Some historical and global examples of tax resistance → Britain / U.K. (see also: Ireland, Scotland, Wales) → resistance to Cromwell’s government (17th Century) → George Cony

On , an English merchant named George Cony refused to pay customs duties that had been established by Oliver Cromwell’s government without its having bothered to go through parliament, and thereby called into question the legal underpinnings of the whole regime.

Emily Cooper’s The History of England (1877) summarizes the case this way:

A merchant named Cony refused in , to pay the Customs dues, on the pretext that they were illegally imposed by the Protector, because unsanctioned by Parliament. The Commissioners of Customs fined Cony £500 for his refusal. This also he refused to pay, and Cromwell, who had been on friendly terms with this merchant, remonstrated personally with him, when Cony reminded the Protector of the words which he had himself used in the Long Parliament: “The subject who submits to an illegal impost is more an enemy of his country than the tyrant who imposes it.” Cromwell grew angry, and sent Cony to prison. He claimed his liberation by writ of habeas corpus, and three eminent lawyers pleaded so strongly in his favour that Cromwell was alarmed lest taxes should be refused generally, and the lawyers were temporarily imprisoned. Sir Peter Wentworth, who had also refused to pay taxes on the same ground, was induced to yield by the earnest commands of Cromwell.

Sir James Mackintosh’s History of England puts it this way:

One man questioned his authority, and appealed to the laws. George Cony, a merchant, refused the payment of certain custom duties, on the ground of their not being levied by authority of parliament, referred to the opposition of Rolls, Valentine, and Chambers, in a similar case, to Charles Ⅰ., and recalled to the memory of Cromwell his own expression in the long parliament, — “that the subject who submits to an illegal impost is more the enemy of his country than the tyrant who imposes it.” He was committed to prison, and brought up by writ of habeas corpus. His counsel, Twisden, Windham, and Maynard, maintained the illegality of both his imprisonment and the tax, and were committed to the Tower for seditious licence of speech. Cony next maintained the same views in person with such force that he shook the conviction or shamed the conscience of the bench. Chief-justice Rolle gave in his resignation, and Glyn was appointed in his room. Between Glyn’s management and the power of the protector, Cony was induced to exchange for safety and contempt a perilous situation which would have associated his name with that of Hampden.

Lord Clarendon, a little closer to the event and with some skin in the game (as a Royalist during the Civil War), remembered it this way:

When [Cromwell] had laid some very extraordinary tax upon the city, one Cony, an eminent fanatic, and one who had heretofore served him very notably, positively refused to pay his part, and loudly dissuaded others from submitting to it, “as an imposition notoriously against the law and the property of the subject, which all honest men were bound to defend.” Cromwell sent for him, and cajoled him with the memory of “the old kindness and friendship that had been between them; and that, of all men, he did not expect this opposition from him, in a matter that was so necessary for the good of the Commonwealth.” But it was always his fortune to meet with the most rude and obstinate behaviour from those who had formerly been absolutely governed by him; and they commonly put him in mind of some expressions and sayings of his own in cases of the like nature: so this man remembered him how great an enemy he had expressed himself to such grievances, and had declared “that all who submitted to them, and paid illegal taxes, were more to blame, and greater enemies to their country, than they who had imposed them; and that the tyranny of princes could never be grievous but by the tameness and stupidity of the people.” When Cromwell saw that he could not convert him, he told him that “he had a will as stubborn as his, and he would try which of them two should be master.” Thereupon, with some terms of reproach and contempt, he committed the man to prison; whose courage was nothing abated by it, but, as soon as the term came, he brought his habeas corpus in the King’s Bench, which they then called the Upper Bench. Maynard, who was of counsel with the prisoner, demanded his liberty with great confidence, both upon the illegality of the commitment, and the illegality of the imposition, as being laid without any lawful authority. The judges could not maintain or defend either, and enough declared what their sentence would be; and therefore the Protector’s attorney required a farther delay, to answer what had been urged. Before that day Maynard was committed to the Tower for presuming to question or make doubt of his authority, and the judges were sent for and severely reprehended for suffering that license. When they, with all humility, mentioned the law and Magna Charta, Cromwell told them, “their magna f⸺ should not control his actions, which he knew were for the safety of the Commonwealth.” He asked them, “Who made them judges? Whether they had any authority to sit there but what he gave them! and, if his authority were at an end, they knew well enough what would become of themselves, and therefore advised them to be more tender of that which could only preserve them,” and so dismissed them with caution that they should not suffer the lawyers “to prate what it would not become them to hear.”

William Godwin’s History of the Commonwealth of England says:

One of the main engines by which the parliament thought to carry its purposes, was the denial of the supplies. But they formed in this an erroneous opinion of the man with whom they had to contend. Cromwel did not suffer himself to be shaken by the difficulty to which he was thus exposed; he did not allow it to be doubted for a moment whether he could carry on the affairs of the public without their assistance. He had recourse to that article in the Government of the Commonwealth which said, that the protector and council shall have power to raise money, and to make laws and ordinances for the welfare of the nation, till the parliament shall otherwise order. The ordinance of assessment for the maintenance of the army and navy expired on the twenty-fourth of December; and on the eighth of February the council issued a fresh ordinance, enacting an assessment to continue till the twenty-fourth of June following. The rate was fixed at sixty thousand pounds per month; and, as the enemies of Cromwel had disseminated the idea that he would impose a more burthensome taxation, the public in general were delighted with his moderation, and quietly submitted to what was required.

Another form of attack was commenced on his government, which with less resolution and constancy on his part would have threatened the most serious consequences. So long ago as , while the parliament was still sitting, one Cony, a merchant in the city, refused to pay certain custom-house duties on the goods he imported, on the pretense that they were not imposed by a legal authority. For this offence he was brought before the commissioners of customs on , and condemned in a fine of five hundred pounds on . Refusing to pay the fine, he was committed to prison on for contempt. A writ of habeas corpus was moved for in his favour in the following term; but the question stood over beyond Easter on account of some technical informalities. He retained three of the most eminent counsel at the bar, Maynard, Twisden and Wadham Windham, to plead for him; and the question came on to be heard on .

This was an affair of vital importance to the government of Cromwel. An ordinance had been passed by the lord protector and council on , for the continuation of the duty of customs for the four succeeding years; and it was under the authority of this ordinance that the duties of customs were at present collected. But the question was, whether those who issued this ordinance had power to make a law. It was a maxim among the professional men, that the written laws of England were statutes, acts or edicts, enacted by the people assembled in parliament; and no maxim seemed more essential to the existence of national freedom. The power of the council to make laws hinged upon the authority of the record called the Government of the Commonwealth. But, if brought into a court of justice, what was this record? It was a document, prepared by the council of the army, and sanctioned by the principal officers of state. This could not for a moment stand the scrutiny of men bred in the technical habits of the courts, as being of force to change the essential dicta of the English constitution.

On the other hand the necessity of the case seemed to supersede all objections. The old government of the state had for the moment perished; and it was indispensable, that the affairs of the nation, as they respected its internal peace and its foreign relations, should be administered in the best mode that offered itself. This was the ground upon which Cromwel stood. And he thought scorn that the public welfare, that a power which he had so hardly earned, and a government which commanded general deference at home and abroad, should be subverted by the nice disputes, or the elaborate deductions, of a band of lawyers.

It was a terrible dilemma into which Cromwel was driven by this case of Cony; and it required equal prudence and firmness to extricate himself from it without mortal injury. If he gave way, if Cony came off victorious in the contest, his government was gone; or, to speak more accurately, it would from that time forward have been a government of violence and military force only. Every one, excited by the example of Cony, would have resisted every tax, and would have defended their resistance on the same grounds that he did.

Cony’s counsel appear to have done full justice the case of their client; and Maynard in particular urged such arguments, and inforced them with such vigour, as, if ceded to, would have shaken the government to its basis. The cause was argued on ; and Maynard and his fellow-pleaders were sent to the Tower, on the charge of having held language destructive to the existing government.

The case did not end here. , Cony, unsupported by counsel, presented himself at the bar of the upper bench, and did such justice to the situation in which he was placed, that Rolle, who presided in the court, felt utterly at a loss what to determine. What grammarians call the sign of the dative case, the preposition to, before “Oliver Lord Protector,” being omitted in Cony’s answer, the decision was postponed; and his next appearance being on the last day of term, the affair was ordered to stand over to the next term. In the mean time Rolle represented the difficulties under which he laboured in such a manner to Cromwel, that he received his writ of ease on ; and in the following week Glyn was appointed to succeed him as lord chief justice of England. Maynard, Twisden and Windham had previously on their submission been discharged from confinement; and Cony was prevailed upon by some means to bring his cause no more before the court.

Frederick Andrew Inderwick’s The Interregnum adds some additional details, though it seems deliberately biased in favor of the Cromwellian position:

When the judges returned to town, and Trinity Term commenced, an event occurred in the Upper Bench which has been universally commented on, as showing Cromwell’s disregard of law and of liberty where the interests of his Government were concerned. Three of the leading counsel of the day — Serjeant Maynard, Serjeant Twisden, and Mr. Wadham Windham — were committed to the Tower for words spoken in court on behalf of their client, a certain Mr. George Cony. All writers, including Hallam [Constitutional History], speak of the case as being somewhat obscure as to the facts, it not being reported in any of the books; but all concur in censuring the conduct of the Government in regard to the three counsel. And yet, without a true knowledge of the facts, no judgment upon the conduct of Cromwell or his Government can be safely arrived at. The immunity of counsel in defending their clients is doubtless one of the great strongholds of English liberty, and yet this immunity is not altogether without restriction. A case would be conceivable where a counsel in his speech might appeal to the crowd to rescue his client, and thus bring terror and violence to bear on the judge. Such conduct would not be beyond the reach of the law. It is a recognised rule of law that when a counsel, regardless of his instructions or of the fair limits of argument, goes out of his way to slander any person, he is subject to an action in respect of words so spoken. And for misconduct in court the judge may exercise over counsel the process of contempt either by fine or committal to prison. I have found among the records of the Council of State the report upon which their action was taken, and from that and the newspapers of the day I have gathered the following facts, which I believe to be accurate, and from which the reader can draw his own conclusions.

Mr. Cony, a City merchant, dealing in Spanish wine, whom Clarendon describes as “an eminent fanatik,” and who combined a hatred of the Government with a dislike to taxation, had refused to pay certain customs’ dues, payable under an ordinance of the Protector, continuing an excise duty which had existed since , if not much longer. The power to make such ordinance was conferred on the Protector and his Council by the Instrument of Government, which contained the following clauses:—

Art. Ⅵ. — The laws shall not be altered, suspended, or abrogated, nor any new law made, nor any tax, charge or imposition laid upon the people but by common consent in Parliament, save only as is expressed in the ⅩⅩⅦth Article.

Art. ⅩⅩⅦ. — That a constant yearly revenue shall be raised … which revenue shall be raised by the customs and such other ways and means as shall be agreed upon by the Lord Protector and his Council, and shall not be taken away or diminished, nor the way agreed upon for raising the same altered, but by the consent of the Lord Protector and the Parliament.

The Protector was also empowered with the advice of his Council to make other binding ordinances during the intervals of Parliament, and he had in fact by virtue of such instrument and by ordinance appointed all the judges, and had lately conferred on Mr. Twisden and Mr. Maynard the degree of the coif. Mr. Cony, having refused to pay these dues, was committed to the Serjeant-at-Arms by the Council of State, under the powers conferred on them by the Long Parliament. He thereupon moved for his habeas corpus in the Upper Bench. The account of the affair, reported to the Council by Mr. Zanchy, the Solicitor to the Commonwealth, was that on Mr. Cony’s case being called on for argument of the habeas corpus, and the counsel for the Commonwealth being engaged in various other courts, he went out to fetch them, and on his return he found Serjeant Twisden — who afterwards as a judge earned for himself an unenviable notoriety for ferocity of demeanour, and who is specially known for his conduct in that respect at the trial of John Bunyan — arguing Mr. Cony’s case. He was contending that the Protector had no power to make any ordinance in regard to customs and excise, and accordingly that no duties or customs were then payable by any law whatever. “He insisted much on the taking away the Star Chamber, and urged that subjects were not to be imprisoned nor their goods attached, but in a legal way and on trial by jury,” and he discussed at length the orders of the Council, and the ordinances under which the commissioners sat at the receipt of custom. The Attorney-General, in his reply, wondered that the Serjeant should speak so much against the present authority, being that under which that court sat, and by which Mr. Cony expected justice. Serjeant Maynard spoke but little, and Mr. Wadham Windham said nothing at all. As the result of Mr. Zanchy’s report all these counsel were summoned before the Council of State, when the Lord Chief Justice was also requested to attend. Every member of the council, including the Protector, was present. The counsel were called in one after the other, when it was resolved “That all three be committed to the Tower, and that His Highness sign the warrant for their commitment for using words tending to sedition and subversive of the present Government.” These “three learned and profound lawyers” accordingly went to the Tower, whence, on , they humbly petitioned for their release, and Serjeant Maynard was discharged. On the Serjeant Twisden petitioned again for his release. He pleaded the case of his wife and seven children, regretted that what he had said in his client’s cause should have excited His Highness’s displeasure, and disavowed any intention to provoke sedition or discontent. Mr. Wadham Windham, except for his wife and seven children, petitioned to the same effect, and not long after they also were released. Meanwhile Mr. Cony’s case was postponed from time to time. He refused to employ counsel, though several offered their services, and, according to tradition, the matter was settled before the following Term, when Serejant Glyn took his seat as Lord Chief Justice of the Upper Bench. The commitment of these counsel was undoubtedly an arbitrary act on the part of the Council of State, and on general grounds indefensible. But on the other hand it must be borne in mind, not in justification but in palliation of the business, that these two serjeants were among the leading men of the time; that these Ordinances of Cromwell’s were authorized by the Instrument of Government which had been accepted by the nation and passed by Parliament: that the proposition of Serjeant Twisden, that no excise or customs whatever were now legally payable (the words that were the gist of the offence) might have given rise to a general repudiation of the payment of customs and excise, and have led to trouble and conflicts from one end of the country to the other.1 Cony was a firebrand of the [John] Lilburn type, encouraged by the cavaliers for the purpose of injuring the Government, and the combination of Cony, the fanatic, as party, and Twisden, the cavalier, as counsel, supporting his opposition to the payment of any taxes whatever, was one calculated in every way to rouse the susceptibilities of the Protector and the Council of State. It seems improbable that Serjeant Maynard would willingly have lent himself to this course, although his action (if indeed he was correctly reported) in regard to Lilburn may have given rise to the suggestion, and the three counsel probably had to thank the indiscretion and the Royalism of Serjeant Twisden for their temporary detention in the Tower. At all events it was so regarded at the Restoration, when Serjeant Twisden was at once made a judge as a reward for his loyalty to the Royal family, and Mr. Wadham Windham was shortly afterwards, in , also appointed to a seat on the King’s Bench. Serjeant Maynard’s intervention in the matter seems, however, to have had no very great effect upon Cromwell, who, in , appointed him Serjeant to His Highness the Protector, and afterwards, as is suggested, his Solicitor-General, a post which he certainly held under Richard.

A great deal has been made of this case to the prejudice of Cromwell by panegyrists of the Restoration, and by writers on constitutional history, and undoubtedly it can only be justified from the point of view of a ruler, on the ground of necessity and that the injury to the Commonwealth by permitting the course of Mr. Cony and his counsel to pass unnoticed was greater than that of interfering with the privileges and rights of the Bar. I can hardly believe, however, that the public of that day took a very serious view of the position, or that the presence of lawyers in their midst was so lovely in their eyes that they found themselves either pained or outraged by hearing that three of their number had, like so many of their fellow citizens in that generation of troubles, spent a few days in the calm and secluded atmosphere of the Tower. Mr. Cony, who withdrew, or, as is said, was coaxed out of his case, appeared again before the Council in the following autumn under circumstances which seem to favour the suggestion that some sort of a compromise had been made with him. He seems, in disregard of the navigation laws which had, since the time of Richard Ⅱ., forbidden the importation of foreign wine in foreign bottoms, to have been in the habit of importing his Malaga wine in any ship, British or foreign, that happened to suit him; and, in , war with Spain having in the meantime been declared, he was expecting the immediate arrival in the Downs of a Dutch ship with a consignment of Spanish wine. “I and my friends,” said he, in a petition to the Protector, “cannot safely bring our goods into the port of London without your leave; but you lately promised me your favour on any reasonable request; therefore I beg speedy leave to bring in my ship and goods.” Matters of trade and navigation were, however, matters for the Council of State, and the petition was accordingly sent on to that body, with a note of a somewhat similar application to Parliament in January, 1652–3, which had been at that time favourably received. The Council sent this forthwith to their Committee, who, on , reported “to signify to George Cony — on his petition to import Spanish wine in a Dutch vessel — that the Council thinks not fit to do anything in the matter at present, since the granting thereof would be contrary to the Act of Navigation.”2 It is said, on what grounds I know not, that the Chief Justice had scruples in regard to Cony; if so, he was not the only judge who showed his independence.


  1. An Act of the Long Parliament (Statute 1653, c. 38) had continued the customs and excise till . An ordinance of the Protector and his Council (Ord. 1653, c. 15, 20th March, 1653–4) continued them till . The Parliament, 1656, confirmed and again continued the customs and excise.
  2. He was heard of again in , when “the rabble of the town of Canterbury” were trying to get him chosen as their member.

Some contemporary newspaper articles by Gilbert Mabbot read:

…Serjant Mainard, Serjant Twisden, and Waddam Windham, were yesterday taken from the bar in Westminster Hall, and sent prisoners to the Tower; the cause is not knowne, but vulgarly given out for beeing of Councell for one Cony against the Commonwealth, who refused to pay custome for goods, and beeing committed by the Committee for Preservation of Customes, brought a Habeas Corpus, upon which his tryall should then have beene, but the certain truth heerof your Honour may expect by the next.

The trew cause of Serjeant Maynard, Serjeant Twisden, and Waddham [Windham’s] commitment to the Tower was for theire pleading to the Court, that the ordinance of his Highnesse and Councill for receiveing the customes was noe better than a private order of a Councill table.

The Court of Upper Bench granted an al[ia]s Habeas Corpus to Mr. Coney (error being found in the former), which was fil’d on and judgment should have been given thereuppon, but deferred till the first day of the next terme. The 3 lawyers comitted to the Tower have petitioned for liberty, acknowledging and being sorrowfull for theire erroure, but yet his Highnesse hath done nothing therein.

George Radcliffe wrote in a letter at the time ():

In England there is great expectation what wilbe comme of Conyes busines; it is put off till the next terme, and mens eyes are attent upon it, as more concerned then at any thinge which happened these many yeares[!]. Cromwell, when he committed Maynard and Twisden and another lawyer, tould them that, if they would have Magna Carta (which they had talked so much on in Westminster Hall), they must put on each a helmet and troope for it! And now they see what they fought for. Here is the liberty of ye subject.

On , Joseph Jane wrote of his worry that the civil disobedience was fizzling out, with the lawyers petitioning meekly to Cromwell to be let out of the Tower:

I doubt of the generality of refusers to pay taxes, in regard those lawyers peticion soe soone; and Maynard doubles his soe spedily, it seemes he is resolved to content the Protector in termes. I had an apprehension of good effects of it at first, but this back-slydinge somewhat cooles me; and I see Whitlock yet continues the scale, who was sayde to have given over.


Mark Wilks was arrested and sent to Brixton Prison for failing to pay his wife’s income taxes. The case became a cause célèbre in the British women’s suffrage movement and an embarrassment to the British government and its tax authorities.

This is a good example of how careful study of the law can help tax resisters find and exploit flaws that hold the tax system or its enforcement arm up to ridicule, make them unworkable, or make them vehicles for additional resistance or propaganda opportunities.

Are you sure you are not paying too much tax to John Bull? We have recovered or saved large sums for women taxpayers. Why not consult us? It will cost you nothing. Women Taxpayer’s Agency (Mrs. E. Ayres Purdie), Hampden House, Kingsway, W.C. Tel 6049 Central.

Ethel Ayres Purdie, resident tax law expert of the Women’s Tax Resistance League, discovered the vulnerability. The Income Tax Act, she wrote, “is a most fearsome piece of composition. Its language is archaic and tautological, it rises wholly superior to punctuation, and proceeds breathlessly through one hundred and ninety-four clauses.” But one of those clauses held a fatal flaw.

The “Married Woman’s Property Act” of was a reform that allowed married women to maintain control of their property rather than relinquishing it to their husbands’ control upon marriage. But the earlier () Income Tax Act still considered the husband to be solely liable for the income taxes of both the husband and wife.

At first, when Elizabeth Wilks began resisting her income tax, the government responded by seizing and selling her property, but when this quirk in the law was discovered, tax resisters like Wilks protested that the government could not legally seize her property since as a married woman her taxes were legally owed by the him in the marriage. So the government went after Mark Wilks instead.

Mark Wilks, for his part, insisted that he could hardly fill out an income tax return since he had no legal right to demand information from his wife about her income! Besides, his modest income and lack of property in his own name meant that he could not afford to pay the taxes on his wife’s considerably larger income (he did pay the tax on the portion of their joint income that was attributable to his own income, though his income was low enough that by itself it would not have been taxable). “I am informed that I am liable for taxes levied on her income,” he wrote “while at the same time the law places all her property entirely beyond my control.”

Meanwhile, the Women’s Tax Resistance League trumpeted the arrest of Mark Wilks and his indefinite imprisonment — “for non-payment of taxes not his own and due on an income over which he has no control and whose amount he can only guess at” — as proving their contention that not only should women resist the income tax, but that married women were not even legally obligated to pay it and those who were paying it were operating under a legal delusion.

The imprisonment of Mark Wilks was a propaganda coup:

For what do the arrest and imprisonment of Mark Wilks mean? We are perfectly certain that it will not last long. Stupid and inept as it has been, the Government, we are certain, will not risk the odium which would justly fall upon it if this outrage on liberty went on. A Government which has much at stake and which lives by the breath of popular opinion cannot afford to ignore such strong and healthy protest as is being poured out on all sides. To us, who are in the midst of it, that which seems most remarkable is the growth of public feeling. In the streets where processions are nightly held, we were met at first by banter and rowdyism. “A man in prison for the sake of Suffragettes!” To the boy-mind of the metropolis, on the outskirts of many an earnest crowd, that seemed irresistibly funny; but thoughtfulness is spreading; into even the boy-mind, the light of truth is creeping. If it had done nothing else, the imprisonment of Mark Wilks has certainly done this — it has educated the public mind.

Wilks was released after less than a month in prison, without official explanation, and without paying the tax.

A tax resistance campaign is almost always one that butts up against the law, and it can be helpful to have campaigners who know a thing or two about legal matters. As Elizabeth Cady Stanton put it when she was considering a tax resistance campaign for women’s suffrage in America,

One thing is certain, this course will necessarily involve a good deal of litigation, and we shall need lawyers of our own sex whose intellects, sharpened by their interests, shall be quick to discover the loopholes of retreat.

Today I’ll summarize some examples of how legal study and the assistance of attorneys have made a difference in tax resistance campaigns.

Poll Tax rebels in Thatcher’s Britain

Understanding the law and the legal process was important in the poll tax rebellion — to give confidence to resisters, to support targets of government reprisals, and to make the process of tax enforcement costly and unmanageable.

Anti-poll tax volunteer Danny Burns writes:

In Bristol when the court cases started, each person with a summons, who rang into the office, was logged and sent an information pack. The same personal attention was given to people with notices from the bailiffs. At the peak of the campaign, the Bristol office was staffed morning and afternoon five days a week by different volunteers. , it was receiving over 200 calls a week. … [The volunteers included] at least five court support workers…

In every part of England and Wales local groups mobilised to provide support for non-payers in the courts. Tens, if not hundreds of activists in each region attended legal briefing sessions. These were run both by activists and sympathetic local lawyers. People were given ideas about how they might disrupt or delay the court proceedings. These included simple things, like asking for a glass of water because their throat was dry, demanding to see the identity cards of everyone present in court, to fainting in court or arranging for fire alarms to go off. People were told to demand their rights to see and read every document which was produced as evidence against them. They were also given briefings on the basic technical arguments.

By , when most of the court cases had started, virtually every Anti-Poll Tax Union in the UK had trained at least two or three of its members to become conversant with the Poll Tax law. Throughout England and Wales over a thousand people were trained to do court support work and could quote the relevant legislation. This is unique in the history of popular campaigning. The Anti-Poll Tax Unions hoped to use the legal precedent of McKenzie versus McKenzie (), which said that a person can “attend a trial as a friend of either party (to) take notes and quietly make suggestions and give advice to that party.” This person would be known as a “McKenzie friend.” McKenzie friends had no right to address the court, but they could advise the non-payer what to say. In this way everyone would be able to offer technical defences and thereby delay the proceedings.

The campaign needed lawyers only in the most technical cases. Lawyers were often seen as a liability, because they represented an individual client, and it was in their interest to get through the procedure as quickly as possible. It was in the campaign’s interest for everything to proceed as slowly as possible. Nevertheless, legal knowledge and guidance was essential. This arrived with the creation of the Poll Tax Legal Group… [which] researched legislation and case law. It set up a network of lawyers throughout England and Wales who could support the legal challenges of Anti-Poll Tax groups and produced over 30 accessible legal bulletins on the Poll Tax and a book called To Pay or Not To Pay. These underpinned the legal needs of the movement and helped ordinary people to get to grips with the law they needed to use.

Delaying tactics were mixed with serious legal technicalities. Councils were challenged for sending notices to the wrong addresses. Given the rate at which people moved houses, it was difficult for the councils to keep up, and as a result many cases were dropped because people hadn’t received proper notice. Big legal challenges were also made over “correct procedures.” These came in the first few weeks and resulted mostly from the inexperience of councils in dealing with this sort of process. The first day of Medina Council’s cases (on the Isle of Wight) is probably the most famous example. The reminder notices were sent out with second class stamps, they consequently arrived late, people didn’t receive the statutory notice which they were entitled to, and the court threw out all 1,900 cases. The council had to start again.

When police attacked an anti-poll tax demonstration in London, many of the demonstrators fought back, and hundreds were arrested. Elements of the campaign leadership distanced themselves from the defendants, embarrassed to have the campaign associated with violence. So other activists helped to form and coordinate an independent group — the Trafalgar Square Defendants’ Campaign — with the following mandate:

The campaign will:

  1. Unconditionally defend all of those arrested on .
  2. Be controlled by and be accountable to the defendants
  3. Be totally independent of any other organisation.
  4. Seek support from the whole Anti-Poll Tax movement and all other sympathetic organisations.
  5. Seek to co-ordinate the legal defence of all those arrested.
  6. Seek to build a coherent picture of events of from the point of view of those arrested.
  7. Publicise the points of view of defendants.
  8. Raise money for a bust fund, controlled by the defendants to cover their legal and welfare costs.
  9. Ensure that at all future Anti-Poll Tax events there will be proper legal cover and support for anyone arrested. This will include an office and workers to visit places of detention and look after prisoners’ welfare.

Danny Burns again:

About a dozen people volunteered to carry out the court monitoring process. They attended every hearing, systematically took notes of everything that was said, recorded the numbers of police officers and approached the defendants asking them to attend the now weekly TSDC meetings… By the summer, over 250 of the defendants had been contacted.

The TSDC ran advice sessions on prison, produced legal briefing notes and mailed out the minutes of the weekly meetings to every defendant every week. A solicitors’ group was established with a core of three, but at the peak of early activity they managed to get over fifteen solicitors involved. This proved important because the solicitors’ group managed to get hold of over 50 hours of police videos and handed them over to the campaign. The police videos were crucial in getting a lot of people off, and a number of people in the campaign worked extremely hard editing videos and rejigging them for particular trials. The solicitors’ group also got the Crown Prosecution Service to hand over a full list of all of the defendants and the names and addresses of their lawyers. The lawyers were all contacted and, although many were initially reluctant to co-operate with the campaign, they soon realised that TSDC had a lot of information which their clients needed.

The Dublin water charge strike

In the campaign against the Dublin water charge in , the resisters used the legal system as another avenue of protest and resistance. The Secretary of the Federation of Dublin Anti Water Charge Campaigns recalls:

Every possible legal angle was pursued by the campaign’s legal team — down to legal definitions of what constituted a householder, making the councils prove that the person they had summonsed actually lived at the address, that they owned the property, etc., etc. We weren’t doing this because we had any illusions in the impartiality of the court system. We knew that even though we were successful in finding various legal loopholes these would all be closed one by one and that the judges would be doing their best to facilitate the councils. This was demonstrated most clearly when a judge in Swords invoked the Public Order Act to close several streets around the courthouse to prevent a protest outside it.

But by contesting every detail of every summons we could make the system unworkable. There were tens of thousands of non-payers. After several months the councils had only managed to get a couple of dozen cases through the courts. Someone calculated that at the rate they were managing to proceed it would take them something like 220 years to process all the cases. And it was costing them more in legal fees than they could ever hope to take back in charges — even if they managed to bully everyone into paying.

Any time the council did manage to get a court order, it was appealed — again the objective being to clog up the system.

George Cony’s aggressive lawyers

When Oliver Cromwell knocked the English king off his throne, he did so in part in the cause of Parliamentary democracy. Upon assuming charge of the English government, however, he grew impatient with Parliament and decided to enact some taxes on his own.

One of Cromwell’s more radical supporters, George Cony, taking Cromwell at his word (Cromwell had said that “the subject who submits to an illegal impost is more an enemy of his country than the tyrant who imposes it”) decided to refuse to pay one of these arbitrary taxes.

Cony’s lawyers argued his case so successfully that Cony’s tax evasion case threatened to call the legal underpinnings of Cromwell’s regime into question. The judges in the case seemed sympathetic, and Cromwell was so alarmed that he had all three lawyers imprisoned in the Tower of London until they repented, upon which the chief-justice who was hearing the case resigned.

Hugh Williams and the Rebecca rioters

Radical lawyer Hugh Williams was of great help to the Rebecca movement in Wales — some say he was more than a legal advisor, but one of the instigators of the movement, or even “Rebecca” herself! One account says: “[Williams] did all the legal work for the rioters, also drafting various petitions for them. He was a prominent member of the Chartist movement, acting as their solicitor, and he defended the prisoners at Welshpool Assizes in July, 1839, for taking part in the Chartist Riots. He rendered similar services to the Rebecca prisoners gratuitously; but was eventually reported to the Lord Chancellor and struck off the Rolls. He, however, continued to do a considerable amount of legal work, and whenever it became necessary for him to appear in court, he invariably employed [another attorney] to appear for him.”

His familiarity with the law and the legal process helped him help the Rebeccaites translate their grievances into formal petitions, which in turn helped the Rebeccaite “people power” movement effect change in government policy.

White supremacists in Reconstruction-era Louisiana

When white supremacists in New Orleans decided to actively withdraw their consent from the mixed-race Reconstruction government of “scalawags” and “carpet-baggers” there in , they formed “The People’s Association to Resist Unconstitutional Taxation” and declared a tax strike.

Fifty-eight New Orleans attorneys signed the following statement of support:

The undersigned attorneys at law, citizens of New Orleans, engage themselves, without compensation, and as a matter of public service, to defend professionally all citizens, residents, or property-holders in this city, who shall desire their assistance in resisting the collection by municipal authorities of the taxes known as the “school-tax,” the “park-tax,” and the “metropolitan-police tax,” and other taxes the collection of which may be lawfully resisted.

The Smith sisters of Glastonbury

Abby & Julia Smith refused to pay taxes to a local government that denied women the vote and that took advantage of this by excessively taxing women’s property in order to ease the tax burden on male voters and to redistribute the money to male patronage recipients. In response, the government periodically seized and auctioned off the Smith sisters’ cows (“Votey” and “Taxey”). That failing to discourage the Smiths, the town decided to fight dirty, and the Smiths fought back legally in a way that brought further attention to their cause:

[A]n inconspicuous advertisement in the Hartford Courant announced the sale at public auction of fifteen acres of Smith pasture land on , a date contrived to fall just before the grass would be cut. Though the sisters set out on that day with ample funds, the collector adroitly shifted the meeting place, and when the two women caught up with the auction, the gavel had just gone down transferring for $78.35 land worth nearly $2,000 to none other than a covetous neighbor who had tried for years to get possession of it.

Abby and Julia were daughters of a lawyer. They brought suit against tax collector George C. Andrews on the grounds that he had violated a law which plainly stated that movable property must first be sold for unpaid taxes before real estate could be seized. The case was tried in the home of Judge Hollister of Glastonbury, who gave a verdict in favor of the sisters and fined Andrews damages of $10. Threatening terrible consequences, Andrews appealed the case.

The new trial, which lasted three days in the Hartford Court of Common Pleas, had a farcical aspect. There were misplaced records; there was distorted evidence. The judge, in absentia, reversed the Glastonbury decision and decided in favor of collector Andrews. At this point the Smiths’ lawyer backed out. Abby and Julia, both now in their eighties, began the study of law with the intention of conducting their own case. Happily a capable lawyer finally agreed to place a second appeal before the Court of Equity.

For two years a wide and sympathetic public followed this devious litigation. Across the nation, even in England and France, editors and columnists lauded the Glastonbury cows in prose and poetry. Reporters visited the town, drank tea in the elm-shaded farmhouse, admired the cows, polled public opinion in Glastonbury, and returned with highly flavored and often inaccurate stories. With whatever condescension these reporters arrived, they seem, one and all, to have found the Smith sisters irresistible. The hospitality, wit, and charm of the two elderly spinsters captivated the world beyond Glastonbury.

When the final verdict was made in their favor, in , women the country over rejoiced. To be sure, Julia and Abby did not vote in Glastonbury, but from that time on their property was undisturbed.

The Greek “Won’t Pay” movement

The current Greek “Won’t Pay” movement, which is resisting a number of stealth taxes the government has added to things like utility bills and road tolls, has also carried its struggle into court — at one point winning an injunction that forbade the state power company from cutting the power of people who were refusing to pay the new utility bill tax.

Newly-enfranchised Pennsylvania women

When women in Pennsylvania won the vote, many discovered to their chagrin that they had also become subject to taxes to which they had previously been immune. Thousands of them, deciding the package was not worth it, decided to refuse to pay.

And they were able to take advantage of a quirk in an law that did not permit the authorities to send women to prison (though they could imprison men) for tax refusal:

It took a few years for the state legislature to pass a law allowing for the jailing of women who refused to pay their taxes.

Maurice McCrackin’s lawyers

Not all legal help is helpful. When American war tax resister Maurice McCrackin was convicted of refusing to cooperate with an IRS summons, he was following a strategy of complete noncooperation that he kept following right into the courtroom — where he refused to stand for the judge, refused to plead to the charges, refused to answer questions, refused to consult with his court-appointed attorney, fasted while behind bars, and had to be wheeled into and out from his court appearances because he wouldn’t walk there under his own power.

For the same reason, upon his conviction, he emphatically said that he was not interested in pursuing an appeal: “I said I wanted to file no appeal, nor did I want steps taken to keep the door open, so an appeal could be perfected later. I do not recognize any appeal on my behalf… My position is not changed. This is a moral, not a legal, struggle.”

One of the lawyers who had been assigned to defend him, however, convinced that the judge had betrayed bias against McCracken in his statements from the bench, said that he intended to appeal anyway.

“Constitutionalist” tax protesters

And then there are the “Constitutionalist” “show me the law!”-style tax protesters. For years they have been bedeviling the IRS with their baroque, ever-evolving, quasi-legal arguments and pleadings based on the real Constitution, or common law, or tortured interpretations of excerpts from a variety of cherry-picked statutes and court rulings.

While they typically know just enough about the law to get into trouble, without knowing enough to get out again, there’s no question that they cause headaches a-plenty for the powers that be. Alas, this does not seem to actually be their objective. Instead, they seem convinced that they’re not just whistling Dixie, but they’re right, and if they can just figure out how to pick the lock of the court system with the right argument, they’ll be able to walk out free into a new world where their Constitution holds sway and the perverters of the true law are vanquished.

Alas, most of what they have discovered is an enormous and inventive catalog of things that don’t work, so in spite of all of their creativity and effort, they have given the rest of us little to work with. But if you ever have a “that’s so crazy it just might work!” idea about going up against the IRS, you might want to research these folks first — they may have already tried it.

And every once in a while they rack up a courtroom victory — not often one that amounts to much in real terms, but it fuels the movement. One observer of the movement reacted to a twist of this sort by saying: “This is going to encourage thousands more people who were on the fence, who were paying taxes only because they were afraid they would be criminally prosecuted. If too many people do this, the tax system will collapse because it is based on people voluntarily complying.”

(I’m most familiar with the U.S. variety, but similar groups exist in Canada, the U.K., and probably elsewhere. Earlier this year in England, for instance, hundreds of Constitutionalist tax protesters stormed a courtroom where one of their number was on trial, whereupon they attempted to put the judge under citizens arrest, and began making their own rulings from the bench!)