Tax resistance in the “Peace Churches” →
Quakers →
19th century Quakers →
Benjamin Bates
An excerpt from that “accompanying letter [by] Benjamin Bates [that] presents a remarkably strong plea for release from this species of discrimination” that one reviewer said “forms a body of the ablest arguments that have ever appeared in defense of certain principles held by this people” follows:
…[A]dmitting that the liberty of conscience is both a natural and constitutional right, and that it is physically impossible to control the free agency of the mind, still, it is contended, an expedient may be found which shall protect those rights from violation, and at the same time satisfy the law, which would otherwise infringe them.
Thus — if the legislature enjoin the performance of certain duties, on which it is supposed, the very existence of the government depends, and those duties happen to interfere with the constitutional rights of any individual, let that individual pay an equivalent and be excused.
If it be a military service, for instance, and his religious principles forbid him to fight, let him pay a tax for the support of schools, and make the tax equal to the military service.
The argument, fairly stated, stands thus — the legislature shall not restrain the free exercise of conscience; but they may levy a tax upon the advantages derived from the exemption.
Have I any objection to the support of schools?
Far from it — I should rejoice to see knowledge and virtue diffused among the lower classes of society; I would cheerfully pay an equivalent for the purpose, and might even be disposed to encourage it by a voluntary contribution; but when I pay a partial tax, a fine, I am neither discharging the common duties of a citizen, nor doing an act of benevolence.
I am paying what is considered by the government as a debt — and for what consideration?
— Plainly for being allowed to enjoy the liberty of conscience.
But I do not derive the liberty of conscience from the government; I hold it from a tenure antecedent to the institutions of civil society.
It was secured to me in the social compact, and it was never submitted to the legislature at all.
They have, therefore, no such privilege to grant or withhold, at their pleasure; and certainly no pretense or authority to sell it for a price.
It appears then, that this exclusive tax for the support of schools, is a groundless and oppressive demand.
It is a muster-fine in disguise — and violates the very principle which it seemed to respect.
It is on this point that the Quakers seem to have gotten ahead of themselves in their tax resistance theory.
They object to paying war taxes, because this would make them participants in warfare, which they believe Christians are forbidden to do.
But they pay whatever other taxes the government demands because they believe that Christians are required to do that.
But then the government comes along and says that they’re demanding a tax on Quakers the revenue from which will not go to pay for anything Christians are forbidden to participate in, as a tax on Quakers for being unwilling to participate in certain other things.
On what grounds could a Quaker object to this?
Because he objects to how the tax is allocated, to what it taxes, to the theory under which the government decides what to tax?
Where is the scriptural support for such a distinction?
Wouldn’t this mean that all taxes are now fair game to critical analysis as to their justness, and wouldn’t that either throw a Quaker into tangled political questions concerning the kingdoms of this earth, or into political opposition to such kingdoms — neither of which seems a particularly Quakerish position to take.
The Friends’ Review of editorialized about a proposed Militia Law for Pennsylvania as follows:
On , a
leaden coffin, containing the mortal remains of one of the most illustrious
advocates and exemplars of the Peace principle, was deposited in a humble
grave at “Jordan’s” in Buckinghamshire, England. And
, a
proposition has been entertained in the State which he organized and
governed — in the city which he wisely planned — to bring hither the dust and
ashes of his cast-off garment, and to erect a splendid monument over the new
grave of one who has slept in Jesus for a century and a half.
And how does Pennsylvania vindicate her claim to the keeping of the mortal
remains of William Penn? Is it by the enactment of a law in direct violation
of those principles of religious liberty, for the exemplification, enjoyment,
and protection of which this Commonwealth was founded? A law against which he
would have solemnly protested, and oppressive to the consciences of his
successors in the faith of the gospel of peace. A law, too, applied specially
to the city of Penn, by which the goods of his co-religionists must be
distrained on their declinature to abandon a principle, which, it is
well-known, has been organic with them from the day
“When Pennsylvania’s founder led his band
From thy blue waters, Delaware, to press
The virgin verdure of the wilderness.”
Would not a manifestation of the respect entertained by Pennsylvania for her
founder seem equivocal at least, if not hollow and heartless, if its
expression should be in the two inconsistent and simultaneous acts of
spoiling the goods of the Quakers for a paltry war tax (this, too, in time of
peace), and expending more money than such tax would yield, in an
ostentatious monument to the memory of Penn, whose aspiration was not for the
praise of men?
The members of the Society of Friends do not base their claim for exemption
from military requisitions in any and every form upon the respect due to
William Penn. Their right to the free exercise of conscience, under both
National and State Constitutions, is fundamental, and lies deeper than any
statute. This right, not derived from but paramount to human enactments, was
distinctly guaranteed in the charter granted by William Penn, and is declared
involate by the bill of rights of the existing Constitution. Friends are a
Christian people, implicitly believing in the teachings of the holy Prince of
Peace. They hold an indubitable conviction that war is sinful — that it was
forbidden by our Lord — that it is contrary to the spirit and tenor of the
New Testament, and that it must be offensive to God. So believing, they can
neither bear arms, nor pay money for not doing so. They cannot implicate
themselves in any way in a military system. If their property is seized, they
do not resist, yet they regard it as persecution for conscience’ sake, and a
violation of their right to obey the Supreme authority which transcends all
human legislation. “To require it under legal penalties,” said Benjamin
Bates, “is to reduce them to the alternative of refusing a compliance with
the laws of their country, or of violating what they most solemnly believe is
to them a law of God, clothed with the most awful sanctions.”
Another article in the same issue reads as follows:
The Moravian makes the following very incomplete
statement:
The Friend, a Quaker paper published in
Philadelphia, complains that members of the sect are served with notices to
pay the State militia tax. It advises them to resist the demand as long as
possible.
This does not fairly state the case. Not resistance but
non-compliance is advised — and this not “as long as
possible,” but always, altogether, and at whatever sacrifice of
property. The Moravian has unintentionally conveyed
an erroneous impression. A Friend can no more, with a clear conscience, pay a
Militia-tax, than could the Moravian pay tribute to
the Pope of Rome. An instance of resistance to legal authority
cannot, we believe, be found in the annals of our religious Society. We are a
law-abiding people. We “render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s.” We
may disapprove of a law and think it oppressive; still we are found among the
first to obey it, unless we are convinced that obedience will conflict with
our duty to God. And then — we peaceably and patiently (but not without
protest) bear the consequences of non-compliance. The advice given by
The Friend was “patient submission to wrong” — and
to “take cheerfully the distraint of their goods.” The editorial to which the
above summary reference is made, gave a clear and irrefutable reason for the
position taken — and in the same Journal of
the ground is logically sustained…
An act to compel the Quakers to perform military service, or to pay money in
lieu thereof, might properly be entitled, “An act for the extinction of
the Religious Society of Friends.” Such would be its effect if Friends,
as a whole, should comply with the requirement. The peace testimony, though
only one of the Society’s principles, is so connected with its Christian code
that
“One link broken, the whole chain’s destroyed.”
From a petition to the Virginia legislature, drafted by Benjamin Bates on :
[The laws] now require that your memorialists, notwithstanding the insuperable objection of their religious scruples, should be trained to arms. Their refusal subjects them to fines, which within certain limitations, are fixed at the discretion of the courts martial, and become in numerous instances extremely oppressive.
Nor is this all — your memorialists conceive that the voluntary payment of a fine imposed for adherence to religious duty, or the receiving of surplus money, arising from the sale of their property, seized for the satisfying of these demands, would be to acknowledge a delinquency, which they cannot admit, and to become parties in a traffic or commutation of their principles.
Hence also, considerable loss is sustained.
And notwithstanding your memorialists may acknowledge that many officers of the government, in these cases, manifest great reluctance, and execute their trust with a scrupulous regard to the interest of the sufferers; yet there are other instances in which wanton depredations are made on the property of individuals.
Your memorialists are aware that it may be said that the law does not discriminate between them and others, and that they ought equally to support the public burdens, and yield their services to the exigencies of the State.
This objection supposes that a general law cannot have a partial or unequal operation.
It supposes, too, that what maybe deemed a national concern, may supersede the chartered rights and privileges of the people.
But your memorialists cannot suppose that these principles, which indeed are no other than the maxims of tyranny, will ever be deliberately adopted or acted upon by this legislature.
If one member of the community believe that it is his duty to fight, aud to slay the enemies of his country, and if another believe that he is prohibited by divine command from planning the destruction or shedding the blood of his fellow creatures, the question, as it relates to the present subject, is not which, or whether either is wrong, but whether a law commanding both to take arms, would not operate unequally and violate the rights of conscience?
It would operate unequally, because it does not discriminate — because to the conscience of the one it would enjoin the performance of a duty, to that of the other, the commission of a crime.
It would violate the liberty of conscience, because it would compel under pains and penalties the performance or an act, which is believed offensive to the Divine Being.
Human authority cannot, like the great Searcher of hearts, try the spirits of men respecting truth and error; it cannot remit the penalties of sin, or control the convictions of the heart; and therefore in this country at least, the liberty of conscience is wisely placed beyond the sphere of legislation, and protected from the encroachment of any power in the government.
While it is therefore evident, that the ostensible object of the law for training them to arms, cannot be effected; and it is presumed from the general notoriety of their principles, that it is not even expected to be attained — while your memorialists believe that the principles they hold can in no sense prove injurious to the community, and are persuaded that this legislature would disclaim the idea of raising revenue by laws inflicting fines on the free exercise of conscience — they trust, that a privilege conferred by the Supreme Being, and by the highest authority in this country declared to be sacred and inviolable, may be safely expected from its justice and liberality.
They therefore respectfully petition, that the laws imposing military requisitions and penalties for non-compliance, may be considered as they respect your petitioners, and such relief afforded as to the wisdom of the legislature shall seem just and necessary.
Signed by order and on behalf of a meeting of the representatives of the aforesaid Society, held in Dinwiddie county, .
Benj. Bates, Clerk at this time.
Bates followed this petition up with a letter of his own in which he further questioned the right of the government to penalize or tax the exercise of a person’s conscientious scruples, saying that the government may only restrain someone’s freedom to put his religious beliefs into practice to the extent that it is necessary “to preserve the peace and order of society” and that “government has no right to bring the laws of God and man into competition.”
He rejects the idea that liberty of conscience only refers to abstract beliefs or professed doctrine, but insists it rightly means the whole domain of conscience — thoughts and acts governed by those thoughts.
…[S]till, it is contended, an expedient may be found which shall protect those rights from violation, and at the same time satisfy the law, which would otherwise infringe them.
Thus — if the legislature enjoin the performance of certain duties, on which, it is supposed, the very existence of the government depends, and those duties happen to interfere with the constitutional rights of any individual, let that individual pay an equivalent, and be excused.
If it be a military service, for instance, and his religious principles forbid him to fight, let him pay a tax for the support of schools, and make the tax equal to the military service.
The argument fairly stated, stands thus — the Legislature shall not restrain the free exercise of conscience; but they may levy a tax upon the advantages derived from the exemption.
Have I any objection to the support of schools?
Far from it — I should rejoice to see knowledge and virtue diffused among the lower classes of society; I would cheerfully pay an equivalent for the purpose, and might even be disposed to encourage it by a voluntary contribution; but when I pay a partial tax — a fine, I am neither discharging the common duties of a citizen, nor doing an act of benevolence.
I am paying a debt and — for what consideration?
Plainly, for being allowed to enjoy liberty of conscience.
But I do not derive the liberty of conscience from the government; I hold it from a tenure antecedent to the institutions of civil society.
It was secured to me in the social compact, and it was never submitted to the Legislature at all.
They have, therefore, no such privileges to grant or withhold, at their pleasure; and certainly no pretense or authority to sell it for a price.
It appears, then, that this exclusive tax for the support of schools, is a groundless and oppressive demand.
It is a muster fine in disguise — and violates the very principle which it seemed to respect.
But is it not unreasonable, it is asked, that our fellow citizens who believe war to be allowable and necessary, should be subjected to the hardships and privations incident to the training and service, while we, under the protection of our religions privileges, enjoy a complete exemption?
We answer no.
If those citizens do believe that war is necessary for their defence; if they conceive it to be their duty and their interest to fight; if it accords with their religious principles to repel aggressions by the sword; if, in the full exercise of their privileges, they give to the government authority to command them in these services; this is their own act. and they cannot complain of the consequences.
But a man is not the judge of his neighbor’s conscience, and if the powers they surrender for themselves involve the constitutional privileges of others, they are binding only on those who have consented to them.
