Tax resistance in the “Peace Churches” → Quakers → 18th century Quakers → Samuel Bownas

I was finally able to get my hands on a microfiched version of Isaac Grey’s pamphlet A Serious Address to Such of the People called Quakers, on the Continent of North-America, as profess Scruples relative to the present Government: Exhibiting the ancient real Testimony of that People, concerning Obedience to Civil Authority. Written Before the Departure of the British Army from Philadelphia, , by A Native of Pennsylvania.

This was the second edition (the first one was bought up in toto by the Meeting in order to suppress it).

The work intends to show that good Quakers have always supported their de facto government, even when that government has been freshly installed via revolution, coup, or what-have-you. Therefore, American Quakers should support the Continental Congress — this, even though that Congress is engaged in rebellion against what was, until recently, considered the government, and even though Quakers stubbornly refuse to concern themselves with “setting up and putting down kings and governments.”

The pamphlet includes several pages of arguments for paying taxes. Here are those excerpts:

…[T]he present revolution is the work of the Lord, and according to the plan and design of his providence, and [the precedents and observations I have cited] tend to prove the safety and propriety of a submission to the powers which now rule: But it may be objected in justification of the present scruples and refusal by some, that the present powers and government are usurped and contrary to law: To this it may be answered that the same objection would have held good under every revolution which has heretofore been brought about, as they must no doubt have been contrary to the authority of the preceding powers, and by their friends and adherents been deemed usurpations, which might also have been alleged against the present constitution of Great Britain…

It appears to me that it is for those who choose not to have any hand in the formation of governments, to take governments such as they find them, and comply with their laws, so far as they are clear of infringing religious rights and matters of faith toward God: It cannot perhaps be found that friends, ever since they were a people, ever refused to assist in the support of government, but have ever held it right and necessary to comply with the laws of the various governments under which they lived; for as, according to our own repeated declarations as a society… the “setting up and putting down Kings and Governments is God’s peculiar prerogative, for causes best known to himself, and that it is not our work or business to have any hand or contrivance therein, nor to be busy bodies in matters above our stations.” Whether then can such a people, by any means, undertake to weaken or oppose the present government, seeing these things are allowed to belong only unto God, is a matter worthy of consideration.… Let us then, I beseech of us, attend to the above-mentioned profession and declaration, and see that if we are to have no hand in such matters, it may be uniform, if not on one side, neither on the other; for our declaration is that we have no hand “either in the setting up or pulling down,” neither by this way or that way, as a religious society, there is no distinction made of what King or of what government, if not as to one, so neither as to another: if not by encouraging, so neither by discouraging.

…[I]t may not be amiss to add something on the subject of the payment of taxes.

For this purpose, I shall produce an epistle of George Fox… where he advises,

All friends everywhere, who are dead to all carnal weapons, and have beaten them to pieces, stand in that which takes away the occasion of wars, which saves men’s lives, and destroys none, nor would have others; and as for the rulers that are to keep peace, for peace sake, and for the advantage of truth, give them their tribute; but to bear and carry weapons to fight with, the men of peace, (who live in that which takes away the occasion of wars) they cannot act in such things, under the several powers, but have paid their tribute, which they may do still for peace sake, and not hold back the earth, but go over it, and in so doing friends may better claim their liberty.

William Penn, in an address to the high court of parliament, … tells them that

We both own and are ready to yield obedience to every ordinance of man, relating to human affairs, and that for conscience sake; and that in all revolutions, we have demeaned ourselves with much peace and patience, disowning all contrary actings; and that we have lived most peaceably under all the various governments that have been since our first appearance;

which could not have been said with propriety, unless they had submitted to the civil ordinances of men, as above declared.

Thomas Story, in his journal… speaking concerning a law made to enforce the bearing of arms, which he disapproved, yet in the course of the debate, which he had with the judge of a court, says,

I began with the example of Christ himself for the payment of a tax, though applied by Cæsar unto the uses of war, and other exigencies of his government

and was going to show the difference between a law that directly and principally affects the person in war, requiring personal service, and a law which only requires a general tax, to be applied by rulers as they see cause;

for though we as a people readily pay such taxes impartially assessed, yet as the kingdom of Christ is not of this world, his servants will not fight, though they may and ought to pay taxes, according to the example of Christ their head:

For more of this Thomas Story episode, see The Picket Line, .

And what that instance and example was, he relates… where he says that

The Lord Jesus Christ obeyed all the righteous laws both of Jews and Romans, so far as his condition in this world subjected him to them: For though he was and is the peaceable Savior, and came not destroy men’s lives, but to save them, yet in obedience to the laws of men, where not opposite to or interfering with the laws of God, he wrought a miracle to pay a poll-tax, where in strictness the law did not require it of him, nor of his disciples; for having Roman privileges by virtue of an old league between the Jews and Romans, whereby they were as children and not strangers, nevertheless to obviate all occasion of offense, he submitted to it, though only an ordinance of men, and his apostles likewise, as an example to his church through all ages then to come.

Though this example is generally well known, it may not be improper here to recite it, which was thus:

And when they came to Capernaum, they that received tribute-money, came to Peter, and said, does your master pay tribute? He said yes. And when he was come into the house, Jesus prevented him, saying, what thinks you, Simon? Of whom do the kings of the earth take custom or tribute; of their own children or of strangers? Peter said to him, of strangers. Jesus said to him, then are the children free. Notwithstanding, lest we should offend them, go you to the sea, and cast a hook, and take up the fish that first comes up, and when you have opened his mouth, you shall find a piece of money: That take, and give to them for me and you.

Matthew 17:24–27.

It is here remarkable that our Savior appears to have revolved in his mind the whole nature of the case, and of the demand that was made; for upon Peter’s informing the tax-gatherers that his master paid tribute, our Lord took occasion to remind him by a gentle reprehension, that he had gone further in his reply than he was bound to do, or than was requisite from the nature of their condition and circumstances; and immediately upon Peter’s entering the house, prevented his speaking by making use of a very strong and lively argument to convince Peter that he had been quite as quick as was necessary; and that instead of being bound to pay the tax, they were, according to the custom of the country, exempt and free; yet notwithstanding this freedom and privilege, or without the least objection to the use to which they money might be applied, though the Romans were in general heathen idolaters, and about that time, as appears from history, actually engaged in war on several sides, and the character of their emperor Tiberius marked as debauched, unjust, cruel, tyrannic, sanguinary, and inhuman. Yet Christ our Lord, though clothed with majesty and power above all the laws and powers of this world, and was thereby able to have subdued all things unto himself, and made them subservient to his will, was so tender of giving uneasiness to the powers that then bore rule that he ordered Peter, by producing an astonishing miracle, as we have read, to comply and pay the tax for this very striking reason, “lest we should offend.”

Thomas Story before-mentioned, in his journal… says, “That the sufferings of the faithful in Christ, in all ages, have not arose from the breach of any laws relating only to civil government, which they do readily observe and conscientiously obey.” And in the same page adds, “That as there always is and must be, in the nature of things, a great and necessary charge attending government, (a kingdom or state being but as one great house or family, and no private or particular family can subsist without charge) for that cause, all are to pay tribute, as justly (or equally) imposed by the legislature.”

The said author, in a conference had with the Czar of Muscovy, says,

Though we are prohibited arms and fighting in person, as inconsistent (we think) with the rules of the gospel of Jesus Christ; yet we can, and do, by his example, readily and cheerfully pay unto every government, and in every form, where we happen to be subjects, such sums and assessments as are required of us by the respective laws under which we live. For when a general tax was laid by the Roman Czar, upon his extensive empire, and the time of payment came, the Lord Jesus Christ [according to scripture, Matthew 25, as recited by Thomas Story] wrought a miracle to pay a tax, where yet it was not strictly due; we, by so great an example, do freely pay our taxes to Cæsar, who of right has the direction and application of them, to the various ends of government, to peace or to war, as it pleases him, or as need may, according to the constitution or laws of his kingdom.

I think this must be referring to Matthew 17, not 25 as the pamphlet says.

William Penn… says, “That since we are as large contributors to the government as our antagonists, we are entitled to as large protection from it.” Now this saying could not have been true, unless they paid all the public taxes, in common with other men, which no doubt their antagonists did; and by analogous conclusion, if we, under the present dispensation, refuse to contribute to the government under which we live, how can we expect to be entitled to its protection, not only at present, but in case the Almighty should see meet further and fully to establish it?

The said author… in answer to some objections made against the society, observes among other things, that it was said, “The Quakers will not support civil government,” etc. To which he answers, “This is also untrue upon experience; for what people, (says he) under government, pay their taxes better than they do.”

Samuel Bownas, in the account of his life, relates an epistolary argument he had with one Ray, a priest, who charged friends with an inconsistency in that, while they actually paid and even collected tax for the purposes of carrying on a war against France with vigor: They yet refused to pay tithes and militia assessments. To which Samuel Bownas replies,

We are still of the same mind with Robert Barclay, that wars and fightings are inconsistent with the gospel principles, and still lie under sufferings with respect to the militia, being careful to walk by the rule of Christ’s doctrine; and yet do not think ourselves inconsistent in actively complying with the law of taxes, in rendering unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and he may do therewith what pleases him.

Where it may be well to observe, that he there speaks of taxes as due unto Cæsar; thereby no doubt meaning the power that for the present bears rule, whether Emperor, Protector, King, or Congress.

From what has been observed, I think it may plainly appear, that friends heretofore have been so far from censuring or condemning their members on such occasions, that they have rather encouraged the payment of taxes, (except those in lieu of personal service) and advised a submission to the powers that bore rule, under the various governments and revolutions in which they lived; but if this be doubted, or any thing has been advanced that is not conformable to the truth, it will be well for any one to point out the same; but if they are consistent with reason, justice, and truth, it will be well to be cautious how any thing is acted opposite thereto; and while we declare that we cannot have a hand in public revolutions, (as belonging unto God) by promoting and encouraging, we may beware of taking an active part by opposing and discouraging, whether as to non-payment of taxes, or other civil acts; and then of consequence none can, with propriety or consistency, be censured or condemned concerning the same, especially in cases where no precedent for censure or condemnation can be found in the history or proceedings of friends.

As it is queried by some, whether Friends paid their taxes under the government of Oliver Cromwell, although there is as great or greater reason to conclude they did, than there is to suppose or prove that they did not; yet it may be observed that the practice of friends, ever since the time of George Fox, has been to keep a particular account of the sufferings they sustained, and the amount thereof, when it was on a conscientious or religious account, which have been recorded, and transmitted down to us from time to time: Now as it never yet has appeared in the accounts of friends sufferings, that anything was taken from them on account of taxes, even under Cromwell’s government, the committee of safety, or any of the then powers, which, if on a religious account, they had refused to pay, would have amounted to a very considerable sum, equal, if not superior, to any recorded by them, and would no doubt have been taken particular notice of among their other sufferings; but as nothing of this kind appears, it is therefore more than probable, and may be very safely concluded, that they submitted in these respects to the several governments, of what kind soever, under which they lived; and that they paid their taxes for the support of those governments, in common with other men, according to their uniform practice as a people.

To the above testimony of the dead, let us attend also to one of the living, an anonymous author, though well known to be Timothy Davis, a worthy friend and minister of the gospel; in a letter to some of his intimate friends on the subject of paying taxes to the present government, printed at Watertown, about two years ago, and sold by B. Edes, near the Bridge, has fully declared his sentiments in the following manner:

Here, Grey inserts a long excerpt from Davis’s pamphlet. See The Picket Line for the whole thing.

The matter now under consideration is serious. Many valuable members of society, both public and private, at this time, in different places, do not think themselves called or bound to join in the refusals and scruples which some make, and many more who have not yet fully considered the matter will probably be of the same mind; if this be allowed, which I believe may safely be done, will it not be exceeding hard that they should be denied the privileges of that society, in whose ways they have been educated, and whose religious principles they profess and hold, and to which they are closely attached? In time past, though there was diversity of sentiments with regard to some matters, yet we bore one with another without censure, in that spirit of condescension and brotherly regard, which is peculiarly characteristic of the followers of the Lamb, and shall we now, in very similar cases, give up that Christian temper, cast one another off, and produce a separation, when love and union might be preserved as well as in former days, and for which there is probably as much occasion as ever there was since the foundation of the province.

If indeed we think it proper as a society to maintain an opposition to the present powers of government, in civil as well as religious respects, it may preclude the use of the present observations, or at least render any service, which might be expected from them, very improbable; but as that would appear to be so contrary to the profession we have made, as well as inconsistent with our established principles, that I presume it cannot really be the case: I have therefore taken the freedom of laying these observations before us for our serious consideration.

Never was there a people more deeply interested in the event of public proceeding, than we now are. We are considerably numerous in various parts of the continent, and particularly so in this State. We are not only interested ourselves, but future generations may likewise be deeply affected by the part we now act. I wish us therefore so to conduct, as that Jew nor Gentile, or the church of Christ, either at this or any future time, may have just occasion of offence.

Now, notwithstanding what has been offered, as there may be some who may allege that their scruples and non-compliance with the demands of the present government, as to civil affairs, arises from a principle of conscience, which I am sensible is a very delicate point to touch upon, yet as I have no other end in view, but the good of society, as well as individuals, I would therefore beg them to consider that conscience, according to the general idea annexed to it, is a very sacred thing. Let us therefore be cautious how we apply it to common, civil, and merely human affairs, lest we make the plea for it upon more important occasions of too light estimation: It is deeply expedient for us to consider its nature, or what we are to understand thereby in religious affairs, and what are the proper and fit objects and subjects thereof, which may be necessary to claim and assert as independent of the power of the civil magistrate: For this purpose let us observe Robert Barclay’s sentiment of the matter, who, in the latter part of the 5th and 6th proposition, after speaking of the light of Christ, and the light of man’s natural conscience, says,

To the light of Christ then in the conscience, and not to man’s natural conscience, it is that we commend men: This, not that, it is, which we preach up and direct people to, as to a most certain guide unto eternal life.

From hence we may safely infer, that no objection arising from any thing short of the light of Christ, can be sufficient to operate with the professors of Christ our Lord, as a Christian church, in their proceedings and determinations; so that it essentially behooves them, certainly to know that it is altogether from the illumination and power thereof, and not at all from the other, that they are actuated: This appears to be absolutely and indispensably necessary for the right and true support of a pure Christian testimony, and which I heartily wish may be deeply and sufficiently attended to by all the active members of society; for in vain is it to endeavor to lift up a standard to the nations, unless in and by that power alone which is able to strengthen for the work; without which pure and unmixed qualification it will prove too large and too heavy, so that being beaten and driven by the winds, it will fall to the ground, to the shame and confusion of those who attempted to erect and support it.

The said author, in the 14th proposition of the apology, treating of the power of the civil magistrate, said,

The question is first, whether the civil magistrate has power to force men in things religious, to do contrary to their consciences, and if they will not, to punish them in their goods, liberties and lives? This (says he) we hold in the negative. But secondly, as we would have the magistrate to avoid this extreme of encroaching upon men’s consciences; so, on the other hand, we are far from joining with or strengthening such libertines, as would stretch the liberty of their consciences to the prejudice of their neighbors, or the ruin of human society. We understand therefore by matters of conscience, such as immediately relate betwixt God and man, or men and men, as to meet together to worship God in that way which they judge is most acceptable unto him; and not to incroach upon or seek to force their neighbors, otherwise than by reason, or such other means as Christ and his apostles used, viz. preaching, and instructing such as will hear and receive it; but not at all for men under the notion of conscience, to do anything contrary to the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledged by all Christians; in which case the magistrate may very lawfully use his authority.

The doctrine here preached is excellent both for those in, as well as those under authority, as it may clearly appear from thence that “in things religious,” such as he there mentions, he apprehends the magistrate has no just power, and that conscience may safely be pleaded; but observe the care and caution with which he writes, and how positively he excludes from that sacred claim “any thing that is acted contrary to the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledged by all Christians.” But it may be asked, what are those moral and perpetual statutes? I at once take it for granted that the laying and paying of taxes for the support of human and civil governments, and acknowledging the authority of the same, are material parts; seeing they have been very generally assented and submitted unto by Christians of all sects and denominations, at and from the personal appearance of our Lord Jesus Christ, in all countries, and under all revolutions, down to this very day; and without which “human society” could not be supported, but inevitably verge into confusion and ruin: From which I would as concisely as possible, according to the worthy author’s manner, and nearly in his own words, lay down a position, and then draw and prove what I apprehend to be an undeniable and conclusive argument, as follows:

  • Position: That it is unlawful and improper to counteract the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledged by Christians.
  • But the laying and paying of taxes for the support of human and civil governments, and acknowledging the authority of the same, are of those moral and perpetual statutes, etc.
  • Therefore it is unlawful and improper to counteract them.

If the cause of refusal and non-compliance were a matter of mere faith and conscience toward God, the case would be exceedingly different, and there would probably be no dissent; but as it appears to be only of civil concern, and relates solely to human affairs, it is therefore apprehended not censurable by the church, or properly cognizable thereby:

According to a note at the end of the pamphlet, the remainder of the text after this point was “added by a Friend of the Author’s, who was entrusted with the publication while he was in the country, with a discretionary power to add whatsoever he thought necessary.” The arguments that follow have a strong resemblance to those in An address to the people called Quakers, concerning the manner in which they treated Timothy Davis, for writing and publishing a piece on taxation which came out several years later (see The Picket Line, ).

And here I cannot but remark one reason why I believe many among us are led into a mistake, and scruples arise against paying of taxes for want of a well informed judgment. It is a received opinion among us, that all wars without distinction are sinful: Hence arises this scruple against paying of taxes for the support of war; but this is not the genuine doctrine of our ancient friends, as will fully appear in the following extract from the writings of Isaac Pennington, where speaking to what he very properly styles “a weighty question concerning the magistrates protection of the innocent,” it is to be observed that this enlightened author views magistracy and defensive war as the same thing, or, if I may use a simile as one building (though consisting of diverse parts) standing on the same foundation. The question is as follows:…

Whether the magistrate, in righteousness and equity, is engaged to defend such, who (by the peaceableness and love which God has wrought in their spirits, and by that law of life, mercy, good-will, and forgiveness, which God, by his own finger, has written in their hearts) are taken off from fighting, and cannot use a weapon destructive to any creature

Answer:

Magistracy was intended by God for the defense of the people; not only of those who have ability, and can fight for them, but of such also who cannot, or are forbidden by the love and law of God, written in their hearts so to do. Thus women, children, sick persons, aged persons, and also priests in nations (who have ability to fight, but are exempted by their function, which is not equivalent to the exemption which God makes by the law of his spirit in the heart) have the benefit of the law, and of the magistrates protection, without fighting for the defense of either.

Now if magistracy be appointed by God, and if it be magistrates duty to defend such, who are either not able, or cannot for conscience sake defend themselves; is it possible any can be right who lay waste this ordinance, or speak of such defense as sinful? If any man be appointed by God to defend my life, is it possible that God can authorize me to call him a sinner for doing his duty? or is it possible that I can, consistent with my duty, refuse him that tribute which is absolutely necessary to enable him thus to defend me? But had I much greater abilities to speak to this subject than I am conscious of, no reasoning of mine could be of equal authority with the author above quoted. Hear him therefore again… where, treating on this peaceable principle professed by the society, he says,

I speak not this against any magistrates or peoples defending themselves against foreign invasions, or making use of the sword to suppress the violent and evil-doers within their own borders; for this the present state of things may and does require, and a great blessing will attend the sword, when it is uprightly borne to that end, and its use will be honorable; and while there is need of a sword, the Lord will not suffer that government, or those governors, to want fitting instruments under them for the management thereof, who wait on him in his fear to have the edge of it rightly directed; but yet there is a better state which the Lord has already brought some into, and which nations are to expect and travel towards.

A candid and judicious author, to wit, Richard Finch, in a treatise called Second Thoughts concerning War… after the above quotation, further adds,

It is evident that this great man holds forth plainly the divine economy I have hinted at above. We see it was his judgment that men using the sword, in this gospel day, may be God’s instruments; and that herein, though not come to the better state or summit of Christian perfection, they may yet be good enough to use or direct the sword to be used religiously in God’s fear: When perhaps many would think that religion in all, instead of using the sword, would if regarded, lead directly from the use of it; but it seems this writer, though a great advocate of our doctrine, thought otherwise; and I profess myself to be his proselyte, though at present, if there are a few persons so pious, I should almost as soon expect to find the philosophers stone, as a whole army of such warriors: And I am persuaded a due regard to what may be urged upon his and my principle, will require more benevolence and reflection of mind than can be expected from unthinking bigotry.

Again the same author,

I admire the wisdom and charity of this writer, in his prudent and generous concessions, though some may think he thereby gives his cause away; but I believe them so essential to the preservation of it, that what he writes is the very truth, and that without such concessions it will be impossible to maintain our ground against a keen adversary. All attempts to explain and defend our doctrine, which go upon the literal sense of the precept, or consider defensive war as a thing in itself wicked, how specious soever worked up or received by shallow judges, instead of honoring and serving, have injured a good cause by multiplying many if not needless absurdities and contradictions upon all such ill-judged attempts to state and clear the controversy.

The same author…:

The sword then which in tenderness of conscience you can not draw, may in another (whom for wise reasons it has not pleased God to lead in the manner he has done you) become the outward providential means to preserve you and others, as well as himself; upon which principle his arms may protect thy person and property, and thy virtue and piety be a defense and blessing upon his arms.

Again…:

King William the Third was a great warrior, and a great blessing to England, as he interposed for its deliverance in a trying time, when the liberty of the subject, under a specious solemnity of preserving it, was secretly undermined; and the great duke of Marlborough, instead of being convinced of our principle, was a glorious instrument in a warlike way. From what has been laid down we may strongly conclude, that though a measure of divine grace, according to scripture, is given to every man, yet there may be an infinite diversity in degrees, and all things considered, it seems even impossible that it should by the giver, in every age and person, be designed to make precisely the same discoveries, and exalt to the same degrees of knowledge and perfection.

The above doctrine corresponds with a matter of fact, wherein the apostle Paul himself was nearly interested: It was at the time when upwards of forty of the Jews had “bound themselves under a curse, saying that they would neither eat nor drink till they had killed Paul” (Acts 23:16–24):

And when Paul’s sister’s son heard of their lying in wait, he went and entered into the castle, and told Paul. Then Paul called one of the centurions unto him, and said, Bring this young man unto the chief captain: for he has a certain thing to tell him. So he took him, and brought him to the chief captain, and said, Paul the prisoner called me to him, and prayed me to bring this young man to you, who has something to say to you. Then the chief captain took him by the hand, and went with him aside privately, and asked him, What is that you has to tell me? And he said, The Jews have agreed to desire you that you would bring down Paul tomorrow into the council, as though they would enquire somewhat of him more perfectly. But do not you yield unto them: for there lie in wait for him of them more than forty men, which have bound themselves with an oath, that they will neither eat nor drink till they have killed him: and now are they ready, looking for a promise from you. So the chief captain then let the young man depart, and charged him, See you tell no man that you has showed these things to me. And he called unto him two centurions, saying, Make ready two hundred soldiers to go to Cesarea, and horsemen threescore and ten, and spearmen two hundred, at the third hour of the night. And provide them beasts, that they may set Paul on, and bring him safe to Felix the governor.

It is evident here that the apostle’s life was preserved through the interposition of the chief captain; and Paul hesitated not to put himself under his protection, although he had been previously assured of the Lord’s particular providence and protection; the Lord having stood by him, and said, “Be of good cheer, Paul, for as you has testified of me in Jerusalem, so must you bear witness also at Rome.”

Upon the whole, much more might be produced to show that it is perfectly consistent with the doctrines of Christianity, and the practice of friends to acknowledge allegiance to the government that God, in the course of his providence, has thought proper should take place, and to conscientiously pay our proportion of taxes for the support thereof; but it is hoped the above is sufficient with every unprejudiced mind.


Samuel Bownas’s autobiographical Life includes an interesting debate about tithe and war tax resistance in the form of a series of letters between Bownas and William Ray, a local establishment parson to whom Bownas, a Quaker, was refusing to pay legally-mandatory tithes.

I’ve reproduced the section from the Life below, but first I’ll summarize the arguments.

William Ray:

  • The tithe due on your land is a part of my property. When you bought your property, you knew that your purchase came with certain legal rights and certain legal obligations attached. You could have chosen to purchase property to which no tithing obligations were attached, or to purchase the tithing rights along with the property, but you did not do so, perhaps because this would have been more expensive: the tithing obligation is one of the considerations that go in to the pricing of property on the market. If you felt conscientiously opposed to paying a tithe, the time to assert your conscience would have been when you decided which property to buy, not once you have already purchased a property to which tithes are attached.
  • It is no more justifiable to refuse to pay tithes because you object to the government having granted the establishment church such a property right, than it would be to trespass on church property on the grounds that the government shouldn’t have granted the church land.
  • Currently, we are at war with France, and although Quakers preach against war as energetically as they preach against hireling ministries, I don’t see you resisting your war taxes, although I understand Quakers have refused to pay militia taxes in the past even in peacetime. If you can pay war taxes with a clean conscience, why not also my tithes?
  • You claim that it is your conscience that is being violated by religious oppression, but indeed I am the victim here: because you disagree with my religious beliefs, you are withholding from me a proper, lawful debt.

Samuel Bownas:

  • Though lawful, the mandatory tithes are not a legitimate claim and do not actually put me in your debt. Genuine debts are a result of some exchange in which both parties receive something of value, but I have received nothing in exchange for the tithes I am said to owe you. My title to my land is complete, and you have done nothing to earn a right to some percentage off of it. If I had signed some explicit condition when I bought title to my land that entitled you to some rent, as I understand is the case for tithes in other places, your argument might hold water. But just pointing to the fact that the market price of my land was influenced by your unjust claim on it is no argument for the justice of your claim.
  • Jesus instructed us to render to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s. The taxes the government takes for war are clearly Caesar’s department, but tithes are explicitly meant for God, and so if I mean to follow Jesus’s instructions, I can only pay tithes for what I believe to be God’s work, and your ministry I don’t believe to be in that category. To pay tithes meant for God to you instead would be, for me, a matter of superstition and idolatry. (For that matter, I don’t think tithing is required at all. Christ came to put an end to the law that required tithes, as well as to the priesthood supported by them. So to pay tithes is in effect to deny Christ.)
  • Furthermore, it is unchristian to live off of money forced from people in this way. You should live off of the proceeds of your own labor, or, if you are unable to do this, you should forthrightly plead for alms.
  • The legal basis of the establishment church’s title to tithes is ridiculous. King Ethelwolf, in the 9th century, fearful for his soul and those of his ancestors, awarded tithe rights to the church in exchange for some superstitious rites from the clergy. And because of this, now you think you can take 10% of the proceeds of my property.

And now, the full excerpt from The Life of Samuel Bownas:

In a little time a storm arose: the parson of the parish having had nothing from our family for thirteen years and upwards, for his small tithes, and other church dues, as he styled them, got a summons for me to meet him before the justice; but before the time came I wrote him a few lines to know his demand, and he wrote me a long letter in answer, to which I replied. All which are annexed. The time came, and some other Friends were convened by other priests from other parishes at the same time. When I was called, there were two justices, Edward Phillips, Esq., of Montague, and Harben, Esq., of Newton. Phillips was very rough and boisterous in words, and Harben altogether as mild, using many arguments to persuade me to pay the demand myself, or suffer some other person to pay it, being very earnest that I should suffer him to pay it for me, and he would not desire to have it all together; supposing I might not so well spare what the parson demanded at once. I told him I was very much obliged to him for his kind offer, believing his intention was to serve me, but I could by no means accept it, without injury to my own mind, it being a matter that concerned my conscience, which I desired to keep void of offence towards God. He took me into another room, and was very earnest to have it made up; urging, “it was so much in arrears, that it was beyond their power to end it, and it must be put into the exchequer, and that would be very chargeable, which,” says he, “must fall upon you at last.” I told him that I could do nothing to make it up; and having conferred some time, we went in again, and he spoke to the effect following, “That he was very sorry he could not serve us, as we were both his neighbours and friends,” meaning the parson and me, and told the parson it would be uneasy to us both; and would have us end it between ourselves. I said, if it were a matter of just debt that I was satisfied was my neighbour’s due, I should soon end it with neighbour Ray, and be as willing to pay as he was to receive it; but as it was not of that nature, I could by no means do it. So I was dismissed, and in a little time served with an exchequer process; and in a few months after, in the next term, I was taken up in my way for Bristol, where I was going about my business, and put into jail. But when the parson had got me there he was very uneasy indeed, so that he could not take his rest, and told his attorney, “If he lost all his claim, he could by no means keep me there, for he had no rest or quietness of mind night nor day.” Accordingly the attorney came to the keeper in less than ten days time, desiring him to let me go home to look after my business; which I did, and in a few days went my journey to Bristol; and when I had done my business there, took a little turn into Wiltshire, and spent about two weeks in visiting meetings, and so returned home.

I informed my friends at the Meeting for Sufferings in London, how it stood; who advised me, that the parson could not proceed further, as he had taken me up and put me into jail: so I heard no more of it all that winter; but in the spring a distant relation of our family came to my wife when I was from home, and desired her to lend him ten pounds, for he was going to a fair, being a considerable grazier. She had no thoughts about the parson’s demands, that being a much larger sum, and he being a dissenter, and having done me the like favour, she lent it him, and he gave her his note accordingly. My wife, when I came home, told me what she had done, and I said it was very well, mistrusting nothing of any trick in the matter; but as he came in my absence to borrow it, so in like manner he came in pretense to pay it, addressing himself to my wife to this effect; “Dear cousin, if you can help me to that note, I had best pay it; you know I borrowed it of you, and shall pay it to you.” So she very innocently brought his note, and he tore it immediately; and putting his hand into his pocket, took out and threw down to her, the parson’s receipt for the ten pounds, in full of all demands for tithes to that time. My poor wife was under a very great surprise, urging, it would be a very great uneasiness to me. “Your husband,” said he, “is we allow, a man of sense, but in this he is a stubborn fool; and I would have paid it out of my own pocket, rather than he should have ruined you and himself, which this exchequer suit would soon have done, if it had gone on; for his original demand is fourteen pounds and upwards, and he hath been at forty or fifty shillings charge already, and you must have paid that and ten times more if it had gone on, which now I have cleared for ten pounds; I think you are exceedingly well off.” “Ay but,” said she, “we look at inward peace more than all that, and I shall be blamed for being privy to the contrivance, and beget a jealousy in my husband about other affairs.” “Oh! my dear cousin, trouble not yourself about that,” said he, “for I can clear you, that you are as innocent of it as a new born babe: and I know I could not have brought it about with your husband, for he would have started so many questions, that I could not possibly have brought it about any other way, than by ploughing with his heifer.” When my wife told me of it, which was not presently, it troubled me, to have my testimony thus evaded by this undermining trick, which was, in the man who did it, designed for our good no doubt, and the note that he gave for the money being destroyed, I had nothing to show under his hand for the money, and what to do in it I was at a loss. I thought it best to convene the elders, and let them know how it stood, and to be advised how I might clear my testimony, and my dear wife and self, from having any hand in this deceitful trick; which I accordingly did, and they were satisfied we were clear of the contrivance, but did not know what to do to satisfy others about it; one Friend was for suing him who had thus tricked me for the ten pounds. But others thought such an act would do more hurt than good, and thought it by no means advisable to act any further, than to go to my kinsman and let him know, that what he had done in the case, though by him intended for a kindness, yet it had the contrary effect on our minds, so that although he intended to serve us, it proved a disservice, and to request that he would never serve us so again. In due time my wife and I took an opportunity, and discoursed the matter over with him; and he to excuse it, said, he little thought we would take it so much amiss as we had, having, as he thought, no reason for it, and wondered our friends should be so stubborn as to contend against law; and he could not bear to think we should be served as Mr. Bantom and Mr. Tilley were; and indeed, if it were again to do, I should do the same, said he. — Robert Bantom and William Tilley were two very great sufferers by exchequer process, both very honest sincere Friends. Thus was this affair ended. The first letter I wrote the parson, with the parson’s answer, and my reply, are annexed, viz:

Lymington,

Neighbour Ray,

Since thou art pleased to proceed against me by justice’s warrant, I desire thou wouldst be pleased to let me know what thou demandest; else, how shall I be able to make my defence? I think thy people this year and last were very unreasonable in their taking, having both years, modestly computed, taken above one eighth part of my hay: and Brook’s never, as I am informed, paid any in kind till thou came into the parish; but now for nine pence the three acres, thou hast taken every year hay worth eight or nine shillings per annum at least. As for arguments between us, for or against, I suppose them needless, but I take it very hard to be so treated from a man of thy pretensions. I believe thou wouldst not, if in my case, like such treatment. Not that I murmur or repine because my goods are taken away on this account, being persuaded that it is my duty actively to refuse a compliance with the laws that command tithes; and if I must, as I have already done, suffer the spoiling of my goods, I hope passively to submit and bear it. This I conclude with desires of good for thee and thine every way.

Samuel Bownas.

At the Parsonage-house,

Sir,

I have been above thirteen years in the parish, and have not given the family any disturbance, though the arrears which are due to me are considerable; so that you have no reason to complain of hard usage from me, but rather to thank me for my kindness, in bearing this injustice so long.

You do not think, when you go to law with one another, or with some of those who differ from you, that you spoil their goods, when you put them to charges, that you may force them to do you justice. And why, pray you, should it be thought a spoiling of your goods, when we do nothing more than you do yourselves, when you think you are wronged; that is, endeavour to recover our own? For I demand nothing of you but what I know to be mine before I receive it.

You might as well make an entry upon our glebe lands, or upon anything else we possess, as to seize upon the tithes, to which you have no more title than to the other, unless you have bought them, as I am sure you have not.

For every body who understands these things will tell you, that when such lands as are tithe free, are sold or let, they are for that reason valued at an higher price, and the lord or seller makes the tenant or purchaser pay for the tithe, as well as for the rest of the estate: and that on the other hand, there is a proportionable abatement made to the purchasers and tenants of such lands as are liable to the payment of tithes. And there is very good reason for it, because in that case the tithes being no part of the landlord’s property, he cannot make them over to another, or demand a price for that which he has not sold; and those who rent or purchase his estate, can claim no title by virtue of any conveyance or grant of his, but only to what he had a right to dispose of himself; so that if you will needs, in this matter, pretend conscience, you ought not to occupy any land but what is tithe-free.

But if you think that this would be very grievous and inconvenient, you ought, when you occupy tithe-land, to permit us quietly to enjoy our tithes, which are a part of our freehold; and to which we have the same title as we have to our glebe, wherein you claim no propriety, as indeed you have no manner of title to the tithe. If you have, be pleased to show it, and let us know from whom you had it. And if you have none, as I know you have not, do not go to pretend conscience for invading your neighbour’s property.

For my part I do not see any reason why you should not actively comply with the law for payment of tithes, as well as with that for taxes, as your friends have done over all the kingdom ever since the revolution; and some of them have been collectors, though the title of the act of parliament did plainly show, that the tax was for carrying on a war against France with vigour: and yet your friends, even those who have been of greatest reputation among you, and the champions of your cause, have declared as much against the lawfulness of all war, as they have done against the payment of tithes, and sometimes have carried the matter so high, as to refuse the payment of money demanded of them for that purpose; as Robert Barclay in his Apology tells us, “they suffered because they would not pay for drums and colours, and other military furniture.” And this they did in the time of peace, when the militia met only to make a raree-show, and had at the place of rendezvous no other enemies to skirmish with but butterflies. Nevertheless, since the war against France began, your friends have given the same active obedience to the laws for payment of taxes, as their fellow subjects have done; and I hope you, for the future, will do for the payment of tithes, which, according to your avowed principles, is as lawful as the payment of taxes for carrying on a war with vigour.

It is a vain thing to pretend conscience to excuse oppression or covetousness, for it must be one or other of these which makes any man take possession of what is not his own, but his neighbour’s.

If we lived by the alms-basket and could claim nothing but what we might expect from the benevolence of those from whom we make any demand of this nature, we could not blame you so much: but the case is otherwise; for we desire none of your benevolence, and we know the tithe is no part of your estate, and that you can claim no right to it, either by donation or purchase. Therefore do not go to call that your own which is not; and being you disclaim all violence against, or oppression of, men upon the account of their conscience, we may reasonably expect so much tenderness from you, that you would not oppress us, because we differ from you, and that you would not, under a pretense of conscience, seize upon our estates, and then make an outcry against us, when we desire the assistance of the civil magistrate, for recovering any part of our properties or freeholds, as often as you unjustly invade them. Surely we might look for more equity from you, being we are members of that church, which in other respects permits you the free exercise of your religion, and has confirmed the same by the late act of indulgence, agreed upon by the bishops, lords, and commons of our communion. An instance of such moderation as was never shown to our church by any other sect who had us under their power, whether Papists, or some violent and fierce Protestant dissenters, who perhaps would handle us as roughly as our predecessors were by them, if God should again permit us to fall under their merciless hands.

You say, you take it hard to be so treated by a man of my pretensions, and if it was from some of the same cloth, you would think it was like themselves. But why should it be thought inconsistent with my pretensions, to demand what I know to be my own? And why may I not say the same to you, that I take it hard to be so treated by a man of your pretensions, who profess, that violence against those who differ from you, merely upon the account of their conscience, is unwarrantable; and yet, contrary to this your profession, you seize upon that which is mine, mine by as good a right as you have to your own estate; for you cannot say that you have purchased the tithes, or that any who had a title to dispose of them did make them over to you; and yet for all that, you pretend conscience for the disturbance you give me, for no other reason, but because I am of a different communion from you. If this was done by some who maintain that violence against men of another persuasion is meritorious, and that heretics ought not to be suffered to live, I should think it was like themselves; though from you I might expect other things. But let that be as it will, I desire nothing from you but the profits of my own estate, which you unjustly withhold from me; and I am resolved, whatever you think or say about the matter, that I will have my right. However, if you are willing to live peaceably, I shall be as moderate as you can expect, and for that reason have referred this business to Mr. Smith, whom I have authorised to do as he thinks fit; and am, sir,

Your friend and well-wisher,

William Ray.

Lymington, .

Neighbour Ray,

Since thou hast advanced some arguments for thy taking tithes, I have somewhat to offer in answer thereto, for my refusal.

1st. Thou art pleased to write, “I ought to thank thee for bearing with this injustice so long;” but I take the refusal of paying tithes to be no injustice. Therefore, &c.

2nd. Thou says, “when I go to law with another, or some that differ from me, I do not think it spoiling of their goods;” which I do not take to be a parallel case with this; for, first, if I go to law with any man, it shall be for some just debt owing to me, for which he, whom I so go to law with, shall have received some valuable consideration; but from thee I have received none for the tithe of my increase; therefore it is not a parallel case.

3d. He with whom I go to law shall have no just plea of conscience, because if I can have no plain demonstration that he had of me a valuable consideration for which I make my demands upon him, I will not go to law at all; therefore it is not a parallel case.

4th. If on such a foundation I go to law, and force my adverse party to justice by law, I conclude with thee, it is not spoiling of his goods. But to go to law, and by it take away people’s goods, without such a valuable consideration as above, is spoiling of goods in my opinion, with a witness.

Thou writes me, “I may as well seize of the glebe-lands, or upon anything else we possess, as upon the tithes.” Under favour, I am of another mind; because I have no title to show for thy glebe lands, or anything else thou enjoys: but for my land, the whole I take to be mine, without any reserve or exception whatsoever, as the writings that give me my title to it, do sufficiently set forth and declare; and I have given for it a valuable consideration, which thou never did for the tenth part thereof: therefore, I am sure I have more right to it than thou canst pretend to, in justice, equity and reason; because I have bought, without reserve, the whole, and manured the same at my own cost and charge; but thou hast bought no part thereof, nor been at any charge about improving it, that I know of.

Thou further writes, “that every body that understands these things, will tell me, when such lands as are tithe-free are sold, for that reason they are valued higher.” What argument is that for the lawfulness of tithes, according to the Gospel? I conceive none at all. The next is, that “if I occupy tithe-lands, I ought quietly to permit you to enjoy the tithes:” that is the matter in dispute, which shall in its place be spoken to.

Now I am come to thy argument about taxes, wherein thou endeavours to make us inconsistent with ourselves, in actively complying with the law for taxes, but refusing a compliance with the law for tithes, endeavouring thereby to lay tithes and taxes upon one foundation. In this also I differ from thee; for I understand taxes to be paid as a civil debt, tribute or custom, to Cæsar: but tithes are paid as a religious act to God and holy church, as in its place shall be further shown. Indeed our Saviour said, “Render unto Cæsar, the things that are Cæsar’s; and unto God, the things that are God’s.” Now if we must render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s, then it remains to be proved, that tithes are Cæsar’s due, before they be demanded as his right.

But here is the grand objection of inconsistency; that because we have suffered for refusing to pay towards the militia for drums, and colours, &c, and yet actively comply with the law of taxes, which is to carry on a war with vigor, &c, insisting on R. Barclay’s words to strengthen the objection. We are still of the same mind with R. Barclay, that “wars and fightings are inconsistent with Gospel principles; and when it is brought so near to us, that by law we are obliged to act both in person and estate, we in this case choose rather passively to suffer, than actively to comply, for conscience-sake.” And this is still our case, and a suffering we lie under, with respect to the militia, in many places, being careful to walk by the rule of Christ’s doctrine. Yet we do not hereby think ourselves inconsistent in actively complying with the law of taxes, in rendering to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and he may do therewith what pleaseth him, we may not direct him; therefore, to use thy own familiar simile, I take this argument of taxes to have no more weight in it, in relation to tithes, it being no parallel case, than the enemies that the militia met with in their rendezvous, at their raree-show.

Thou writest, that “it is a vain thing to pretend conscience to excuse oppression or covetousness.” I am entirely of thy mind; so that where any man pretends to refuse the payment of tithes out of covetousness, believing at the same time in his conscience they are justly due; it is a pity, if that be his only excuse, that he should not pay smartly for it: but beware of mistaking, by supposing the refusal to be from covetousness, when it is really conscience.

Thou addest, “if you lived by the almsbasket,” &c, which indeed I think you ought to do, if your own hands cannot sufficiently administer to your own wants; for a forced maintenance is not consistent with the Gospel ministry; and that thou knows right well, having often-confessed it in my house. Thou adds, “tithes is no part of my estate, either by donation or purchase.” But I say as above, I have purchased the whole, without any reserve or exception of tithes. But in thy own country, North Britain, I have been informed, tithes are excepted in deeds and conveyances, so that they have some colour to use such an argument, but I can see no foundation for such an argument in this country. Thou advises me not to call that my own, which is not; I say, it is my own, because I have, without reserve, purchased the whole, as witness my writings: besides all that, at my own charge I have manured and improved it.

Thy next paragraph is already answered.

I acknowledge thee a member of that church, or society, who have granted us the indulgence we now enjoy in the exercise of our religion; for which, I with the rest of my brethren ought to be truly thankful to God and the government. But I must tell thee, some of thy brethren, not of the meanest rank in your church, have, like battering rams, endeavoured to break that chain of indulgence, we now enjoy, but Providence has hitherto prevented them, and I hope ever will, unless God should see meet to try his church, to discover thereby the truly religious from the hypocrites.

Thou seems angry, and to resent it, that I should take it ill or hard, to be so treated by a man of thy pretensions; but the reason why I wrote so, is this; because I have more than once heard, that my neighbour Ray has said in our house, that it was a matter of conscience to him, to force a maintenance from such as for the sake of conscience could not pay him, using that text, “Whose ox have I taken, or whom have I defrauded?” Which I have sometimes spoken of to others, and it gained great credit and good thoughts concerning my neighbour Ray, and for that reason, and no other, I took such treatment hard. But however, if thy conscience be altered, it will give reason for my thoughts concerning thee also to change.

I shall give thee my reasons, why I cannot actively comply with the law for paying tithes, and answer thy last paragraph in the conclusion of this.

I was in my youth very thoughtful, touching the nature and design of religion, and conscious to myself, that an implicit faith, with a blind obedience, might not be sufficient to bring me to the end intended by it. I observed many under great sufferings for refusing to pay tithes, and that their plea for it was conscience; but many more I found did pay, and they thought they did right, at least made no scruple of conscience in doing it. This contradiction in practice made me willing to look into it myself, that what I did herein might not be for imitation’s sake on either side, but that I might act on a principle of faith, knowing, “what is not of faith is sin.” These reasons put me on examining and trying for myself.

I now assure thee, that it is not out of stubbornness, ill-humour, or covetousness, but purely on a principle of conscience, for these reasons following, that I can neither pay nor receive tithes.

1st. The dedication of them is grossly superstitious, and I think protested against by most, unless such as love to suck the sweets of other men’s labour, being dedicated and given by king Ethelwolf, about 855, to God and St. Mary, for the redemption of his own soul, with the souls of his ancestors; in the consideration whereof, the clergy were to sing a certain number of masses for the king and his nobles.

2nd. It is already granted by me, that we must render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s. And I promise thee, I shall be both ready and willing to pay the tenth of my increase unto God, when I am satisfied he requires it of me; or unto them he shall appoint, when I am satisfied he has appointed them, as he did the tribe of Levi; but for me to pay tithe to a man, claiming it as a minister of God, when I know that no such thing is required of me, tithe being no Gospel maintenance that I can understand, it might justly be said unto me, “Who has required this of thy hands?” Yet, if tithe be compelled from me by a human law, I cannot help that, nor resist the force of that demand by argument from Scripture; therefore, being persuaded that God requires of me no such thing as the payment of tithes, but that I am called to protest against all superstition and idolatry, and the law of tithes plainly appearing to me to be such, I cannot, with a safe conscience, actively comply therewith, but choose rather to please God than man, although it may be to my disadvantage in this world, yet by so doing I hope for future gain.

3d. And again, tithes are required to be paid as a religious act: viz. “to God and holy church;” and I am persuaded that God requires no such thing, therefore I cannot pay them with a safe conscience, being a Protestant against that which I call popery, not in word and tongue only, but in deed and truth also.

Lastly. Tithes are not required by the Gospel, that I can understand. If thou canst make it out, please to do it, for it is clear to me, that Christ came to finish and put an end to that law which required tithes, as well as to the priesthood supported by them; therefore to continue in the practice of tithing, is in effect, “denying that Christ is come in the flesh to put an end to them,” according to Scripture and the practice of former times; for which reason I think an active compliance with the law for tithes is sin, and in my opinion, he that payeth and he that receiveth, are equally culpable in God’s sight; for which cause we can neither receive nor pay, as this deed of settlement will prove, and more instances of the like kind might be produced from sundry parts of the nation; a plain demonstration, that as we cannot pay tithes, neither can we receive them, when they are as legal a property to us as they are to you.

I could say more, but what is said may perhaps be tedious, and thought impertinent, therefore for the present this shall suffice.

To conclude thou art pleased to give me thy resolution, viz: to have what thou calls thy right; and if I could think it was so too, we should soon reconcile this matter.

Thou adds, “If I am willing to live peaceably,” (I desire no other than a peaceable living,) “thou wilt be as moderate as I can expect.” But it seems an odd way of showing thy moderation, to employ an attorney; for thou adds, “for that purpose thou hast referred the matter to Mr. Smith, to do as he thinks fit,” and that may not perhaps be the best way to show thy moderation; however, be that as it will, I must tell thee, that what I cannot directly pay, for the reasons aforesaid, I cannot order or allow another indirectly to pay for me; for although I might bribe my conscience, as the chief priests did the soldiers, and lull it asleep in such hypocrisy, yet an awakening time will come, when every thought, with every secret thing, will be brought to light, and appear as it is.

This with due respects from him who shall always be ready and willing to serve thee and thine, in anything I can with a safe conscience, and in any office of love mayest command Thy friend and neighbour,

Samuel Bownas.

These letters were exchanged between us some weeks before I was made a prisoner, and whether they might soften him or not, I dare not say; but he was very uneasy while I was in prison, and, as I was informed, told his attorney and his wife, if he lost his debt, he could not keep me there.

This storm being blown over I enjoyed quietness, save that I was persecuted for church-rates, small tithes, &c, for the parson would not let his dues, as he called them, run on again in arrears, but would take it in kind every year, so he never had me before a justice again, but if he could not have it in one thing, would take another.…

In a year or two after [my return from a subsequent trip], my wife was taken with a lingering disorder, for recovering her out of which, I applied myself to several doctors, but all in vain, for she continued wasting more than two years and eight months, growing weaker apace a few weeks before she died, which was in the . She died in a sweet frame, often saying nothing troubled her, but that she was so easily deceived about the parson’s tithe, which being done in ignorance, not designedly, she was the more easy about it.


From: Evans, William & Evans, Thomas The Friend’s Library: Comprising Journals, Doctrinal Treatises, and Other Writings of Members of the Religious Society of Friends Volume Ⅲ, Philadelphia: Joseph Rakestraw, , pages 42–48.


At the upcoming national gathering of NWTRCC at Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana, I’m going to be presenting a summary of the history of war tax resistance in the Society of Friends (Quakers).

Today I’m going to try to coalesce some of the notes I’ve assembled about the second, and possibly most important, period of Quaker war tax resistance — between the establishment of the Quaker colony in Pennsylvania and the relinquishment of political control there by Quakers during the French and Indian War.


The Pennsylvania experiment ()

The advance of war tax resistance among English Quakers had ground to a halt. Quakers in England still would not pay certain explicit war taxes like “trophy money,” nor pay for substitutes to serve in their places in the military, nor buy goods stolen at sea from enemy nations by government-sanctioned pirates, but attempts failed to extend this testimony to other taxes that were clearly designed to pay for war.

For example, Elizabeth Redford tried to convince Quakers to refuse a new tax in on the grounds that it was obviously meant to fund the Seven Years War (the act that enacted the tax was entitled “For granting to his majesty certain rates and duties upon marriages, births, and burials, and upon bachelors and widowers, for the term of five years, for carrying on the war against France with vigour”). Her meeting brought her up on charges of violating the discipline and declared that whatever the purpose of the tax, it was being raised by the crown for expenses of its choosing and Quakers should not inquire further into what those expenses were but should pay the tax without question.

Several years later, during the War of the Spanish Succession, this got thrown back in Quaker faces. William Ray, in a letter to Quaker Samuel Bownas, argued that Quakers should stop resisting tithes because they had stopped resisting war taxes: “though the title of the act of parliament did plainly show that the tax was for carrying on a war against France with vigour” he wrote, “since the war against France began your Friends have given the same active obedience to the laws for payment of taxes as their fellow subjects have done.” Bownas did not deny this, but instead he tried to argue that tithes were different.

Meanwhile, Quaker William Penn was granted a royal charter for a large North American colony, to which many Quakers emigrated and established a colonial government that would be run, to some extent, on Quaker pacifist principles. I say “to some extent” because it was still a royal colony, under the military protection of the crown, and with an explicit colonial mandate to engage in military battles against enemies of the home country. The Quaker Assembly of the colony was also subservient in many ways to the crown-appointed governors and to the British government itself.

Occasionally during wartime, that government would appeal to the Pennsylvania Assembly to raise some funds to help out the war effort — to help defend Pennsylvania against pirates, Frenchmen, hostile Indians, and the like. The Assembly would sometimes respond to such requests with noble-sounding statements of Quaker principle, like this one by Assembly Speaker David Lloyd in : “the raising money to hire men to fight or kill one another is matter of conscience to us and against our religious principles.”

But most commentators on the period, even those who are sympathetic to the Quaker pacifist position, tend to read these statements cynically. The Assembly used these requests for money as opportunities to try to wrest more control from the governor and from London. These statements of conscience seemed often not to be principles so much as gambits in the negotiation process. The Assembly would usually, in the end, grant the requested money, or some amount anyway, but would thinly veil its nature by eliminating any wording about the money being intended for the military and instead would simply decree that it was intended as a gift to the crown from its grateful subjects, “for the Queen’s [or King’s] use.”

This was such a transparent dodge that it became hard for anyone to take seriously the part of the Quaker peace testimony represented in Lloyd’s quote. On one occasion, according to colonial legislator Benjamin Franklin, the Assembly refused to vote war money, but instead granted funds “for the purchasing of bread, flour, wheat, or other grain” knowing that the governor would interpret “other grain” to include gunpowder.

The Assembly were able to get away with this, in a colony full of ostensibly conscientious Quakers, because the orthodox point of view about war tax resistance in the Society held that only explicit war taxes were to be resisted, while generic taxes that only happened to be for war were to be paid willingly. So long as the government kept the name of the tax neutral and didn’t detail how it would be spent, a Quaker could pay it without having to worry about it.

But some Quakers were unable to remain blind to the Assembly’s sleight-of-hand. In , the Rhode Island Quarterly Meeting sent emissaries to some of its rebellious Monthly Meetings who were beginning to refuse to pay state taxes on these grounds. In , William Rakestraw published a pamphlet in which he agreed that “we ought not to ask Cæsar what he does with his dues or tribute, but pay it freely,” but added: “if he tells me it is for no other use but war and destruction, I’ll beg his pardon and say ‘my Master forbids it.’ ” He argued that the latest “for the Queen’s use” grant, in spite of its generic name, should fool nobody: it was meant to fund war, and no Quaker should pay a tax for it. Thomas Story, who visited the colony from England, defended the orthodox position, and had traveled Pennsylvania encouraging Quakers to pay their war taxes.

During the French & Indian War, Pennsylvania was invaded from the west. The westernmost European settlers in Pennsylvania were largely non-Quaker, and were impatient for a military defense — they felt that the Quaker pacifists in Philadelphia were using them as a shield. The Pennsylvania Assembly eventually gave in to their demands. It organized a volunteer militia and appropriated money for fortifications. This time it did not use the “for the King’s use” dodge by giving the money to the crown and letting it allocate the funds to war expenses, but instead the Assembly appointed its own commissioners to spend the money, and so became responsible itself for the war spending. (The legislation itself still tried to put a happy face on things, saying the grant was “for supplying our friendly Indians, holding of treaties, relieving the distressed settlers who have been driven from their lands, and other purposes for the King’s service,” but it was that last clause — “other purposes” — that hid where most of the spending would actually happen: largely building and supplying military forts.)

This compromise pleased few. Back in London there were calls to ban Quakers from colonial government entirely for their refusal to support the military defense of the colonies. London Quakers were urging pacifist Quakers to resign from the Pennsylvania Assembly as a way of forestalling complete disenfranchisement.

At the same time, a set of American Quakers felt that this was the last straw and if Quaker legislators were going to abandon their pacifist principles and enact a war spending bill, it would be up to Quaker taxpayers to refuse and resist. Several of them, including Anthony Benezet, sent a letter to the Assembly announcing that “as the raising sums of money, and putting them into the hands of committees who may apply them to purposes inconsistent with the peaceable testimony we profess and have borne to the world, appears to us in its consequences to be destructive of our religious liberties; we apprehend many among us will be under the necessity of suffering rather than consenting thereto by the payment of a tax for such purposes.”

That petition was not viewed sympathetically by the Assembly. They reminded everyone that nobody had had any problem paying those “for the Queen’s use” taxes in the past, and that this new tax was really not very different, even though the fig leaf had been removed. Meanwhile, the anti-Quakers in London got word of the petition which further inflamed them and gave them ammunition in their fight to get Quakers disenfranchised. The London Yearly Meeting was furious about the petition and it sent two emissaries to the colonies with orders to “explain and enforce our known principles and practice respecting the payment of taxes for the support of civil government.”

The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting held a conference in to try to come up with some guidance for Friends on whether or not to pay the new war taxes. They were unable to reach consensus. A group of them, including Benezet & John Woolman, sent a letter to quarterly and monthly meetings that set out the reasons why they were choosing to resist. The Assembly’s attempt to hide its war tax as a “mixed” tax with beneficial spending in the mix did not impress them. They wrote:

[T]hough some part of the money to be raised by the said Act is said to be for such benevolent purposes as supporting our friendship with our Indian neighbors and relieving the distresses of our fellow subjects who have suffered in the present calamities, for whom our hearts are deeply pained; and we affectionately and with bowels of tenderness sympathize with them therein; and we could most cheerfully contribute to those purposes if they were not so mixed that we cannot in the manner proposed show our hearty concurrence therewith without at the same time assenting to, or allowing ourselves in, practices which we apprehend contrary to the testimony which the Lord has given us to bear for his name and Truth’s sake.

This is one answer to the dilemma many Quakers find themselves in today. The U.S. government is in a constant state of war and threatens the whole world with its vast nuclear arsenal and its drone assassins. But it pays for this out of the same budget and with the same taxes as it pays for everything else it buys — including today’s equivalents of “such benevolent purposes as supporting our friendship with our Indian neighbors and relieving the distresses of our fellow subjects who have suffered in the present calamities” — so what is a good Quaker to do? Benezet, Woolman, and the rest took the position that mixing good spending and bad doesn’t erase the stain from the bad, but stains the good.

The capitulation by the Quakers in the Pennsylvania Assembly was not a compromise that satisfied either the militant Pennsylvanians, the anti-Quaker antagonists in London, or the prominent pacifists in the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. In , under pressure from all sides, most Quaker legislators resigned from the Assembly, and the experiment in Quaker government in Pennsylvania came to an end.

Meanwhile, what had become of those London Quaker enforcers who had come across the pond to knock some sense into the war tax resisting faction? Something unexpected happened: they met with representatives from both the taxpaying and tax-resisting factions, held a two-day meeting on the subject, and ended up agreeing to disagree. The London representatives, rather than chastizing the resisters, instead recommended that Quakers “endeavor earnestly to have their minds covered with fervent charity towards one another” on the subject without taking a position one way or the other.

That’s not what the London Yearly Meeting had in mind. But the logic of the war tax resisters’ position, and the sincerity with which they presented it, had an infectious tendency. Not long after the emissaries returned home, the London Yearly Meeting had been expected to issue a strong condemnation of the resisters who had signed the letter urging Quakers to consider refusing to pay the war tax. Instead, the topic was dropped from the agenda entirely. Why? Because the more Quakers in England heard about the war tax resistance in Pennsylvania, the more sympathetic they became. The Yearly Meeting authorities decided it was better not to discuss the matter at all rather than risk facing the sort of enthusiasm for war tax resistance that had rocked the Philadelphia meeting.