.) be allowed, for one, with such conscience as God had given him, to say that they could not have that peculiar privilege; that they could not have that exemption which was forever to distinguish them as the State Church of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Let him be allowed to say that they could have the benefits and protection which a great, a wise, and a good government could bestow upon its citizens; but they never, with his consent, should be allowed to refuse to contribute their due proportion to the defense of the country; so long as they claimed that protection, and so long as they remained in the full enjoyment of it. He must be allowed to say, in all sincerity and candor, and with all respect at the same time to the feelings of the Society of Friends, that whilst they lived under this government they must either show that it was unworthy of support or they must contribute to sustain both the military, the judicial, and all other establishments which the law-making power of this Commonwealth considered it necessary to establish. So long as their churches and their church property were all protected by the laws and the Constitution of the Commonwealth, he must be allowed to say, here and everywhere else, however much they might desire to avoid such impositions, still they must contribute to the public burdens. They need not do military duty, nor need they march out in defense of their country. If there was any thing in the nature of the service which ran in conflict with their peculiar opinions, and forbade them to enlist as soldiers, they need not do so. They need not be compelled to take away the life of their fellow man. They might remain peaceably at their fire side while the mass of the people of Pennsylvania turned out, marched to the field of battle, and exposed their lives in the cause of our common country. But, of the abundance of this world’s stores with which they were blessed, let them contribute something to the common cause; let them do something at least to testify their affection for the government which thus protects them, by contributing cheerfully their proportion towards its maintenance and support.

He proposed to lay no tax on their consciences; the only demand he made was upon their purse. And upon what principle of justice or equity could that demand be resisted? Under what right of conscience could it be evaded? He knew of no such principle — he knew of no such right. He would admit that the gentlemen from Allegheny, (Mr. Forward) in begging this whole question, as he most undoubtedly had done, had made the argument his own and the conclusions his own. But when we looked to the facts, when we looked to the history of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as it was — when we looked to the character of our people — when we looked to the history of the provision in the Constitution of 1790, — when we looked to that provision merely as a tribute paid to a tender conscience and to religious toleration, he (Mr. W.) denied that either the argument or the conclusion belonged to the gentleman from Allegheny.

Walter Forward then “rose, he said, to make a few brief explanations of the remarks which he had offered yesterday to the consideration of the committee”:

He felt the more anxious to do this because it was to him a matter of some concern that the sentiments which he had expressed should be rightly understood, both here and elsewhere. In the first place, then, he would remark that he had not stated, as had been imputed to him, that this was a tax upon conscience. No such language had ever escaped his lips. In reply to the argument which had given to this equivalent for non-performance of military duty the character of a tax, he had said that if it was a tax it was a tax upon conscience; but that, whatever name might be given to it, it was in fact and in substance what was called by law a penalty or fine; and that this was not only its legal character, but its true and proper character.

It would be remembered that one of the gentlemen who had addressed the committee on this subject had taken occasion to dwell upon the absurdity of the doctrine of non-resistance and non-combativeness. It would be recollected, also, that it had been further pressed upon the consideration of the committee that this was a tax and nothing more nor less than a tax.

In adverting to these arguments, he (Mr. F.) had taken occasion, fairly taken occasion, to say that in the 15^th and 16^th centuries one of the main arguments brought against those who had been brought to the stake and suffered martyrdom by the fire and faggot, was that they had been guilty of absurdities; that their opinions were erroneous, and that they must know better than to believe in them. This was what he had said, and no more. In relation to tax, he had made the remark that in other countries, contributions to the support of a national church were levied as a tax, — that they were called by the name of a tax, and that this was essentially a tax upon conscience. Such was the ground which he had assumed, and he had yet heard nothing which should induce him to change his view of the matter. And now, when he had endeavored to point out the consequences of what he believed to be an erroneous argument: and when he endeavored, by such force of reasoning as he could command, to persuade a gentleman to review his opinions and to re-consider his arguments; when he had endeavored to show, with historical truth, that the argument which had been here used was the very argument which had been used in former ages of the world against those who had been persecuted to death for opinions’ sake; when he did this, and when, in a spirit of liberality and candor, he invited the gentleman to look at the consequences of his own argument, he was then told that he charged that gentleman, and others who entertained similar opinions, with introducing this argument for the purpose, and with the intention, of adopting the absurdities, and fanning into existence the fierce and blood-thirsty spirit of persecution which characterized the 15^th century. Now, he would ask this committee whether any man, looking fairly to what he (Mr. F.) had said, could so far have misunderstood his argument as to build up on its foundation such imputations as these? Had he taken any undue advantage in his remarks? Was it not fair to deduce absurd or erroneous consequences from the arguments of those who entertain different opinions from ourselves? Surely it was fair. And yet, for simply doing this, was he to be charged with imputing to others questionable motives, or a design to revive absurd doctrines? All that he had said was by way of warning; to show that the argument used on this floor was the same which had been used in the 15^th century, and for this, the gentleman told him that he had charged upon him (Mr. W.) the oppression of the 15^th century. If this was the only mode in which the gentleman from Luzerne was willing to treat the matter, there would be an end at once to all further discussion.

…If his worthy friend (and he trusted the gentleman would not repel this appellation) would take the trouble to turn to his books on logic, he would there find that one very common mode of sophistry consisted in mis-stating the argument of our adversaries; and he (Mr. F.) thought, if he was not much mistaken, that the gentleman would also find this characterized as not a very reputable kind of sophistry; because, in every event, an antagonist was entitled to fair dealing.…

The gentleman from Luzerne had been pleased to say that I would not exact, from persons having scruples of conscience, the duty of bearing arms in a time of peace when there was no enemy invading our soil and no danger threatening us; but that, in a time of war or in a case of emergency or anticipated attack, I would no longer respect their conscientious scruples but would compel them to go to the field of battle and shed the blood of their fellow-men, as though no such scruples had ever existed. And, sir, the gentleman is pleased to think that there is a great absurdity in this. Now, what I said was that in entering into society formed for the general good of the whole body, certain of our natural rights were, of necessity, surrendered to the government. And I said that this right of conscience never could be and never had been deemed to be surrendered, except on grounds of some great over-ruling public necessity. I said that in the event of war (although I did not intimate this as being my opinion, but merely alluded to it as an argument which had been broached by others), it might be fairly said that this necessity for the surrender of all these scruples to the general good actually existed, and that, therefore, their natural rights were to be given up on the altar of our country. But, sir, I never said that the Quakers, or Menonists, or Amonists, or any other denomination of people holding these scruples of conscience, should be compelled to go to the field of battle and to shed the blood of their fellow-men. On the contrary, I stated my belief that it was not right, in this age of the world, to compel a man to take up arms and to shed blood in despite of the dictates of a conscience which tells him that it is wrong and sinful to do so; but I expressed my opinion that in time of exigency or war he ought to be compelled to pay an equivalent for his personal services; that is to say, that he ought to be required to contribute towards the public service his proper proportion of those means which were necessary for the defense of the country. This is what I said, and not what the gentleman from Luzerne imputes to me. He has imputed to me in fact the very contrary of what I did in reality say.

In reference to the observations of the gentleman, that we were about to create a privileged class, and to bestow on that class immunities and privileges which we denied to other portions of our citizens, I have nothing to remark. We are not to be prevented from advocating and contending for a sacred principle on the ground that we are about to create a privileged class. If the principle of toleration is not sufficiently respected to furnish an exemption from a general rule, of one man in many thousands, it seems to me that we cannot boast much of its existence among us. If such a rule of conduct as this is to be adopted, we shall put down the principle of toleration in our government for ever. Who had ever heard of such a thing as a principle of toleration being applied to all men? And, if not applied to all men, what came of the fears and forebodings as to the stability of our government, which had been so emphatically expressed by the gentleman from Luzerne, if this principle is made a part of our fundamental code? This, however, is not the question. It is deemed, by the gentleman from Luzerne, to be enough to repel this claim to say that by granting it you establish a state church, because the claim is not universal. The gentleman is entitled to the full benefit of all his arguments in this matter; he may rest satisfied with them if he is so disposed. I leave them in his hands.

He desired to make one more explanation. He did not say or insinuate, with all deference to the gentleman from Luzerne (Mr. Woodward), that any experiment for taxes to support government was proper. In the sacred volume, he knew it was said, “render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s,” and they were so rendered. And he knew it was also said, “the powers that be are ordained of God.” And he also knew that the first and second Charles, James the first, Louis the fourteenth, and all monarchical governments, had adopted this passage in order to sustain the doctrine of the divine right of kings. But did he attribute to the gentleman from Luzerne the design to support the divine right of kings? No. But they all cited precisely the same argument: “Render to Cæsar,” etc. Could this be carried out to a tyrannical extent? And could the tyranny be exerted on the ground that it was right to “render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s?” Cæsar, he thanked God, was not here; although there were many, perhaps, who had been waiting and wishing for him for some years past. This much by way of explanation; and here he would leave the question as he found it.

Andrew J. Cline suspected that there was something fishy in the assertion that “conscience” was “a natural right”:

[He] did not now intend to go over the whole ground, but merely to advert to one proposition of the gentleman from Allegheny to which he could not give his assent and on which the whole of the argument of yesterday had turned. The speech of the gentleman was learned, able, and eloquent, but it failed to convince his (Mr. C’s) reason and conscience. The gentleman had affirmed that the right of conscience was a natural right, with which no one had a right to interfere. He (Mr. C.) wished the gentleman had stated what he meant by a right of conscience. I know (said Mr. C.) that a man is at liberty to exercise his conscience. I know that I am at liberty to exercise reason, understanding, and will; but it would be an awkward expression to speak of the right of reason, understanding, and will. It is equally so to say right of conscience. We might say it was the conclusion to which a man comes after the exercise of his reason and the faculties which God gave him. If we could be in error as to reason, so we might be as to conscience; so then, if we entertained scruples, they would be founded in error. What right had any man to say he had come to certain conclusions on the subject of the agrarian system, and that he had a right to share my property? I (said Mr. C.) could not submit to this conclusion. The government would not. If the government would, it was a state of things which he trusted never to see prevail in this country. Therefore, he must say he entertained great doubts as to these scruples of conscience. And he held these doubts, and made this declaration, with great deference to the gentleman from Allegheny, whose argument was most happy, able, and impressive, but the premises were not founded in reason. He (Mr. C.) did this also, with the utmost deference to that respectable society which made this appeal to the Convention, and he confined what he had to say to that class.

A respectable delegation of Quakers had solicited this from the committee, and he was present at an interview between them and the committee on the subject. They then stated their wish to be exempt, not in time of peace but of war, and to be exempt not only from personal service but from the payment of any equivalent for it. We should do great injustice, in his opinion, to the great body of our fellow citizens, if we granted this prayer and imposed an obligation on one class of citizens from which we exempted another. True, it was said that all citizens were at liberty to avail themselves of conscientious scruples on this subject. But this would not be tolerated: he could not think that it should be tolerated.

In regard to the freedom of conscience, he was willing that it should be secured to them. But why? Because that implied only the privilege of exercising their religious belief in a manner that would not conflict with any law for the support of the government. We give to all a right to worship the Deity in the manner most agreeable to their own consciences; and further than this no State had gone. No State Constitution contained a provision for the complete exemption of any portion of its citizens from personal service, or an equivalent, on account of conscientious scruples. He was of opinion that the Legislature ought to have the power to make the exemption; but not with reference to one class alone, but all classes and sects. He was inclined to believe that the militia trainings were of little or no value for any purpose; but he would not exempt one class from a duty that others were obliged to perform, on account of the religious scruples which the favored class might entertain.

There was something in the character of these scruples which he could not understand. They were not palpable and tangible. He could not grasp their meaning. The gentleman from Allegheny (Mr. Forward), who had spoken so eloquently on the subject of the rights of conscience, might well understand it. But in his mind there appeared to be great danger in allowing every man to say that, on account of this or that conscientious scruple which he entertained, he could not give his support and obedience to a law of the land, however necessary might be that law for the well-being of the country. Such a principle would be productive of the greatest confusion and perplexity. A man might, on the score of conscience, refuse to pay his tax for the support of a pauper, on the ground that the pauper had worked in a distillery and might work there again, contrary to the conscientious belief of this man that distilleries ought not to be in the most remote manner encouraged. Many laws might in some way or other be found to conflict, or they might be imagined to conflict, with the conscientious belief of mere individuals.

The gentleman’s position in regard to the rights of conscience, he could not understand. He may understand it, and so may you, Mr. Chairman; but to me, it appears to be very vague and indefinite to say that a man shall be exempt from obedience to laws concerning which he may have conscientious scruples. A man might memorialize and petition for the redress of what he conceived a grievance, but until his prayer was granted or the government dissolved, it was his duty to submit to the powers that be.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

Thomas S. Bell put forward an amendment that would have changed a section of the proposed Constitution in this way:

The freemen of this commonwealth shall be armed, organized and disciplined for its defence, when and in such a manner as may be directed by law. Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so, but shall pay an equivalent for personal service.may be required by law to pay an equivalent therefor.

This way it would be up to the legislature’s discretion whether militia exemption fines would be mandatory for conscientious objectors. Bell defended his proposal:

The amendment which I propose gives to the legislature a discretionary power on the subject of requiring, from those who entertain conscientious scruples, the payment of an equivalent for their personal service. As the constitution stands at present, injustice is inflicted upon this class of citizens, inasmuch as they are excused from bearing arms, but must, must pay an equivalent for personal service; thus leaving no discretion to the legislature to relieve them from what they consider an oppressive measure.

The simple question now is for us to decide, is, whether we prefer to leave the constitution as it is — compelling them to pay an equivalent in time of peace; or whether we will leave the discretionary power with the legislature, if they deem it wise to exercise that power, to exonerate them in a time of profound peace not only from the necessity of bearing arms but also of paying an equivalent which they regard as oppressive.

John Cummin wasn’t about to let that slide by, and gave a characteristically long-winded rebuttal. Here are some excerpts:

With respect… to the claims of the petitioners to be excused from military duty, and from fine likewise for non-compliance with the law of the land: He (Mr. C.) had fully and deliberately examined them and came to the conclusion that they had neither right nor justice to sustain them. He should like to know how it happened that these Quakers could, as they had already done, send representatives of their own creed and religious notions to this convention, from the city of Philadelphia, and the counties of Bucks, Delaware, Lancaster, and Chester, and at the same time refuse to render their assistance to their country when assailed by a foreign foe. Notwithstanding that these men are privileged to fill the highest offices in the gift of the people, yet would they refuse to serve in the tented field, and beg to be excused from contributing towards carrying on the expenses of a war if one should take place! Yes! they would enjoy all the rights, privileges, and benefits of their country, but desire to be excused from the patriotic service and duty of defending it, or of contributing towards its defence and safety!

But, sir, these memorialists come here and tell us that the Prince of Peace is opposed to all war. I will ask, where do they derive their authority for such a statement? Where can they point to any assertion which will justify such a conclusion? When he sojourned among men upon earth, where do we ever find that he said a word against the soldier? Where do we find that he said a word against the men who fought the battles of his country? Not a word of such a character is to be found. On the contrary, he did much for the soldier.

But, Mr. President, this is not all. These memorialists say that the Savior came into the world to give peace upon earth. And what is the account which he gave of his own mission? He says that he came to give the sword and not peace. And there has been more blood shed since that day on the score of religion and for the sake of religious creeds and tenets, than there ever was for kingdoms, and power, and property. According to the prophecy then made, I say, there has been more blood shed for the sake of religion than for the claims of monarchs. Should any portion of the people of this or any other country ask for such privileges as are here laid claim to, without at least bringing forward some good satisfactory reason why they should be granted to them? I think not. To my mind it is absurd to ask such things of men elected, as we have been, to form a constitution for the government of the whole people of Pennsylvania, and not of a part of them.

I’ve heard the argument before that “there has been more blood shed… on the score of religion and for the sake of religious creeds and tenets, than there ever was for kingdoms, and power, and property” — but usually from people arguing that this is to the discredit of religion, rather than to the credit of war.

The gentleman from Chester, (Mr. Bell) strives to steal a march upon us, as he thinks this matter is about to go off so smoothly. But, as he is a legal character, I will beg leave to turn his attention to a few remarks which I am now about to make.

Here, then, we have a set of men praying to be exempted, not only from the performance of military duty, but also from the payment of any equivalent for their personal service. This is the claim which is here set up. Now, I will take liberty to ask the gentlemen at the bar — the lawyers of this body — and especially the gentleman from Chester, who has manifested such zeal in behalf of these memorialists — to suppose for a moment that they had a claim for a debt against any one of these memorialists. Would they suffer him to come as a witness in his own behalf, and himself to recover the money? Would they suffer him to sit in a jury box, and to give a verdict in his own favor? Moreover, would they suffer him to be the judge of his own case? Well, you say that this is not a debt — that the money raised in lieu of personal service in the militia is not a debt. I deny it. I take the directly contrary ground, and I say that it is as solemn a debt as ever could be due, and that it ought to be paid the first in the land.

They have acknowledged themselves to be rebels, not only in this country but in England. If they are men, such a people as those of whom our Savior spoke, who when you smite them on the one cheek would turn to you the other, we might think there was something more substantial, something more reasonable in the claim which they here set up. No, sir — nothing of the kind. In refusing to pay these taxes, they refuse to pay the honest tribute and custom that are due, and which they in common with their fellow-men are bound to pay. They direct you to do honor to them and their principles. They walk through these halls with their hats on. These are the men who undertake to direct you how you are to act and what sort of a constitution you are to form for the government of the people of this great commonwealth. I do not speak for myself; I have no personal end to obtain and no personal feeling to gratify. I speak in behalf of the mass of the people of this commonwealth. I speak for a principle which should regulate the conduct and animate the heart of every freeman — and by which every man in the land should be placed on an equality. Will it not be admitted even by the gentleman from Chester himself that we should not accept of such testimony as is offered here? Will it not be admitted that no debtor should be suffered to go into a jury box, or to be a judge upon the bench, so that he may be enabled to give judgment in his own favor? I will thank the gentlemen to give their views on this subject. I invite them to do so. I invite the gentleman from Chester to give his views of the case I have presented, because I have no desire to say all on one side of the question and close my ears to what may be said on the other.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

The next day, James M. Porter stood up for Bell’s proposal:

The proposition of the gentleman from Chester, (Mr. Bell) is not a proposition to exempt persons who have conscientious scruples against bearing arms from paying an equivalent for personal service; but it is a proposition to submit the subject to the legislature, in order that they may act upon it in such manner as they, in their wisdom, may think proper. This proposition involves two questions. First, can the legislature be trusted? And, secondly, is not this such a matter of detail as ought properly to belong to the legislature rather than to the fundamental law of the land?

My venerable friend from Juniata (Mr. Cummin), thinks that this matter is to be settled by the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and he believes that the proposition now before us involves the lawfulness or unlawfulness of all wars. For my own part, I cannot conceive with what propriety such topics can be brought into this discussion. They are altogether collateral, and might be an argument addressed to the legislature if the question were before that body for decision, but they can have no reference to the subject-matter now before this body. I believe that the question which we have to settle is simply whether it would be proper or prudent to vest in the legislature the power contemplated in the amendment of the gentleman from Chester. I may here be permitted to say that in relation to another class of our citizens, the legislature has had this power granted, or that at all events, the legislature has exercised the power upon the supposition that it had been granted. It is known to all of you that persons working upon the canals are exempt from the performance of military duty or from the payment of any equivalent. And why is this? Because it is supposed that the service in which they are engaged in behalf of the commonwealth is an equivalent for the performance of military duty.

Under the regulations adopted by the government of the United States in relation to the militia, we know that all persons engaged in the transportation of the mail — and in ferries upon mail routes; — and that all officers, executive, legislative, and judicial in the United States government are exempt, because it is supposed that the other duties which they perform to the government or to the community are equivalent to their performance. As to some persons, therefore, we do trust this matter to the legislature, and why, let me ask, may it not safely be committed to them so far as regards that class of our citizens who entertain conscientious scruples?

But in reference to this obligation to bear arms, I might ask whether, independent of their conscientious scruples, these persons have not at all events a plausible reason to assign, why they should be excused. I have spoken of other portions of our citizens being excused from the performance of military duty on the ground of a supposed equivalent to the commonwealth. The Society of Friends embraces the greater portion of that part of our citizens who entertain conscientious scruples against bearing arms; and though there are other sects in the state of Pennsylvania who accord with them in this view, still they are but few in point of numbers. As to the Society of Friends, one or two illustrations may not here be out of place.

We all know — all of us at least who have resided in a community where they are to be found — that it is one of the principles of the Society of Friends to maintain their own poor, and I ask my friend from Juniata (Mr. Cummin) to point to a single instance in this commonwealth, if he can do so, in which a member of that society has been maintained under the poor law of the commonwealth? The Society of Friends, we are also aware, educate their own children in their own schools; and yet, I will ask the gentleman from Juniata, do not the members of that society pay their portion of the taxes imposed for the support of a general system of education for the poor throughout the state? I speak of that which they are bound to render under the tax law of the state. And, independent of all this, might I not point to the proud monuments of charity with which this commonwealth is filled by their influence? What noble enterprise is there for the advancement of science, for the proud law of charity, as for the development of the resources of your state, where involuntary contributions have been asked, in which the Society of Friends have not at all times been found among the foremost of its supporters?

Joseph R. Chandler gave his approval as well:

[I]t is well known that persons have gone into the houses of a portion of our citizens, carrying off their property and insulting their families, under the pretext of fines due for their non-performance of military duty, which duty they regard as a violation of their rights of conscience.

The Society of Friends maintain all their own poor and they contribute to the maintenance of the poor of other classes. They exhibit, in their characters and lives, the examples of pure morality and virtue; they are the friends and patrons of science, and they ask at our hands only that they may be allowed to enjoy that blessing which they came here to enjoy, and for the enjoyment of which their fathers first settled this country; that blessing which we took from them, in asking them to adopt our manners and our customs instead of their own. Whenever we assemble to hear a lecture — to promote any charitable or scientific object — or to encourage the cause of morality and virtue, there at all times is this class of our citizens to be found among us. And shall we extend to them no consideration? What do they ask from us? They ask of us only a simple boon; they ask of us only that they may not be compelled to contribute to the demoralization of the community by doing that which, in the best performance of it, they believe to be contrary to their duty.

It has been said that they refuse to fight for the dearest rights of freemen; that they live in the enjoyment of all the good in land, and yet that they refuse to protect it; that they will give up their own land to rapine and to plunder, and ask us to defend it for them. Sir, I concur in the opinion that every citizen — be he a Quaker, a Catholic, a Menonist or to whatever other sect or denomination he may belong, is bound to defend his dearest rights. But the question presents itself, what are his dearest rights? Do they consist of his palace or his house? Do they consist of those treasures which take to themselves wings and fly away? Do they consist of those possessions which the “moth eats, and the rust corrupts, and where thieves break through and steal?” No, sir, in my opinion such is not the case. The history of this country at least, if of no other, would show a very different state of things. Who peopled Maryland? Who but the Catholics flying away from persecution, that they might enjoy their dearest rights? Who peopled Pennsylvania? who but the Quakers, flying away from persecution to enjoy their dearest rights? What induced the pilgrim fathers who landed on the ice-bound rock of Plymouth, to leave their homes for that inhospitable shore, but that they might enjoy the dearest rights of men and of freemen — liberty of conscience and freedom from persecution? If then the conscience of a man refuses to allow him to take up arms and to shed blood, why should we deny him the exercise of that right, and compel him either to take up arms or to pay an equivalent for personal service?

But Bell’s amendment was rejected, 52 to 65, and the original wording of the section — which, after all of this hot air, was essentially identical to that of the constitution of 1790 — was approved, 92 to 21. But that wasn’t the end of the story. John Cummin was still smoldering about those darned Quakers.

These excerpts can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

In February, the convention met to consider a section on the rights of conscience and freedom of religion.

That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can, of right, be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishments or modes of worship.

John Cummin thought this would be a good opportunity to make one more rhetorical gesture against Quaker conscientious objection:

Mr. Cummin of Juniata moved to amend, by striking out all after the word “conscience,” in the sixth and seventh lines, viz: the words “and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship.”

Mr. C. said that he had moved to strike out these words because they were inconsistent with, if not in direct contradiction of, the language of the second section of the sixth article of the constitution. He was sorry the subject was not in abler hands. He, however, would argue it in the best manner he was able. In the section to which he had just referred, it was there laid down that “The freemen of this commonwealth shall be armed, organized, and disciplined for its defence, when and in such manner as may be directed by law. Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so, but shall pay an equivalent for personal service.”

Now, what, he asked, were we to understand by “freemen”? The freemen of the commonwealth. And there was a clause also in the same section with regard to conscientious scruples — that a man should not be compelled to do military duty if he entertained any, but should pay an equivalent instead. The words which he had moved to strike out were, in his opinion, at variance with the language of the section which he had just read. It might be said, perhaps, that these conscientious scruples belong to every citizen of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. But this he denied. What other religious society besides the Quakers had sought or prayed to be exempted from military duty, and refused to pay an equivalent, as they said in their memorials. He would contend then that there was a contradiction between the language of the two sections which ought to be reconciled. This convention, under a full sense of what was due to its own character and dignity, would not overlook and leave uncorrected this contradiction. He cared not what might be the mode of worship adopted by any set of men, they could not, in his judgment, be exempted for any reason whatsoever from the payment of an equivalent for the non-performance of military duty. But, strictly speaking, no man could really be excused — could give an equivalent for his services. What could be an equivalent for a man’s services in battle — as, for instance, in the defence of Baltimore when bombarded by the British? What, he asked, would have been an equivalent for the services of the man who shot Gen. Ross, when in full march on Baltimore, and which would probably have been in flames in a few hours afterward? Nothing.

He knew that it was contended by many that all men may refuse to do military duty by the payment of a tax. This position he utterly controverted and most positively denied. He contended that the Society of Friends claimed the right, as a religious body, separate and apart from other denominations, to be exempted from either doing duty or paying an equivalent therefor. When this question was up before, the delegate from Bedford, (Mr. Russell) offered an amendment to the effect that all persons should be exempted from military duty who chose to exempt themselves. It, however, was voted down. The convention said that they should not have this privilege who asked to be exempted on the score of religion, and of its being irreligious to bear arms. Did not the constitution state that no preference shall be given to any religious sect?

All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can, of right, be compelled to attend, erect or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by law, to any religious establishments or mode of worship.

All this he subscribed to — he fully admitted. No man on this floor could show that his right of conscience had been infringed, or he persecuted for exercising it. Nobody objected to any man exercising his right of conscience. It was a glorious right, and he highly valued it. But yet he had been charged with being opposed to it. He entirely denied the truth of the charge. He would say that he esteemed the exercise of the right of conscience in any set of men, but he could not respect them if they did not obey the laws of their country — if they did not act as patriots, and if they even refused to pay an equivalent for the non-performance of a duty which it became all men, professing to be patriots, to discharge. The Society of Friends admitted that they had paid $300,000, by the sale of property levied upon and sold in order to pay for a non-compliance with the requisitions of the law. Now, he regarded this as nothing less than a rebellion against both divine and human laws. They own their allegiance to the Prince of Peace, and he thought the more of them on account of it. But he could not support any section which went to give them a preference over all other religious sects. He could not give his vote for creating any odious distinctions in society which, he maintained, would be the case unless the amendment he had offered should prevail. They were distinctions which no man ever dreamt of in Pennsylvania. It was his decided opinion that if the other religious classes of the community were to be actuated by the same principles, feelings, and notions as the Quakers, it would not be long before a dissolution of the government would take place. For how could it be supported? How protected?

There was no government on the face of the earth better entitled to the respect and allegiance of the people than the government of this state, and the general government of the United States. The people ought all to be on an equality of footing. But this had not been the case, as he could show, with respect to the Quakers, if he were to go into a statement of facts as connected with the early history of this country. He could show how these people had been opposed to their own government, and thrown every obstacle in its way. He could show that they had not been patriots, but on the contrary, enemies of their country, prior to the French Canadian War and during the revolution of 1774–5–6. At both periods these people had shown great enmity to their own government. They not only stood out against the demands of the governor for men and money, but they did all they possibly could to induce others to follow their evil and unpatriotic example during the last war.

He did not wish to repeat what he had before said. He desired the clause which he had indicated stricken out, in order that there might be no contradiction in the language of the constitution. He did not believe that there was a scholar in that hall who was able to reconcile the conflicting, as he conceived it to be, language of the two sections.

He maintained that those delegates elected to this convention, and who advocated this exclusive privilege in regard to the Quakers, would seem to have been elected for the purpose of defeating those measures that were calculated to add to the dignity and to advance the glory of Pennsylvania and of the Union at large. He would say most unequivocally that if the Society of Friends would not give their aid and assistance to the state when deemed necessary, they had no right to have any representatives on the floor of this convention. Mr. C. proceeded to notice some of the taunts, as he regarded them, which had been thrown out against foreigners by certain delegates…

“…when he was reminded by the Chair… that he was digressing from the subject before the convention.”

A Mr. Ingersoll moved to adjourn, but the motion lost. Cummin then continued, but the convention’s stenographer seems to have been getting fed up with him too, as the minutes of the convention at this point say of him only that:

Mr. Cummin then resumed his remarks, by reiterating his sentiments in regard to its being the duty of the Society of Friends to contribute their aid and support to the government under which they live, as well as any other class of citizens.

“Several motions were made that the convention adjourn,” but these also lost, but then Mr. Fuller moved for a vote to approve the section to which Cummin was objecting, and that motion passed. The vote on the section was 94 to 1, with Cummin the only dissenter.

In 1837, Pennsylvania held a constitutional convention (about which there is much more at The Picket Line). A committee of Quakers addressed the convention concerning the language it was considering about requiring militia service or, for conscientious objectors, the payment of an equivalent:

This can also be found in the book American Quaker War Tax Resistance.

To the Members of The Convention elected to revise the Constitution of Pennsylvania.

The committee appointed to present the memorial of the religious Society of Friends, on the subject of military requisitions, having had very little opportunity, at the time their memorial was submitted, to enforce or explain their views in relation to military demands, now take the liberty of presenting to the members, severally, a few explanations of their principles, and the principles of those whom they represent; in order that the convention may understand the ground on which they ask for themselves, and for all others who are conscientiously scrupulous of contributing to the prosecution of war, an entire exemption from military penalties and demands.

In the first place we would observe, that the first minister in the Society, in the early periods of his ministry, distinctly and unequivocally professed a belief, that the practice of war was inconsistent with the principles and tenor of the Christian religion. About the twenty-seventh year of his age, and third of his ministry, he was strenuously urged to accept a commission in the parliamentary army; but he rejected the offer as inconsistent with his religious principles, and suffered nearly six months’ imprisonment, in a filthy jail, on account of his refusal. From that time to the present, the Society of Friends have always believed that wars and fightings are inconsistent with the nature of the Messiah’s reign. Amidst the plots and struggles for power, by which the history of the nations where they reside has been marked, they have still professed and maintained the same doctrine. They have submitted peaceably to the governments which have been placed over them; but have taken no part in setting them up or pulling them down, by military force. When subjected to fines or imprisonment, on account of their religious principles, they have patiently endured whatever has been imposed upon them; but have always refused to contribute to the prosecution of war, whatever its ostensible object may have been. And certainly the experience of a hundred and eighty years must be admitted as amply sufficient to establish the sincerity of their belief, whatever may be thought of the correctness of their doctrine.

In the second place we would observe, that the rights of conscience are in their nature unalienable; and that every act of government, which abridges or destroys them, is an usurpation, not a legitimate exercise of authority. This is clearly attested in the present bill of rights, which declares that “no human authority can in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.” If it is asked, what is meant by conscience — we answer: By conscience we mean that apprehension and persuasion a man has of his duty to God; and the liberty of conscience we plead for, is a free and open profession, and unmolested exercise of that duty. Such a conscience as keeps within the bounds of morality in all the affairs of human life, and requires us to live soberly, righteously, and godly in the world. Such a conscience, where its influence extends, must promote the happiness of individuals, the stability of governments, and the peace of civil and religious society.

In the charter of William Penn, granted in 1701, we find the following declarations, in regard to the rights of conscience:—

Article 1. — “Because no people can be truly happy, though under the greatest enjoyment of civil liberties, if abridged of the freedom of their consciences, as to their religious profession and worship; and Almighty God, being the only Lord of conscience, Father of lights and spirits, and the Author as well as object of all divine knowledge, faith, and worship, who only doth enlighten the minds, and persuade and convince the understandings of people; I do hereby grant and declare, that no person or persons, inhabiting in this province, or territories, who shall confess and acknowledge one Almighty God, the Creator, Upholder, and ruler of the world, and profess him or themselves obliged to live peaceably under the civil government, shall be, in any case, molested or prejudiced in his or their person or estate, because of his or their conscientious persuasion or practice, nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious worship, place, or ministry, contrary to his or their mind; nor do or suffer any other act or thing contrary to their religious persuasion.”

Last article. — “And because the happiness of mankind depends so much on the enjoying of liberty of their consciences, as aforesaid, I do hereby solemnly declare, promise, and grant, for me, my heirs and assigns, that the first article of this charter, relating to liberty of conscience, and every part and clause therein, according to the true intent and meaning thereof, shall be kept, and remain, without any alteration, inviolably for ever.”

This charter, we may remember, was granted by a conspicuous member of the Society of Friends, when the power and administration of the government were chiefly, if not wholly, in the hands of members of that Society. The liberty thus solemnly and irrevocably guarantied, was unquestionably applicable to practice as well as belief; to every thing, in short, which could become a matter of conscience. In this charter the rights of conscience are first declared in broad and general terms; and subsequently the general principle is applied to a particular case. But this specification does not weaken the force, nor diminish the extent of the general declaration. A specific disavowal, on the part of William Penn, of an authority to demand any military service from those who were conscientiously restrained from the use of arms, would have appeared supererogatory, if not absurd; as he could not, consistently with his acknowledged principles, require such military service from any persons whatever. But in relation to worship, and the support of a disapproved ministry, the case was not quite so obvious. The intolerance of that and the preceding age related chiefly to worship and ecclesiastical establishments. William Penn and his friends had suffered more on account of their dissent from the established worship, than from any other cause. Some of those colonists who had sought an asylum from persecution in the western world, became persecutors themselves. To secure the settlers of Pennsylvania against all apprehension of any encroachment of their conscientious rights, by himself or his successors, William Penn not only made a general declaration in favour of liberty of conscience, but gave a specific assurance, in regard to ecclesiastical exactions. The faith of government was thus solemnly pledged, for the maintenance of a complete toleration of the religious principles of those who were then settled, or might afterwards settle, in the province. Under this assurance, a large part of the province, now state of Pennsylvania, was settled; and we conceive that the grant thus made could no more be revoked, without a breach of faith, than the title to their lands. And it is worthy of notice, that while William Penn or his fellow-professors held the reins of government, this engagement was faithfully observed. If any inconvenience has ever arisen from this grant, or its faithful observance, the circumstance has escaped our notice. These considerations certainly furnish no inconsiderable ground for hope, that the Society of Friends will not, in the nineteenth century, be deprived of those rights, which their predecessors, on the same soil, in the beginning of the eighteenth, extended to every class of natives and emigrants.

We however wish it to be understood, that we do not ask for ourselves, to the exclusion of others similarly conscientious, an exemption from military exactions. Although the Society of which we are members have, as already stated, always professed a testimony against wars and bloodshed; yet we are convinced that this testimony is not confined to us, but that many serious Christians of other persuasions unite with us in our opinion respecting the antichristian character of war. And we can see no reason why the sacred and unalienable rights of conscience should be restricted to any particular denomination of Christians.

Thirdly, we observe:— That as we cannot, consistently with our conscientious persuasion, contribute our personal aid in the destruction of human life, so we cannot, for the same reason, voluntarily employ others as substitutes. To engage another to do what we cannot conscientiously do ourselves, appears to us totally irreconcilable with Christian morality. Believing, as we do, that the dispensation has already commenced, in which “nation shall not lift up sword against nation, or the people learn war any more,” we cannot employ any part of our time in learning the art or discipline of war. And to purchase, by pecuniary equivalent, the privilege of abstaining from military measures, would be an implicit acknowledgment that we were actuated rather by views of convenience, than religious principle; and that the right of performing our duty to our Creator may be justly granted or withheld, by the authority of government. The application of the proceeds of such equivalent to civil purposes, even to those which we fully approve, does not change the principle. It is the payment of an equivalent, as the purchase of a religious right, not the purpose to which it may be applied, to which we conscientiously object.

It is worthy of special notice, that from the first settlement of the colony until the year 1775, about twenty years after the members of our Society had chiefly withdrawn from the legislature, there never was a compulsive militia law enacted in Pennsylvania. At a previous date, it was declared, in a preamble to one of the laws, that a compulsory law for the purpose of raising a military force, was unconstitutional, and a breach of the privileges of the people. A measure first adopted in the midst of the turmoil of a revolution, and in a highly excited state of the public mind, certainly furnishes a very unsafe precedent for its indefinite continuance under a settled government.

Fourthly,— The opinion so generally embraced, that it is the duty of all the citizens of a state to contribute their part toward the general defence, appears to be founded upon two gratuitous assumptions, which are neither demonstrable nor self-evident:— To wit, That defensive war is not only justifiable, but may become a duty: aud that the safety of the people depends upon military defence.

As the first of these assumptions is one from which we conscientiously dissent — the practical inference to which it tends cannot be pressed upon us, without infringing our religious liberty. With regard to the second it may be fairly presumed, that if war, whether offensive or defensive, is inconsistent with the spirit and tenour of the Christian dispensation, the wisdom and goodness of our Creator have provided means to maintain the necessary relations of civil society, without resorting to hostile measures. Believing, as we certainly do, that the Author of nature is the founder of Christianity, and that he is perfect in wisdom and power, we are convinced, that a reliance on Divine protection, in the performance of our duties, furnishes a firmer ground of hope, than any thing which the art or policy of man can supply. Indeed, the experience of Pennsylvania, as long as its government was administered upon principles purely pacific, affords conclusive testimony of the possibility of preserving a national existence, even in the midst of savage tribes, without the aid of military defence. While several of the other colonies, which were planted by men of military principles, acting upon the usual policy of nations, were involved in barbarous and exterminating wars, so far were the settlers of Pennsylvania from being overrun by the savage tribes, among whom they erected their peaceful dwellings, that the growth of the province in population and wealth was unusually rapid. The name of its founder has been transmitted with veneration, from age to age, among the aborigines of the country; his treaties with them, supported neither by oaths nor arms, were never infringed; and it is believed, that no English blood was ever shed by an Indian tomahawk, on the land which he purchased of them. Here was a practical demonstration of the doctrine, that a peaceable demeanour, and the strict observance of justice, are capable of preserving friendship and peace, with a people unacquainted with the benign doctrines of Christianity — whose usual avocation was the chase, one more nearly allied than any other to war, and among whom the retaliation of injuries was inculcated as a religious duty. If peace could be thus preserved, in the midst of such nations, surely we ought not to judge so meanly of the religion we profess, us to deny the possibility of maintaining it when surrounded by people professing a religion which breathes glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, and good will to men.

If, however, the military policy should still be preferred, and an equivalent for personal service be insisted on, it may not be impertinent to enquire, whether those who abstain, on religious grounds, from participating in hostile measures or preparation, do not furnish an ample equivalent. The diffusion of their principles, and the influence of their example, must, to a greater or less extent, counteract the spirit of war, and incline the community to the preservation of peace. Hence, they act as a preventive of war; and it is certainly more eligible to prevent an evil, than to cure it. A community among whom the pacific principle is habitually predominant, collects a moral atmosphere around it, in which war can hardly originate. Whatever security may be expected from military measures, it is impossible to deny that war is in itself an evil. It would therefore appear to be a necessary part of a just and liberal policy, to encourage every effort to prevent its occurrence. And we cannot rationally deny, that the diffusion of opinions, such as Friends have always held, must operate in favour of peace.

Fifthly,— We find in some of the state constitutions of the Union, that provision is made for exempting from military service such persons as are conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms. A number of them are silent on the subject, and consequently impose no obligation on the legislatures to enact laws which may operate oppressively on the consciences of the citizens.

The constitution of Maine provides, that “persons of the denomination of Quakers,” and some other descriptions, “may be exempted from military duty.”

The constitution of Vermont provides, that “the inhabitants of this state shall be trained and armed for its defence, under such regulations, restrictions and exceptions, as congress, agreeably to the constitution of the United States, and the legislature of this state, shall direct.”

The constitution of Tennessee directs, “the legislature shall pass laws exempting citizens belonging to any sect or denomination of religion, the tenets of which are known to be opposed to the bearing of arms, from attending private and general musters.”

The constitution of Mississippi directs the legislature to provide by law, for organizing and disciplining the militia, in such manner as they shall deem expedient, not incompatible with the laws and constitution of the United States in relation thereto.

The constitutions of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, and Missouri, contain no article requiring the enrolment of the militia, or imposing a penalty for the non-performance of military service.

The constitutions of New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Louisiana, Alabama, Indiana, and Illinois, profess to exempt those citizens who are conscientiously opposed to bearing arms, from being compelled thereto; but the exemption is rendered nugatory, by the provision that they shall pay an equivalent.

We are not aware of any inconvenience having been witnessed in those states, where military exactions are not made, from the conscientious citizens. But we have ample reason to believe, that in Pennsylvania, where large sums have been distrained from members of our Society, and sometimes in a very vexatious manner, under the character of equivalents for personal service, very little has ever reached the treasury of the state. The sums thus distrained, we apprehend, are mostly dissipated, and lost in the hands of those who are intrusted with their collection.

We deem it needless to insist on the utter uselessness of the military service on account of which these exactions are professedly made; for we apprehend there is very little difference of opinion, among the reflecting class of citizens, respecting the nature and effect of militia trainings. It is generally agreed that, to those who attend them, they are efficient schools of vice; but totally powerless in relation to their ostensible object. In regard to those who are conscientiously restrained from bearing arms, it certainly is not expected that they shall be armed and disciplined for the defence of the state. The only object of demanding an equivalent, must therefore be to replenish the treasury. But the hope of attaining this object, besides the injustice of deriving a revenue from the conscientious scruples of the citizens, appears from experience to be wholly illusory. Must, then, the peaceable citizens continue, under the authority of the constitution, to be subjected to fines and imprisonment, in support of a system which is confessedly useless in relation to its ostensible object, and does not enjoy even the negative credit of doing no harm?

Lastly,— We cannot but desire, that the convention may embrace the present opportunity, of placing the state of Pennsylvania, which has heretofore led the way in several important improvements, on ground equally elevated with any of her sister republics, by introducing into the constitution such provisions as shall secure to all the citizens a full and unmolested enjoyment of their civil and religious rights; and that they may thus bear to the world a noble testimony, that they regard the privilege of serving our Creator, according to the dictates of our consciences, in life and conduct, as well as in faith and doctrine, as sacred and unalienable. We have no doubt that experience would prove the wisdom and safety of the measure, and in this, as in other cases, confirm the conclusion — that whatever is intrinsically just, is also politically expedient.

We are respectfully your friends,

Thos. Stewardson,
Enoch Lewis,
Israel W. Morris,
William Evans.

Philadelphia, 9^th mo. 1837.