Henry David Thoreau → his writings → Slavery in Massachusetts

I lately at­tended a meet­ing of the cit­i­zens of Con­cord, ex­pect­ing, as one among many, to speak on the sub­ject of slav­ery in Mas­sa­chu­setts; but I was sur­prised and dis­ap­pointed to find that what had called my towns­men to­gether was the des­tiny of Ne­braska, and not of Mas­sa­chu­setts, and that what I had to say would be en­tirely out of order. I had thought that the house was on fire, and not the prai­rie; but though sev­eral of the cit­i­zens of Mas­sa­chu­setts are now in pris­on for at­tempt­ing to res­cue a slave from her own clutches, not one of the speak­ers at that meet­ing ex­pressed re­gret for it, not one even re­ferred to it. It was only the dis­po­si­tion of some wild lands a thou­sand miles off which ap­peared to con­cern them. The in­hab­i­tants of Con­cord are not pre­pared to stand by one of their own bridges, but talk only of tak­ing up a po­si­tion on the high­lands be­yond the Yel­low­stone River. Our But­tricks and Davis­es and Hosmers are re­treat­ing thither, and I fear that they will leave no Lex­ing­ton Com­mon be­tween them and the en­emy. There is not one slave in Ne­braska; there are per­haps a mil­lion slaves in Mas­sa­chu­setts. [¶1]

They who have been bred in the school of pol­i­tics fail now and al­ways to face the facts. Their meas­ures are half meas­ures and make­shifts merely. They put off the day of set­tle­ment in­def­i­nitely, and mean­while the debt ac­cu­mu­lates. Though the Fu­gi­tive Slave Law had not been the sub­ject of dis­cus­sion on that oc­ca­sion, it was at length faintly re­solved by my towns­men, at an ad­journed meet­ing, as I learn, that the com­pro­mise compact of hav­ing been re­pu­di­ated by one of the par­ties, “There­fore,… the Fu­gi­tive Slave Law of must be re­pealed.” But this is not the rea­son why an in­iq­ui­tous law should be re­pealed. The fact which the pol­i­ti­cian faces is merely that there is less honor among thieves than was sup­posed, and not the fact that they are thieves. [¶2]

As I had no op­por­tu­nity to ex­press my thoughts at that meet­ing, will you allow me to do so here? [¶3]

Again it hap­pens that the Bos­ton Court-House is full of armed men, hold­ing pris­oner and try­ing a man, to find out if he is not really a slave. Does any one think that jus­tice or God awaits Mr. Lor­ing’s de­ci­sion? For him to sit there de­cid­ing still, when this ques­tion is al­ready de­cided from eter­nity to eter­nity, and the un­let­tered slave him­self and the mul­ti­tude around have long since heard and as­sented to the de­ci­sion, is sim­ply to make him­self ri­dic­u­lous. We may be tempted to ask from whom he re­ceived his com­mis­sion, and who he is that re­ceived it; what novel stat­utes he obeys, and what prec­e­dents are to him of au­thor­ity. Such an ar­bi­ter’s very ex­is­tence is an im­per­ti­nence. We do not ask him to make up his mind, but to make up his pack. [¶4]

I lis­ten to hear the voice of a Gov­er­nor, Com­mander-in-Chief of the forces of Mas­sa­chu­setts. I hear only the creak­ing of crick­ets and the hum of in­sects which now fill the sum­mer air. The Gov­er­nor’s ex­ploit is to re­view the troops on muster days. I have seen him on horse­back, with his hat off, lis­ten­ing to a chap­lain’s prayer. It chances that that is all I have ever seen of a Gov­er­nor. I think that I could man­age to get along with­out one. If he is not of the least use to pre­vent my be­ing kid­napped, pray of what im­port­ant use is he likely to be to me? When free­dom is most en­dan­gered, he dwells in the deep­est ob­scur­ity. A dis­tin­guished cler­gy­man told me that he chose the pro­fes­sion of a cler­gy­man because it af­forded the most lei­sure for lit­er­ary pur­suits. I would rec­om­mend to him the pro­fes­sion of a Gov­er­nor. [¶5]

, also, when the Sims trag­edy was acted, I said to my­self, There is such an of­fi­cer, if not such a man, as the Gov­er­nor of Mas­sa­chu­setts — what has he been about the last fort­night? Has he had as much as he could do to keep on the fence dur­ing this moral earth­quake? It seemed to me that no keener sat­ire could have been aimed at, no more cut­ting in­sult have been of­fered to that man, than just what hap­pened — the ab­sence of all in­quiry after him in that cri­sis. The worst and the most I chance to know of him is that he did not im­prove that op­por­tu­nity to make him­self known, and wor­thily known. He could at least have re­signed him­self into fame. It ap­peared to be for­got­ten that there was such a man or such an of­fice. Yet no doubt he was en­deav­or­ing to fill the gu­ber­na­to­rial chair all the while. He was no Gov­er­nor of mine. He did not gov­ern me. [¶6]

But at last, in the pre­sent case, the Gov­er­nor was heard from. After he and the United States gov­ern­ment had per­fectly suc­ceeded in rob­bing a poor in­no­cent black man of his lib­erty for life, and, as far as they could, of his Cre­a­tor’s like­ness in his breast, he made a speech to his ac­com­plices, at a con­grat­u­la­tory supper! [¶7]

I have read a re­cent law of this State, mak­ing it penal for any of­fi­cer of the “Com­mon­wealth” to “de­tain or aid in the… de­ten­tion,” any­where within its lim­its, “of any per­son, for the rea­son that he is claimed as a fu­gi­tive slave.” Also, it was a mat­ter of no­to­ri­ety that a writ of re­plevin to take the fu­gi­tive out of the cus­tody of the United States Mar­shal could not be served for want of suf­fi­cient force to aid the of­fi­cer. [¶8]

I had thought that the Gov­er­nor was, in some sense, the ex­ec­u­tive of­fi­cer of the State; that it was his busi­ness, as a Gov­er­nor, to see that the laws of the State were ex­e­cuted; while, as a man, he took care that he did not, by so doing, break the laws of hu­man­ity; but when there is any spe­cial im­por­tant use for him, he is use­less, or worse than use­less, and per­mits the laws of the State to go un­ex­e­cuted. Perhaps I do not know what are the du­ties of a Gov­er­nor; but if to be a Gov­er­nor re­quires to sub­ject one’s self to so much ig­no­miny with­out rem­edy, if it is to put a re­straint upon my man­hood, I shall take care never to be Gov­er­nor of Mas­sa­chu­setts. I have not read far in the stat­utes of this Com­mon­wealth. It is not prof­it­a­ble read­ing. They do not al­ways say what is true; and they do not al­ways mean what they say. What I am con­cerned to know is, that that man’s in­flu­ence and au­thor­ity were on the side of the slave­holder, and not of the slave — of the guilty, and not of the in­no­cent — of in­just­ice, and not of jus­tice. I never saw him of whom I speak; in­deed, I did not know that he was Gov­er­nor until this event oc­curred. I heard of him and Anthony Burns at the same time, and thus, un­doubt­edly, most will hear of him. So far am I from be­ing gov­erned by him. I do not mean that it was any­thing to his dis­credit that I had not heard of him, only that I heard what I did. The worst I shall say of him is, that he proved no bet­ter than the ma­jor­ity of his con­stit­u­ents would be likely to prove. In my opin­ion, he was not equal to the oc­ca­sion. [¶9]

The whole mil­i­tary force of the State is at the ser­vice of a Mr. Sut­tle, a slave­holder from Vir­ginia, to enable him to catch a man whom he calls his prop­erty; but not a sol­dier is of­fered to save a cit­i­zen of Mas­sa­chu­setts from be­ing kid­napped! Is this what all these sol­diers, all this training, have been for these sev­enty-nine years past? Have they been trained merely to rob Mexico and carry back fu­gi­tive slaves to their mas­ters? [¶10]

These very nights I heard the sound of a drum in our streets. There were men train­ing still; and for what? I could with an ef­fort par­don the cock­er­els of Con­cord for crow­ing still, for they, per­chance, had not been beaten that morn­ing; but I could not ex­cuse this rub-a-dub of the “train­ers.” The slave was carried back by ex­actly such as these; i.e., by the sol­dier, of whom the best you can say in this con­nec­tion is that he is a fool made con­spic­u­ous by a painted coat. [¶11]

Three years ago, also, just a week after the au­thor­i­ties of Bos­ton as­sem­bled to carry back a per­fectly in­no­cent man, and one whom they knew to be in­no­cent, into slav­ery, the in­hab­i­tants of Con­cord caused the bells to be rung and the can­nons to be fired, to cel­e­brate their lib­erty — and the cour­age and love of lib­erty of their an­ces­tors who fought at the bridge. As if those three mil­lions had fought for the right to be free them­selves, but to hold in slav­ery three mil­lion others. Now­a­days, men wear a fool’s-cap, and call it a lib­erty-cap. I do not know but there are some who, if they were tied to a whip­ping-post, and could but get one hand free, would use it to ring the bells and fire the can­nons to cel­e­brate their lib­erty. So some of my towns­men took the lib­erty to ring and fire. That was the ex­tent of their free­dom; and when the sound of the bells died away, their lib­erty died away also; when the pow­der was all ex­pended, their lib­erty went off with the smoke. [¶12]

The joke could be no broader if the in­mates of the pris­ons were to sub­scribe for all the pow­der to be used in such sa­lutes, and hire the jail­ers to do the fir­ing and ring­ing for them, while they en­joyed it through the grat­ing. [¶13]

This is what I thought about my neigh­bors. [¶14]

Every hu­mane and in­tel­li­gent in­hab­i­tant of Con­cord, when he or she heard those bells and those can­nons, thought not with pride of the events of , but with shame of the events of . But now we have half bur­ied that old shame un­der a new one. [¶15]

Mas­sa­chu­setts sat wait­ing Mr. Lor­ing’s de­ci­sion, as if it could in any way af­fect her own crim­i­nal­ity. Her crime, the most con­spic­u­ous and fa­tal crime of all, was per­mit­ting him to be the um­pire in such a case. It was really the trial of Mas­sa­chu­setts. Every mo­ment that she hes­i­tated to set this man free — every mo­ment that she now hes­i­tates to atone for her crime, she is con­victed. The Com­mis­sioner on her case is God; not Ed­ward G. God, but sim­ply God. [¶16]

I wish my coun­try­men to con­sider, that what­ever the hu­man law may be, nei­ther an in­di­vid­ual nor a na­tion can ever com­mit the least act of in­just­ice against the ob­scur­est in­di­vid­ual with­out hav­ing to pay the pen­alty for it. A gov­ern­ment which de­lib­er­ately en­acts in­just­ice, and per­sists in it, will at length even be­come the laugh­ing-stock of the world. [¶17]

Much has been said about Amer­i­can slav­ery, but I think that we do not even yet re­al­ize what slav­ery is. If I were se­ri­ously to pro­pose to Con­gress to make man­kind into sau­sages, I have no doubt that most of the mem­bers would smile at my pro­po­si­tion, and if any be­lieved me to be in ear­nest, they would think that I pro­posed some­thing much worse than Con­gress had ever done. But if any of them will tell me that to make a man into a sau­sage would be much worse — would be any worse — than to make him into a slave — than it was to en­act the Fu­gi­tive Slave Law, I will ac­cuse him of fool­ish­ness, of in­tel­lec­tual in­ca­pac­ity, of mak­ing a dis­tinc­tion with­out a dif­fer­ence. The one is just as sen­si­ble a pro­po­si­tion as the other. [¶18]

I hear a good deal said about tram­pling this law un­der foot. Why, one need not go out of his way to do that. This law rises not to the level of the head or the rea­son; its nat­u­ral hab­i­tat is in the dirt. It was born and bred, and has its life, only in the dust and mire, on a level with the feet; and he who walks with free­dom, and does not with Hin­doo mercy avoid tread­ing on every ven­o­mous rep­tile, will in­ev­i­ta­bly tread on it, and so tram­ple it un­der foot — and Web­ster, its maker, with it, like the dirt-bug and its ball. [¶19]

Recent events will be val­u­a­ble as a crit­i­cism on the ad­min­is­tra­tion of jus­tice in our midst, or, rather, as show­ing what are the true re­sources of jus­tice in any com­mu­nity. It has come to this, that the friends of lib­erty, the friends of the slave, have shud­dered when they have un­der­stood that his fate was left to the le­gal tri­bu­nals of the coun­try to be de­cided. Free men have no faith that jus­tice will be awarded in such a case. The judge may de­cide this way or that; it is a kind of ac­ci­dent, at best. It is ev­i­dent that he is not a com­pe­tent au­thor­ity in so im­por­tant a case. It is no time, then, to be judg­ing ac­cord­ing to his prec­e­dents, but to es­tab­lish a prec­e­dent for the fu­ture. I would much rather trust to the sen­ti­ment of the peo­ple. In their vote you would get some­thing of some value, at least, how­ever small; but in the other case, only the tram­meled judg­ment of an in­di­vid­ual, of no sig­nif­i­cance, be it which way it might. [¶20]

It is to some ex­tent fa­tal to the courts, when the peo­ple are com­pelled to go be­hind them. I do not wish to be­lieve that the courts were made for fair weather, and for very civil cases merely; but think of leav­ing it to any court in the land to de­cide whether more than three mil­lions of peo­ple, in this case a sixth part of a na­tion, have a right to be free­men or not! But it has been left to the courts of jus­tice, so called — to the Su­preme Court of the land — and, as you all know, rec­og­niz­ing no au­thor­ity but the Con­sti­tu­tion, it has de­cided that the three mil­lions are and shall con­tinue to be slaves. Such judges as these are merely the in­spec­tors of a pick-lock and mur­derer’s tools, to tell him whether they are in work­ing order or not, and there they think that their re­spon­si­bil­ity ends. There was a prior case on the docket, which they, as judges ap­pointed by God, had no right to skip; which hav­ing been justly set­tled, they would have been saved from this hu­mil­i­a­tion. It was the case of the mur­derer him­self. [¶21]

The law will never make men free; it is men who have got to make the law free. They are the lov­ers of law and order who ob­serve the law when the gov­ern­ment breaks it. [¶22]

Among human be­ings, the judge whose words seal the fate of a man fur­thest into eter­nity is not he who merely pro­nounces the ver­dict of the law, but he, who­ever he may be, who, from a love of truth, and un­prej­u­diced by any cus­tom or en­act­ment of men, ut­ters a true opin­ion or sen­tence con­cern­ing him. He it is that sen­tences him. Who­ever can dis­cern truth has re­ceived his com­mis­sion from a higher source than the chief­est jus­tice in the world who can dis­cern only law. He finds him­self con­sti­tuted judge of the judge. Strange that it should be nec­es­sary to state such sim­ple truths! [¶23]

I am more and more con­vinced that, with ref­er­ence to any pub­lic ques­tion, it is more im­por­tant to know what the coun­try thinks of it than what the city thinks. The city does not think much. On any moral ques­tion, I would rather have the opin­ion of Box­boro’ than of Bos­ton and New York put to­gether. When the former speaks, I feel as if some­body had spoken, as if hu­man­ity was yet, and a rea­son­a­ble be­ing had as­serted its rights — as if some un­prej­u­diced men among the coun­try’s hills had at length turned their at­ten­tion to the sub­ject, and by a few sen­si­ble words re­deemed the rep­u­ta­tion of the race. When, in some ob­scure coun­try town, the farm­ers come to­gether to a spe­cial town-meet­ing, to ex­press their opin­ion on some sub­ject which is vex­ing the land, that, I think, is the true Con­gress, and the most re­spect­a­ble one that is ever as­sem­bled in the United States. [¶24]

It is ev­i­dent that there are, in this Com­mon­wealth at least, two par­ties, becoming more and more distinct — the party of the city, and the party of the coun­try. I know that the coun­try is mean enough, but I am glad to be­lieve that there is a slight dif­fer­ence in her favor. But as yet she has few, if any organs, through which to ex­press herself. The editorials which she reads, like the news, come from the seaboard. Let us, the in­hab­i­tants of the coun­try, cultivate self-re­spect. Let us not send to the city for aught more essential than our broad­cloths and groceries; or, if we read the opin­ions of the city, let us entertain opin­ions of our own. [¶25]

Among meas­ures to be adopted, I would sug­gest to make as ear­nest and vig­or­ous an as­sault on the press as has al­ready been made, and with ef­fect, on the church. The church has much im­proved within a few years; but the press is, al­most with­out ex­cep­tion, cor­rupt. I be­lieve that in this coun­try the press ex­erts a greater and a more per­ni­cious in­flu­ence than the church did in its worst pe­riod. We are not a re­li­gious peo­ple, but we are a na­tion of pol­i­ti­cians. We do not care for the Bi­ble, but we do care for the news­pa­per. At any meet­ing of pol­i­ti­cians — like that at Con­cord the other eve­ning, for in­stance — how im­per­ti­nent it would be to quote from the Bi­ble! how per­ti­nent to quote from a news­pa­per or from the Con­sti­tu­tion! The news­pa­per is a Bi­ble which we read every morn­ing and every af­ter­noon, stand­ing and sit­ting, rid­ing and walk­ing. It is a Bi­ble which every man car­ries in his pocket, which lies on every ta­ble and coun­ter, and which the mail, and thou­sands of mis­sion­ar­ies, are con­tin­u­ally dis­pers­ing. It is, in short, the only book which America has printed and which America reads. So wide is its in­flu­ence. The ed­i­tor is a preacher whom you vol­un­ta­rily sup­port. Your tax is com­monly one cent daily, and it costs noth­ing for pew hire. But how many of these preach­ers preach the truth? I re­peat the tes­ti­mony of many an in­tel­li­gent for­eigner, as well as my own con­vic­tions, when I say, that prob­a­bly no coun­try was ever ruled by so mean a class of tyrants as, with a few no­ble ex­cep­tions, are the ed­i­tors of the pe­ri­od­i­cal press in this coun­try. And as they live and rule only by their ser­vil­ity, and ap­peal­ing to the worse, and not the bet­ter, na­ture of man, the peo­ple who read them are in the con­di­tion of the dog that re­turns to his vomit. [¶26]

The Lib­er­a­tor and the Com­mon­wealth were the only pa­pers in Bos­ton, as far as I know, which made them­selves heard in con­dem­na­tion of the cow­ard­ice and mean­ness of the au­thor­i­ties of that city, as ex­hib­ited in . The other jour­nals, al­most with­out ex­cep­tion, by their man­ner of re­fer­ring to and speak­ing of the Fu­gi­tive Slave Law, and the car­ry­ing back of the slave Sims, in­sulted the com­mon sense of the coun­try, at least. And, for the most part, they did this, one would say, be­cause they thought so to se­cure the approbation of their patrons, not be­ing aware that a sounder sen­ti­ment pre­vailed to any ex­tent in the heart of the Com­mon­wealth. I am told that some of them have im­proved of late; but they are still em­i­nently time-serv­ing. Such is the char­ac­ter they have won. [¶27]

But, thank for­tune, this preacher can be even more eas­ily reached by the weap­ons of the re­former than could the rec­re­ant priest. The free men of New Eng­land have only to re­frain from pur­chas­ing and read­ing these sheets, have only to with­hold their cents, to kill a score of them at once. One whom I re­spect told me that he pur­chased Mitchell’s Cit­i­zen in the cars, and then threw it out the win­dow. But would not his con­tempt have been more fa­tally ex­pressed if he had not bought it? [¶28]

Are they Amer­i­cans? are they New Eng­land­ers? are they in­hab­i­tants of Lex­ing­ton and Con­cord and Fra­ming­ham, who read and sup­port the Bos­ton Post, Mail, Jour­nal, Ad­ver­tiser, Cou­rier, and Times? Are these the Flags of our Union? I am not a news­pa­per reader, and may omit to name the worst. [¶29]

Could slav­ery sug­gest a more com­plete ser­vil­ity than some of these jour­nals ex­hibit? Is there any dust which their con­duct does not lick, and make fouler still with its slime? I do not know whether the Bos­ton Her­ald is still in ex­is­tence, but I re­mem­ber to have seen it about the streets when Sims was car­ried off. Did it not act its part well — serve its mas­ter faith­fully! How could it have gone lower on its belly? How can a man stoop lower than he is low? do more than put his ex­trem­i­ties in the place of the head he has? than make his head his lower ex­trem­ity? When I have taken up this pa­per with my cuffs turned up, I have heard the gur­gling of the sewer through every col­umn. I have felt that I was han­dling a pa­per picked out of the pub­lic gut­ters, a leaf from the gos­pel of the gam­bling-house, the grog­gery, and the brothel, har­mo­niz­ing with the gos­pel of the Mer­chants’ Ex­change. [¶30]

The ma­jor­ity of the men of the North, and of the South and East and West, are not men of prin­ci­ple. If they vote, they do not send men to Con­gress on er­rands of hu­man­ity; but while their broth­ers and sis­ters are be­ing scourged and hung for lov­ing lib­erty, while — I might here in­sert all that slav­ery im­plies and is — it is the mis­man­age­ment of wood and iron and stone and gold which con­cerns them. Do what you will, O Gov­ern­ment, with my wife and children, my mother and brother, my father and sister, I will obey your com­mands to the letter. It will indeed grieve me if you hurt them, if you de­liver them to over­se­ers to be hunted by bounds or to be whipped to death; but, nev­er­the­less, I will peace­a­bly pur­sue my cho­sen cal­ling on this fair earth, until per­chance, one day, when I have put on mourn­ing for them dead, I shall have per­suaded you to re­lent. Such is the at­ti­tude, such are the words of Mas­sa­chu­setts. [¶31]

Rather than do thus, I need not say what match I would touch, what sys­tem en­deavor to blow up; but as I love my life, I would side with the light, and let the dark earth roll from un­der me, cal­ling my mother and my brother to follow. [¶32]

I would re­mind my coun­try­men that they are to be men first, and Amer­i­cans only at a late and con­ven­ient hour. No mat­ter how val­u­a­ble law may be to pro­tect your prop­erty, even to keep soul and body to­gether, if it do not keep you and hu­man­ity to­gether. [¶33]

I am sorry to say that I doubt if there is a judge in Mas­sa­chu­setts who is pre­pared to re­sign his of­fice, and get his liv­ing in­no­cently, when­ever it is re­quired of him to pass sen­tence un­der a law which is merely con­trary to the law of God. I am com­pelled to see that they put them­selves, or rather are by char­ac­ter, in this re­spect, ex­actly on a level with the ma­rine who dis­charges his musket in any di­rec­tion he is or­dered to. They are just as much tools, and as lit­tle men. Cer­tainly, they are not the more to be re­spected, be­cause their mas­ter en­slaves their un­der­stand­ings and con­sciences, in­stead of their bodies. [¶34]

The judges and law­yers — sim­ply as such, I mean — and all men of ex­pe­di­ency, try this case by a very low and in­com­pe­tent stan­dard. They con­sider, not whether the Fu­gi­tive Slave Law is right, but whether it is what they call con­sti­tu­tional. Is vir­tue con­sti­tu­tional, or vice? Is eq­uity con­sti­tu­tional, or in­iq­uity? In im­por­tant moral and vital ques­tions, like this, it is just as im­per­ti­nent to ask whether a law is con­sti­tu­tional or not, as to ask whether it is prof­it­a­ble or not. They per­sist in be­ing the ser­vants of the worst of men, and not the ser­vants of hu­man­ity. The ques­tion is, not whether you or your grand­father, sev­enty years ago, did not en­ter into an agree­ment to serve the Devil, and that ser­vice is not ac­cord­ingly now due; but whether you will not now, for once and at last, serve God — in spite of your own past rec­re­ancy, or that of your an­ces­tor — by obey­ing that eter­nal and only just Con­sti­tu­tion, which He, and not any Jef­fer­son or Adams, has writ­ten in your being. [¶35]

The amount of it is, if the ma­jor­ity vote the Devil to be God, the mi­nor­ity will live and be­have ac­cord­ingly — and obey the suc­cess­ful can­di­date, trust­ing that, some time or other, by some Speaker’s cast­ing-vote, per­haps, they may re­in­state God. This is the high­est prin­ci­ple I can get out or in­vent for my neigh­bors. These men act as if they be­lieved that they could safely slide down a hill a lit­tle way — or a good way — and would surely come to a place, by and by, where they could be­gin to slide up again. This is ex­pe­di­ency, or choos­ing that course which of­fers the slight­est ob­sta­cles to the feet, that is, a down­hill one. But there is no such thing as ac­com­plish­ing a right­eous re­form by the use of “ex­pe­di­ency.” There is no such thing as slid­ing up hill. In morals the only sliders are back­sliders. [¶36]

Thus we stead­ily wor­ship Mam­mon, both school and state and church, and on the sev­enth day curse God with a tin­ta­mar from one end of the Union to the other. [¶37]

Will man­kind never learn that pol­icy is not mo­ral­ity — that it never se­cures any moral right, but con­sid­ers merely what is ex­pe­di­ent? chooses the avail­a­ble can­di­date — who is in­var­i­a­bly the Devil — and what right have his con­stit­u­ents to be sur­prised, be­cause the Devil does not be­have like an angel of light? What is wanted is men, not of pol­icy, but of pro­bity — who rec­og­nize a higher law than the Con­sti­tu­tion, or the de­ci­sion of the ma­jor­ity. The fate of the coun­try does not de­pend on how you vote at the polls — the worst man is as strong as the best at that game; it does not de­pend on what kind of pa­per you drop into the bal­lot-box once a year, but on what kind of man you drop from your cham­ber into the street every morning. [¶38]

What should con­cern Mas­sa­chu­setts is not the Ne­braska Bill, nor the Fu­gi­tive Slave Bill, but her own slave­hold­ing and ser­vil­ity. Let the State dis­solve her union with the slave­holder. She may wrig­gle and hes­i­tate, and ask leave to read the Con­sti­tu­tion once more; but she can find no re­spect­a­ble law or prec­e­dent which sanc­tions the con­tin­u­ance of such a union for an instant. [¶39]

Let each in­hab­i­tant of the State dis­solve his union with her, as long as she de­lays to do her duty. [¶40]

The events of the past month teach me to dis­trust Fame. I see that she does not finely dis­crim­i­nate, but coarsely hur­rahs. She con­sid­ers not the sim­ple her­o­ism of an ac­tion, but only as it is con­nected with its ap­par­ent con­se­quences. She praises till she is hoarse the easy ex­ploit of the Bos­ton tea party, but will be com­par­a­tively si­lent about the braver and more dis­in­ter­est­edly her­oic at­tack on the Bos­ton Court-House, sim­ply be­cause it was un­suc­cessful! [¶41]

Cov­ered with dis­grace, the State has sat down coolly to try for their lives and lib­er­ties the men who at­tempted to do its duty for it. And this is called jus­tice! They who have shown that they can be­have par­tic­u­larly well may per­chance be put un­der bonds for their good be­hav­ior. They whom truth re­quires at pre­sent to plead guilty are, of all the in­hab­i­tants of the State, pre­em­i­nently in­no­cent. While the Gov­er­nor, and the Mayor, and count­less of­fi­cers of the Com­mon­wealth are at large, the cham­pi­ons of lib­erty are im­prisoned. [¶42]

Only they are guilt­less who com­mit the crime of con­tempt of such a court. It be­hooves every man to see that his in­flu­ence is on the side of jus­tice, and let the courts make their own char­ac­ters. My sym­pa­thies in this case are wholly with the ac­cused, and wholly against their ac­cusers and judges. Jus­tice is sweet and mu­si­cal; but in­just­ice is harsh and dis­cor­dant. The judge still sits grind­ing at his organ, but it yields no mu­sic, and we hear only the sound of the han­dle. He be­lieves that all the mu­sic re­sides in the han­dle, and the crowd toss him their cop­pers the same as be­fore. [¶43]

Do you sup­pose that that Mas­sa­chu­setts which is now do­ing these things — which hes­i­tates to crown these men, some of whose law­yers, and even judges, per­chance, may be driven to take ref­uge in some poor quib­ble, that they may not wholly out­rage their in­stinc­tive sense of jus­tice — do you sup­pose that she is any­thing but base and ser­vile? that she is the cham­pion of lib­erty? [¶44]

Show me a free state, and a court truly of jus­tice, and I will fight for them, if need be; but show me Mas­sa­chu­setts, and I re­fuse her my al­le­giance, and ex­press con­tempt for her courts. [¶45]

The ef­fect of a good gov­ern­ment is to make life more val­u­a­ble — of a bad one, to make it less val­u­a­ble. We can af­ford that rail­road and all merely ma­te­rial stock should lose some of its value, for that only com­pels us to live more sim­ply and ec­o­nom­i­cally; but sup­pose that the value of life it­self should be di­min­ished! How can we make a less de­mand on man and na­ture, how live more ec­o­nom­i­cally in re­spect to vir­tue and all no­ble qualities, than we do? I have lived for the last month — and I think that every man in Mas­sa­chu­setts ca­pa­ble of the sen­ti­ment of pa­tri­ot­ism must have had a sim­i­lar ex­pe­ri­ence — with the sense of hav­ing suf­fered a vast and in­def­i­nite loss. I did not know at first what ailed me. At last it oc­curred to me that what I had lost was a coun­try. I had never re­spected the gov­ern­ment near to which I lived, but I had fool­ishly thought that I might man­age to live here, mind­ing my pri­vate af­fairs, and forget it. For my part, my old and wor­thi­est pur­suits have lost I can­not say how much of their at­trac­tion, and I feel that my in­vest­ment in life here is worth many per cent less since Mas­sa­chu­setts last de­lib­er­ately sent back an in­no­cent man, Anthony Burns, to slav­ery. I dwelt be­fore, per­haps, in the il­lu­sion that my life passed some­where only be­tween heaven and hell, but now I can­not per­suade my­self that I do not dwell wholly within hell. The site of that po­lit­i­cal or­gan­i­za­tion called Mas­sa­chu­setts is to me mor­ally cov­ered with vol­canic sco­riae and cin­ders, such as Mil­ton de­scribes in the in­fer­nal re­gions. If there is any hell more un­prin­ci­pled than our rul­ers, and we, the ruled, I feel cu­ri­ous to see it. Life itself be­ing worth less, all things with it, which min­is­ter to it, are worth less. Sup­pose you have a small li­brary, with pic­tures to adorn the walls — a gar­den laid out around — and con­tem­plate sci­en­tific and lit­er­ary pur­suits, &c., and dis­cover all at once that your villa, with all its con­tents is lo­cated in hell, and that the jus­tice of the peace has a clo­ven foot and a forked tail — do not these things sud­denly lose their value in your eyes? [¶46]

I feel that, to some ex­tent, the State has fa­tally in­ter­fered with my law­ful busi­ness. It has not only in­ter­rupted me in my pas­sage through Court Street on er­rands of trade, but it has in­ter­rupted me and every man on his on­ward and up­ward path, on which he had trusted soon to leave Court Street far be­hind. What right had it to re­mind me of Court Street? I have found that hol­low which even I had re­lied on for solid. [¶47]

I am sur­prised to see men go­ing about their busi­ness as if noth­ing had hap­pened. I say to my­self, “Un­for­tu­nates! they have not heard the news.” I am sur­prised that the man whom I just met on horse­back should be so ear­nest to over­take his newly bought cows run­ning away — since all prop­erty is in­se­cure, and if they do not run away again, they may be taken away from him when he gets them. Fool! does he not know that his seed-corn is worth less this year — that all be­nef­i­cent har­vests fail as you ap­proach the em­pire of hell? No pru­dent man will build a stone house un­der these cir­cum­stances, or en­gage in any peace­ful en­ter­prise which it re­quires a long time to ac­com­plish. Art is as long as ever, but life is more in­ter­rupted and less avail­a­ble for a man’s proper pur­suits. It is not an era of re­pose. We have used up all our in­her­ited free­dom. If we would save our lives, we must fight for them. [¶48]

I walk toward one of our ponds; but what sig­ni­fies the beauty of na­ture when men are base? We walk to lakes to see our se­ren­ity re­flected in them; when we are not se­rene, we go not to them. Who can be se­rene in a coun­try where both the rul­ers and the ruled are with­out prin­ci­ple? The re­mem­brance of my coun­try spoils my walk. My thoughts are mur­der to the State, and in­vol­un­ta­rily go plot­ting against her. [¶49]

But it chanced the other day that I scented a white wa­ter-lily, and a sea­son I had waited for had ar­rived. It is the em­blem of pu­rity. It bursts up so pure and fair to the eye, and so sweet to the scent, as if to show us what pu­rity and sweet­ness re­side in, and can be ex­tracted from, the slime and muck of earth. I think I have plucked the first one that has opened for a mile. What con­fir­ma­tion of our hopes is in the fra­grance of this flower! I shall not so soon de­spair of the world for it, not­with­stand­ing slav­ery, and the cow­ard­ice and want of prin­ci­ple of North­ern men. It sug­gests what kind of laws have pre­vailed long­est and wid­est, and still pre­vail, and that the time may come when man’s deeds will smell as sweet. Such is the odor which the plant emits. If Na­ture can com­pound this fra­grance still an­nually, I shall be­lieve her still young and full of vigor, her in­teg­rity and genius un­im­paired, and that there is vir­tue even in man, too, who is fit­ted to per­ceive and love it. It re­minds me that Na­ture has been part­ner to no Mis­souri Com­pro­mise. I scent no com­pro­mise in the fra­grance of the wa­ter-lily. It is not a Nym­phæa Doug­lasii. In it, the sweet, and pure, and in­no­cent are wholly sun­dered from the ob­scene and bale­ful. I do not scent in this the time-serv­ing ir­res­o­lu­tion of a Mas­sa­chu­setts Gov­er­nor, nor of a Bos­ton Mayor. So be­have that the odor of your ac­tions may en­hance the gen­eral sweet­ness of the at­mos­phere, that when we be­hold or scent a flower, we may not be re­minded how in­con­sis­tent your deeds are with it; for all odor is but one form of ad­ver­tise­ment of a moral qual­ity, and if fair ac­tions had not been per­formed, the lily would not smell sweet. The foul slime stands for the sloth and vice of man, the de­cay of hu­man­ity; the fra­grant flower that springs from it, for the pu­rity and cour­age which are immortal. [¶50]

Slav­ery and ser­vil­ity have pro­duced no sweet-scented flower an­nually, to charm the senses of men, for they have no real life: they are merely a de­cay­ing and a death, of­fen­sive to all healthy nos­trils. We do not com­plain that they live, but that they do not get bur­ied. Let the liv­ing bury them: even they are good for manure. [¶51]


I spent some time yesterday assembling a version of Thoreau’s Slavery in Massachusetts on this site. I added links that help explain the back-story. It is difficult to know what Thoreau is going on about unless you have some idea of what “the Sims tragedy” was, some inkling of what the Missouri Compromise and Kansas-Nebraska Act were, and know at least a little bit about the symbolism of the Revolutionary War battles of Lexington & Concord, for instance.

This essay is in one sense very much locked to its time: it was meant to address a very specific event — the legal kidnapping and reenslavement of Anthony Burns in by officials of Massachusetts. It is full of pointed and specific reference to the events, heroes and villains surrounding slavery, the Fugitive Slave Laws, political compromises, and abolitionist resistance.

But the essay also escapes these locks. We don’t have to make a costume party out of it and pretend that we’re abolitionists gathered at a to appreciate what Thoreau has to say. His speech is more motivating to me today than a thousand contemporary rants and exposés. Today’s ostensible anti-war movement would be well-served by closing the browser on the latest MoveOn petition, putting down the collection of Noam Chomsky essays, and giving it some serious study.

All around the country today you can hear people who say they want to do something to stop the war, shut down the Dubya Squad, and perhaps redeeem the name of their country — “but what can we do?” And so the peace movement continues to dither and hold parades and support vaguely the sort of choreographed dances with police officers that pass for civil disobedience today.

Yesterday I was invited by a publisher to review a copy of a new book called “The Case for Impeachment.” I declined. I’m of the school of thought that arguments that Bush should be impeached are like arguments that the hijackers should be disciplined by the FAA — laughably out of scale to the crime and unlikely to amount to anything.

So much energy is going into this impeachment campaign — this hope that Representatives in Washington, who have (please remember) cooperated whenever asked in all of Dubya’s crimes, will repent and begin the long and difficult process of releasing the country to the redeeming mercies of Dick Cheney.

Other right-thinking folk curse the makers of voting machines and expend their energy trying to make sure that every vote gets counted correctly in the next election. (But I counted all the votes in the last election, and of one hundred and twenty-two million ballots cast, I counted one hundred and twenty-one million votes to continue the war in Iraq and the torture policy — that was enough to make me stop losing sleep about whether the voting machines in Ohio might slip a digit.)

All of this because people think the problem we have is in the White House, and the solution too must be nearby in Washington, and that the problem is with the politicians and the solution too must be with the politicians. Thoreau faced the same attitudes, and told his audience in Massachusetts to reel themselves back in from Washington and Nebraska because slavery is right here at home, and to stop being so foolish as to wait, periodically voting and petitioning, until politicians finally get around to giving justice their formal approval.

The fate of the country does not depend on how you vote at the polls — the worst man is as strong as the best at that game; it does not depend on what kind of paper you drop into the ballot-box once a year, but on what kind of man you drop from your chamber into the street every morning.

Most people who are asking “but what can I do?” seem to me to really be abbreviating a longer question: “what can I do that doesn’t involve personal risk or inconvenience and that puts the burden of behaving justly on someone else’s shoulders?” And the answer to that question is: “keep dithering and parading and petitioning!” For the few people who mean something more than this, my answer begins, “first, read Thoreau…”


I’ve been adding more to my collection of excerpts from the journals of Henry David Thoreau, chronologically. I’m up through most of now.

I’m choosing excerpts in which Thoreau most directly confronts the themes of law, government, man in society, war, economics, duty, and conscience. These are scattered about in his journals, sometimes as aphorisms salted amongst his reflections on the natural world, occasionally as extended rants, such as those prompted by the case of fugitive slave Thomas Sims.

Some time ago, I read Sandra Harbert Petrulionis’s study of how Thoreau had used his journal as a source for the essay Slavery in Massachusetts. Petrulionis wrote:

A comparison of the text of Slavery in Massachusetts with the Journal from which it derives reveals that Thoreau curtailed the Journal’s stridency, revising or cutting more than twenty passages that with few exceptions can be categorized as blasphemous, revolutionary, or, at best, politically incautious. In the Journal, among other infractions, Thoreau equates the suffering of slaves with Christ’s, and he unequivocally advocates violence in the fight to end slavery.

I’m eager to reach in the journals so I can read Thoreau’s original, “strident” drafts. I’m curious also whether A Plea for Captain John Brown — which compares Brown with Christ and which unequivocally advocates violence in the fight to end slavery — exists in a yet more vigorous draft in the journals.

It seems as though this project of compiling Thoreau’s writings on political philosophy must have been done before and that I must be reinventing the wheel, but if it has, I have not discovered it. In any case, I haven’t found anything like this on-line (where the journals themselves only seem to exist as scanned page-images).


In my ongoing project of excerpting those sections of Thoreau’s journals in which he discusses politics, economics, civil disobedience and the like, I have just reached the point at which he gave the speech that he published as Slavery in Massachusetts.

He used his journal to write rough drafts of much of the rhetoric he would use for that speech and essay, starting with his reaction to the reenslavement of Thomas Sims in (see Thoreau’s undated journal entries in , and his entry for ), and then with the similar case of Anthony Burns in (see Thoreau’s journal entries for , , , , , and )

While reading these entries, I was reminded of poor, deluded, Constitutionalist tax protester Ed Brown, who is waving a Waco wick at that big matchbook in Washington and getting ready to go out in a blaze of gunfire because, though the judge disagreed, Brown knows there’s no law on the books that requires him to pay taxes. “Show me the law and I’ll pay the taxes”:

The judges and lawyers, all men of expediency, consider not whether the Fugitive Slave Law is right, but whether it is what they call constitutional. They try the merits of the case by a very low and incompetent standard. Pray, is virtue constitutional, or vice? Is equity constitutional, or iniquity? It is as impertinent, in important moral and vital questions like this, to ask whether a law is constitutional or not, as to ask whether it is profitable or not. They persist in being the servants of man, and the worst of men, rather than the servants of God. Sir, the question is not whether you or your grandfather, seventy years ago, entered into an agreement to serve the devil, and that service is not accordingly now due; but whether you will not now, for once and last, serve God, — in spite of your own past recreancy or that of your ancestors, — and obey that eternal and only just Constitution which he, and not any Jefferson or Adams, has written in your being. Is the Constitution a thing to live by? or die by? No, as long as we are alive we forget it, and when we die we have done with it. At most it is only to swear by. While they are hurrying off Christ to the cross, the ruler decides that he cannot constitutionally interfere to save him.

(I used to just laugh at the weird legal theories of the Constitutionalist tax protesters, but now that I’ve heard the sort of creative Constitution reading practiced by none other than the United States Attorney General, I think the Ed Browns of America are probably as qualified as the next guy to interpret the Highest Law in the Land.)


The U.S. torture policy has been buzzing around in my head like an angry wasp these last few days, making it hard for me to enjoy anything else.

I haven’t read the newly-released memos or followed the talking heads or read Obama’s recent speech at CIA head­quarters. I’ve only caught hints of this and that in headlines and blog commentary. I feel like I got the message in its essentials a long time ago, and the emerging details are starting to become just atrocity porn.

On the other hand, lots of people don’t seem to have gotten the message, or it doesn’t mean the same thing to them that it means to me. They don’t think it concerns them, or, at any rate, any further than requiring of them that they select an opinion to wear on appropriate occasions.

Others, smoking the same pipe Obama’s smoking, dream themselves a fantasy in which all the nastiness is behind us and we don’t have to much worry ourselves about it anymore except perhaps on rainy days when a sigh of melancholy reflection sounds like just the thing to match the weather.

I was reminded of what Thoreau wrote in his jour­nals as he was preparing what he would later deliver as Slavery in Mas­sa­chu­setts:

The effect of a good government is to make life more valuable — of a bad government, to make it less valuable. We can afford that railroad and all merely material stock should depreciate, for that only compels us to live more simply and economically; but suppose the value of life itself should be depreciated. Every man in New England capable of the sentiment of patriotism must have lived the last three weeks with the sense of having suffered a vast, indefinite loss.…

Thoreau is referring to the Anthony Burns fugitive slave case, in which Mas­sa­chu­setts — ostensibly a “free state” — arrested Burns and returned him as property to his owner, with the full cooperation of the state government.

…I had never respected this government, but I had foolishly thought that I might manage to live here, attending to my private affairs, and forget it. For my part, my old and worthiest pursuits have lost I cannot say how much of their attraction, and I feel that my investment in life here is worth many per cent. less since Mas­sa­chu­setts last deliberately and forcibly restored an innocent man, Anthony Burns, to slavery. I dwelt before in the illusion that my life passed somewhere only between heaven and hell, but now I cannot persuade myself that I do not dwell wholly within hell. The sight of that political or­gan­i­za­tion called Mas­sa­chu­setts is to me morally covered with scoriæ and volcanic cinders, such as Milton imagined. If there is any hell more unprincipled than our rulers and our people, I feel curious to visit it. Life itself being worthless, all things with it, that feed it, are worthless. Suppose you have a small library, with pictures to adorn the walls — a garden laid out around — and contemplate scientific and literary pursuits, &c, &c, and discover suddenly that your villa, with all its contents, is located in hell, and that the justice of the peace is one of the devil’s angels, has a cloven foot and a forked tail — do not these things suddenly lose their value in your eyes? Are you not disposed to sell at a great sacrifice?

I went out back on an unusually hot afternoon yesterday to do some weeding in the garden and try to keep my mind from dwelling on waterboarding and sleep deprivation. It’s Spring and everything is coming up, and the garlic are so vigorous they look almost like cornstalks, and on two occasions I lifted border-bricks and found clutches of wriggling baby salamanders, and Jay Bybee sits on the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

I am surprised to see men going about their business as if nothing had happened, and say to myself, “Un­for­tu­nates! they have not heard the news;” that the man whom I just met on horseback should be so earnest to overtake his newly bought cows running away — since all property is insecure, and if they do not run away again, they may be taken away from him when he gets them. Fool! does he not know that his seed-corn is worth less this year — that all beneficent harvests fail as he approaches the empire of hell? No prudent man will build a stone house under these cir­cum­stances, or engage in any peaceful enterprise which it requires a long time to accomplish. Art is as long as ever, but life is more interrupted and less available for a man’s proper pursuits. It is time we had done referring to our ancestors. We have used up all our inherited freedom, like the young bird the albumen in the egg. It is not an era of repose. If we would save our lives, we must fight for them.

There is a fine ripple and sparkle on the pond, seen through the mist. But what signifies the beauty of nature when men are base? We walk to lakes to see our serenity reflected in them. When we are not serene, we go not to them. Who can be serene in a country where both rulers and ruled are without principle? The remembrance of the baseness of pol­i­ti­cians spoils my walks. My thoughts are murder to the State; I endeavor in vain to observe nature; my thoughts involuntarily go plotting against the State. I trust that all just men will conspire