Tax resistance in the “Peace Churches” →
Quakers →
20th–21st century Quakers →
Charles Purvis
From The Modesto Bee, a report of a war tax resistance court case that ran aground :
Quaker loses “war tax” case
San Francisco — A federal appeals court rejected the argument of Quaker Charles Purvis, 60, of Fairbanks, Alaska, citing legal authority that he had a right to withhold the portion of his taxes which would have been used to finance the Vietnam War.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld a U.S. Tax Court order that Purvis pay the $13,592 he owes in federal income taxes for plus penalties.
On his returns for those years, Purvis had listed amounts totaling $13,592 as a “war crimes deduction.”
San Francisco (UPI) —
A Quaker who refused to pay a portion of his income taxes, saying he was taking a “war crimes deduction” to protest the Vietnam War, has been ordered to pay nearly $14,000 plus penalties to the Internal Revenue Service.
The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that Charles Purvis, 60, of Fairbanks, Alaska, didn’t have a legal right to make the deduction on federal income tax forms in .
The pacifist had argued he had legal authority to withhold the portion of his taxes used to finance the conflict in Southeast Asia.
IRS
officials said Congress had not provided a “war crimes deduction” in the Internal Revenue Code and ordered him to pay $13,952.
The federal court rejected Purvis’ arguments that military action in Vietnam and other military preparations violated international law, particularly the Nuremberg Principles, and that he would become an accomplice to this illegal action if he paid his taxes.
Purvis also alleged payment of his taxes would render him in violation of a federal law that prohibits individual military expeditions against foreign countries or people with whom the United States is at peace.
The Tax Court has rejected two more attempts by individuals to avoid payment of income tax by challenges to the law or the government.
James E. Ramsden of Hager City, Wis. had filled out his Form 1040 with the words “Object — Fifth Amendment” and he attached a protest challenging the constitutionality of the court itself.
Ramsden’s claims were rejected by the court which also upheld an assessment of penalties for failure to file a tax return.
Charles F. Purvis of Fairbanks, Alaska claimed a “war crimes deduction” equal to his income.
He claimed that he was resisting taxation under international law because he opposed the war in Vietnam.
This too was rejected by the court.
Purvis appealed to the Supreme Court in , but I haven’t seen anything about how that went.
I suspect the Court decided against hearing the appeal.
The appeal tried to use international law, particularly the parts that make it universally illegal for people to engage in acts of aggressive war and war crimes, to argue for the necessity of war tax resistance.
It’s too bad the text of the Purvis appeal isn’t on-line.
You can find a version of it in People Pay for Peace () by William Durland, who was also Purvis’s attorney during this appeal.
I regretted that Charles Purvis’s petition for a writ of certiorari in his
Supreme Court appeal was not available
on-line. It’s a good example of someone trying to get the
U.S. government to
take seriously what its prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, said
at the Nuremberg trial of German “war criminals”:
And let me make clear that while this law is first applied against German
aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must
condemn aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here now
in judgment. We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence and
aggression by those in power against the rights of their own people only when
we make all men answerable to the law. This trial represents mankind’s
desperate effort to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen who have
used their powers of state to attack the foundations of the world’s peace and
to commit aggressions against the rights of their neighbors.
Fat chance, but there’s something to be said for making the effort. Anyway,
here, on-line for the first time as far as I can tell, are excerpts from the
Purvis writ, as presented by his attorney William Durland (and as found in
Durland’s book People Pay
for Peace). Afterwards I’ll share some of my thoughts:
The decision below as it applies to Petitioner, a Quaker, and war tax
refuser, causes him to become a party or an accessory to a criminal act in
violation of international law, the United States Constitution, the criminal
statutes of the United States and his conscience.
To compel the petitioner to pay federal income tax deficiencies and additions
as war taxes makes him a party of an accessory to a criminal act in violation
of international law and Article Ⅵ of the United States Constitution.
International Law is Applicable to Cases Arising in
U.S. Courts
There can be no doubt that international law is relevant and applicable to
cases arising in United States Courts. Article Ⅵ , paragraph 2 of the United
States Constitution provides that:
All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or law of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding.
When a question arises concerning whether international law is relevant to a
domestic case, it is the duty of the domestic court to determine (1) whether
principles of international law are implicated in the case; if so (2) which
principles of international law are applicable and (3) whether application of
these principles to the case at bar overrides inferior municipal law thus
justifying otherwise allegedly illegal conduct.
In the
Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700
(), the Supreme Court declared that:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.
Accord,Hilton v. Guyot.
See generally I Whitman International Law Section 11
(). International law is applicable to
domestic courts. The question is which aspects of international law become
“the supreme law” of the land. Treaties made by the President, “and with the
advice and consent of the Senate” are obviously included by express
provisions of Article Ⅱ, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. The
term “treaty”, though not defined in the Constitution, has generally been
determined to include “irrespective of their nomenclatures, such
international agreements as conventions, pacts, protocols and covenants.”
Introduction to
U.S. Treaties and
Other International Agreements, Cumulative Index, ⅹ
() (Hereafter,
U.S.T.).
What has been termed “customary international law” is also binding on
domestic courts.
Such customary International Law as is universally recognized or has at any
rate received the assent of the United States, and further all international
conventions ratified by the United States, are binding upon American courts,
even if in conflict with previous American statutory law…
Ⅱ Oppenheim,
International Law. 101
(6th
ed.
). “Offenses against the Law of Nations”
have been sustained in federal courts even if there were no statutes defining
the offense under Article Ⅰ, Section 8, Clause 10 of the
U.S. Constitution.
Therefore a substantial body of treaties, international agreements, and
offenses against the Law of Nations or customary international law are
binding on American courts. See Introduction to
U.S.T. Cumulative Index, supra, at ⅺ.
International Law Prohibits Aggressive Policies of “Defense”
There are many bases for determining that American nuclear weapons are in
violation of international law. (Petitioner will present his case against
nuclear planning here rather than the Vietnam War crimes because (1) the
brevity of the writ requires it; (2) the latter has terminated and
(3) the former continues to be a basis for the present refusal to pay war
taxes for past years. However, much of this argument also applies to the
former). Perhaps the most fundamental tenet of all international norms is
that a sovereign refrain from use of or threat of force in its relations with
other countries. This policy has been consistently expressed in various forms
as early as .
In the
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, , 32
Stat.
1779, 1780, T.S.
392 the parties (including the United States) expressed “a strong desire to
concert for the maintenance of the general peace;” to extend “the empire of
law,” and to strengthen “the appreciation of international justice…”
Accord, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, , 37
Stat.
2199, 2201, T.S.
536.
Similarly, Article Ⅰ of the Pan American Anti-war Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation,
, 49
Stat.
3363, 3375, T.S.
906, states that the parties “solemnly declare that they condemn wars of
aggression in their mutual relations or in those with other states…”
The Charter
of the United Nations, , 59
Stat.
1033, T.S. 993
(hereinafter
U.N.
Charter) is replete with references to the duty to use peaceful means
in international relations. The Preamble expresses a determination “to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war…”; “to ensure, by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force
shall not be used, save in the common interest…”
U.N.
Charter, 59
Stat.
1033, 1035. Chapter Ⅰ of the
U.N.
Charter sets forth the purposes of the United Nations. Because these
provisions provide a guiding light in the interpretation of international
law, it is important to develop a firm grasp of these basic principles.
Article Ⅰ provides that:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace;
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
[E]ncouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all…
U.N.
Charter at 1037 (emphasis added).
In Article 2, the members agree to “fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them” in the Charter; to “settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered” to “refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force…” or to act “in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.”
U.N.
Charter at 1037.
International Law Prohibits Specific Planning for and Acts of
Aggression
The Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
, 36
Stat.
2277, T.S. 403
(hereinafter, Hague Conventions), was “inspired by the desire to
diminish the evils of war…” 36
Stat.
at 2279. The Convention declares that where no specific international
regulation addresses a specific course of conduct, that the parties follow
“the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the
dictates of the public conscience.” 36
Stat.
at 2280. Article 22 of the Convention provides that “[t]he right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not unlimited.” 36
Stat.
at 2301. Most importantly, Article 23 provides:
In addition… it is especially forbidden:
To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
To kill or wound treacherously…
To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering…
36
Stat.
at 2301–02.
Article 24 prohibits the bombardment of villages, towns, or cities which are
undefended. 36
Stat.
at 2302, while Article 27 declares that in sieges or bombardments all
necessary steps must be taken to spare buildings dedicated to religion, the
arts, science, or caring for the sick and wounded. 36
Stat.
at 2303.
The Charter of
the International Military Tribunal
, 59
Stat.
1544, E.A.S. 472 (“London Agreement
enunciating the Nuremberg Principles”) (Hereinafter, Nuremberg
Charter) outlined violations of international law for which even
individual citizens of belligerent nations could be held responsible. Article
6 provides that:
The following acts, or any of them are crimes… for which there shall be
individual responsibility:
Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation… of a war of
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements
or assurances, or participation in a common plan… for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws and customs of war.
Such violations shall include but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment… of civilian populations… plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages…
Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination… and
other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population before or
during the war or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crimes… whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Article 7 went on to provide that the “fact that the Defendant acted pursuant
to order of his [sic.] Government
or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility.”
Charter at 1548.
In the United States delegation to the
United Nations introduced a Resolution before the General Assembly affirming
“the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal.”
G.A.
Res. 95(1),
U.N.
Doc.
A/64/Add. 1, at 188
(). The Resolution was unanimously adopted
by the General Assembly on . In the Nuremberg Principles
were restated by the International Law Commission. Finally, the United
Nations Security Council, by Resolution, condemned acts of “reprisals as
incompatible with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”
G.A.
Res. 188, Session ⅩⅨ,
4/1/1964.
U.S. Policies
and Development of Nuclear Weapons are Inconsistent with International
Law
There can be no doubt that the actual aggressive use of atomic weapons
results in almost total destruction of everything within several miles of the
site of the explosion. See United States Department of Defense, The
Effects of Nuclear Weapons (). The
residual effects caused by radiation and radio-active fall-out create
long-term illness and death in a matter analogous to poisoning. See United
States Atomic Energy Commission, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
(),
p. 473.
The indiscriminate and “wanton destruction of cities” which results from the
use of nuclear weapons is prima facie proof of war crimes,
as defined by Principle VI
of the Nuremberg Charter, and of crimes against humanity, as
defined by Principle VI(c)
of the Charter. Likewise, the poisonous effects of nuclear
radiation and fall-out are prima facie violations of the
United States’ obligations under Article 23(a) of the Hague
Conventions prohibiting the use of “poison or poisonous arms.”
Additionally, Article 23(a) of the Hague Conventions of
and ,
which prohibits the use of “arms, projectiles, or material of a nature of
cause superfluous injury”, and the
Declaration of St. Petersburg
of , which declares that “the only
legitimate object… [of] war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”,
indicate a customary rule of international law prohibiting weapons of
indiscriminate destruction such as nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the aggressive use of atomic weapons would directly contradict the
express purposes of using best efforts to avoid a nuclear war and negotiate
an end to the nuclear arms race. See discussion,
infra.. And since the radiation-related after effects
of nuclear explosions cannot be controlled, the harm to persons and property
in neutral countries would constitute an act of aggression against third
states. G.A.
Res. 3314, Session ⅩⅩⅨ,
12/14/74.
The real question is whether current policies and weapons are in violation of
international law. To answer this question one must look to the history and
facts of nuclear weapons development.
On the basis that the “planning” or “preparation” for wars of aggression
violates Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter, that “use of
threat of force” is in violation of several treaties including the
U.N.
Charter; that the
U.N.
Charter condemns “situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace,”
U.N.
Charter Art. 1, 59
Stat.
at 1037, and imposes a duty upon members “to practice tolerance and live
together in peace,”
U.N.
Charter, Preamble, at 1035; that the United States has declared an
intention “[t]o prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes”
and to eliminate nuclear weapons from national arsenals,
e.g. Declaration on Atomic
Energy, 60
Stat.
at 1480. Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 21
U.S.T. at 484–85; and that the United
States has promised to work for international peace and security “with the
least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources” 21
U.S.T. at 486;
U.N.
Charter Art. 26, 59
Stat.
at 1041, the possession of nuclear weapons for future “first strike” use is
violative of international law. The “official” nuclear policy of this country
is one of deterrence or second-strike capability. This concept is aptly
explained by Robert Aldridge who for sixteen years worked in Lockheed
Corporation’s engineering department, designing every submarine-launched
ballistic missile bought by the Navy. Aldridge explains:
Deterrence is the strategic policy under which most of us believe the
Pentagon is still operating. It is presented as a defensive measure, of
sorts, because it is based on a second-strike response — massive and
unacceptable retaliation — which theoretically deters the Soviet Union from
attacking us.
Aldridge, The Counterforce Syndrome () (hereinafter Counterforce)
Aldridge goes on to note that to be an effective deterrent, United States
retaliatory forces would have to survive the worst conceivable attack and
still wreck havoc in the Soviet Union. To this end, land-based ballistic
missiles are stored in underground silos. The fact is that since the late
1960s both the Soviet Union and the United States have possessed this
deterrent capability. Counterforce at 2. To maintain this
“balance” super-powers agreed in S.A.L.T. Ⅰ
(Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) to refrain from developing elaborate
anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs).
There came a time, however, when actual
U.S. policy
shifted from deterrence to what Aldridge terms “counterforce”. In9
, Aldridge resigned after helping design
three generations of Polaris missiles, the multiple individually-targeted
reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for Poseidon, and
the beginnings of the Trident missile. The cause of Aldridge’s resignation
was his sense of a shift in nuclear policies:
At the onset of the Trident program, I discovered the Pentagon’s interest in
acquiring a precise “counterforce” weapon capable of destroying “hardened”
military emplacements such as missile silos. This was a profound shift from
a policy of retaliating only when fired upon, because it does not make sense
to attack empty silos (which is all that would be left following an enemy
first-strike attack on the United States).
Counterforce at ⅶ.
The S.A.L.T. Ⅰ agreement
froze the number of strategic arms, but did not freeze quality improvements — the area of primary
U.S. emphasis.
Counterforce at 60. The sheer explosive power of these weapons
is unimaginable. According to Senator George McGovern, the
U.S. presently
possesses 8,500 warheads, a combined explosive power of over three billion
tons of TNT, which calculates to about
1,500 pounds of explosive for every man, woman and child on the planet.
McGovern, “End of the World”, Playboy 124, 126
() (hereinafter,
McGovern). But the magnitude of explosive is not as important as
the accuracy of the explosion. Moreover,
S.A.L.T. Ⅰ
did not limit the numbers of strategic warheads (as opposed to strategic
missiles) and thus since
S.A.L.T. Ⅰ
the U.S. has
increased its nuclear warhead stockpile from 4,600 to 9,000 while the Soviet
Union has increased theirs from 2,000 to 4,000. “The
SALT Trap”. The Progressive, p. 9, ().
Additionally, S.A.L.T. Ⅰ placed no
restrictions on production of two weapon systems which have critically
affected the arms race: MIRVs and the cruise missile.
MIRVing missiles means two to fourteen additional independently
targeted warheads to a single missile, giving it the kill potential of many
missiles. The cruise missile is a mobile weapon which flies at altitudes
below the detective capabilities of radar and which can strike within thirty
feet of a target over 2,000 miles distant, according to the
Progressive Magazine.
The dangers in such policies are legion. For one thing, these developments
make it virtually impossible to verify compliance with an arms limitation
agreement. Although satellites can count missiles, submarines or airplanes,
they cannot determine how many warheads are on a given missile.
McGovern at 196.
The United States has retrofitted accuracy improvement systems and
MIRVs
to both land and submarine launched missiles. In
the
U.S. retrofitted
550 Minutemen Ⅲ missiles with the NS-20
guidance system which doubled the accuracy of the 1650
MIRV warheads.
This gave each warhead an even chance of landing within 600 feet of any Soviet
silo with a blast nine times greater than the Hiroshima bomb.
McGovern at 196. Each of the 1,650 Minuteman warheads now has
over an 80% chance of destroying any Soviet silo at which it is aimed.
Other weapons systems currently in development pose an even greater threat of
the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Lockheed began work in
on a maneuvering re-entry vehicle
(MARV) which permits in-flight alterations
in navigation increasing ever-more the accuracy of the hit. In
, concept studies were initiated for the
Mark 500
MARV
for possible use on Trident missiles.
In the
ABM Treaty was modified to allow only
100 defensive interceptors for each country, thus making nonsense of the
Pentagon rationale that in-flight maneuverability is essential to evade enemy
defense systems.
In the Missile X program was initiated. The
actual implementation of the program began in
. Under this system five to
twenty-five mile trenches will be dug in the Western
U.S. Each trench
will conceal a missile which can be moved back and forth at random, the
assumption being that the Soviets would exhaust their
ICBMs
trying to “find” the missile. The problem is that the Pentagon scenario omits
to consider the fact “that a 20-megaton burst, such as that produced by a
Soviet SS-9 ICBM,
would leave a 75-foot high layer of dirt on the lid if it struck as far as
half a mile away. Missile-X would probably be entombed unless it were planned
as a first-strike weapon.” Counterforce at 27. Moreover, the
trench system once again creates insurmountable verification problems since
“there would be no way the Soviets would be certain that there was only one
missile in any given trench.” Counterforce at 27.
The Trident submarine launched missile system is a floating vessel of
destruction. The 560 foot long Trident carries twenty-four submarine launched
ballistic missiles (SLCMs) each with a
range of 4,000 nautical miles and each equipped with eight 100-kiloton
warheads. The proposed modifications of the Trident submarine, or Trident-2,
carries twenty-four Trident-2 missiles, each with a range of 6,000 nautical
miles, and each capable of “delivering seventeen super-accurate
MARV
warheads to within as few feet as many targets. Counterforce at
25, 26. As Aldridge describes it:
One Trident submarine will be able to destroy 408 cities or military
targets with a blast five times that which was unleashed over Hiroshima.
A fleet of thirty Trident submarines would be able to deliver an
unbelievable 12,240 nuclear warheads against an enemy’s territory — or 30
times the number originally thought sufficient for strategic deterrence.
Clearly, if Trident attains the accuracies the Navy seeks, it will
constitute the ultimate first-strike weapon. Counterstrike at
26.
Once each nation possesses weapons capable of a first-strike, then the risks
of a nuclear war escalate in a geometric progression. The dilemma is that (1)
since each is capable of a first-strike which would presumably cripple the
other’s ability to retaliate, (2) since only 100
ABMs are allowed per side, and (3) since
cruise missiles and other systems can penetrate enemy territory undetected by
radar, then each side will be vulnerable to a crippling first-strike attack
thus tempting each side to devastate the “enemy” before the “enemy”
devastates them. This scenario of mutual nuclear insecurity is only years
ahead. Although the United States is ahead of the Soviets in developing a
first-strike capability, Counterforce at 59, it is only a matter
of time before the Soviets possess an effective first-strike capability.
Perhaps, in anticipation of that day, President Carter announced a
U.S. first nuclear
strike doctrine in his address to the General Assembly of the
U.N. from the
rostrum of the General Assembly on .
…I hereby declare on behalf of the United States that we will not use
nuclear weapons except in self-defense; that is, in circumstances of an
actual nuclear or conventional attack on the United States, our territories
or armed forces, or such an attack on our allies.
New York Times, Transcript of President Carter’s
Address to United Nations General Assembly,
p. A12.
The doctrine is extremely far-reaching:
It announces that the
U.S.
“will” use nuclear weapons (he did not say, for example, “might”
or “reserves the right” or similar words);
Nuclear weapons would be used also in case of attack by “conventional”
weapons;
They would be used also in case of attack by conventional weapons on
U.S. forces
stationed, flying over, or on the high seas, anywhere in the world — for
example, in situations similar to
the Pueblo
incident.
Mr. Carter did not use the language of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter,
which allows individual or collective self-defense only “if an armed
attack occurs”; the formulation “in circumstances of an
actual attack” is not used in any pertinent international instrument.
Implicit in the phrase is that the
U.S. might use
nuclear weapons also if no armed attack “has occurred”, so that it could
conceivably cover also preventive use of nuclear weapons.
Since the doctrine announces first use of nuclear weapons regardless of
the results (perhaps a
U.S. Air Force
plane was shot at, but not hit?) and, in any case, severity, duration,
and character of the “actual attack”, is not discussed, the doctrine
violates the general principle of proportionality.
The doctrine does not explicitly state that the nuclear weapons would be
used exclusively against the attacking state. Is that omission
deliberate? In other words, is it a revival of Secretary of State Dulles’
doctrine of “massive retaliation of our own choosing”, that is, against a
nation which did not attack but which the
U.S. would
unilaterally hold responsible for the attack?
The doctrine does not say that the attack, to which the
U.S. would
reply with nuclear weapons, was illegal (If a
U.S. bomber or
a bomber of any
U.S. ally
would penetrate the territory of another state, the latter would act
legally in shooting it down).
The doctrine does not refer to the obligation to seek peaceful
settlement before taking such enormous steps, which would be in
contravention of Article 33 of the
U.N.
Charter.
This coupled with the authority of the President under the
War Powers Act, who is therein allowed
to engage in hostilities without declaration of war for a period of 60 to
90 days, violates the Hague Convention
No. 3 of
.
The American nuclear firepower outlined above provides ample basis for
concluding that such systems are violations of international law. (This
analysis was formulated by
Prof. John H.E. Fried,
Former Special Legal Assistant,
U.S. War Crimes
Tribunal, Nuremberg). Dr.
Fried, in a recent paper presented to the Ⅺth Congress, International
Association of Democratic Jurists in Malta, concluded that a first nuclear
strike is forbidden by existing international law because nuclear war (1)
has no rational war aim — its aim is destruction, (2) would prevent obedience
to fundamental rules concerning the conduct of hostilities, (3) would prevent
the carrying out of post battle obligations of belligerents, (4) would make
it impossible to respect the rights of neutral states. The danger of
accidental unintended nuclear war is paramount, causing the dictates of
public conscience to prohibit a first nuclear strike before it takes
place. (See also Art. 18, 1,
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War
().)
International Law Imposes a Duty Upon Individual Citizens to Disassociate
Themselves from Violations of Such Law
Since the Nuremberg principles have become a part of international law, the
notion of individual responsibility for war crimes has achieved wide
acknowledgment. (See below). Under the Nuremberg Charter, it is
no defense to claim one was merely following orders. Nuremberg
Charter, supra,
Art. 7. Individual
responsibility attaches if “a moral choice was possible”.
Ex Parte Quirin 317
U.S. 1
(1942).
Professor Falk has found that case law developing during the War Crimes
Trials after World War Ⅱ “established that the zone of individual
responsibility for crimes against peace extended well beyond principal
policy-making and state leaders.” Falk, “The Nuremberg Defense in the
Pentagon Papers Case”, Crimes of War (Falk, Kolko and Liften,
eds.,
) 231. See,
e.g. “The Ministries Case,” Ⅻ–ⅩⅣ,
Trials of War Criminals (). In
the Flick Case, which involved prosecutions of German
industrialists, the War Crimes Tribunal stated:
[I]t is urged that individuals holding no public offices and not
representing the state, do not, and should not come within the class of
persons criminally responsible for a breach of international law. It is
asserted that international law is a matter wholly outside the work,
interest, and knowledge of private individuals. The distinction is unsound.
International law, as such, binds every citizen just as does ordinary
municipal law… The application of international law to individuals is no
novelty.
Quoted in Ⅱ The Law of War: A Documentary History 1283 (L.
Friedman ed.
) (hereinafter Friedman).
Furthermore, the Tokyo War Crimes Trial Decision, reprinted in
Friedman at 1029, suggests that anyone with knowledge of
illegal activity and an opportunity to do something about it is a potential
criminal under international law unless the person takes affirmative
measures to prevent the commission of the crimes. (emphasis added).
Under these considerations an individual American citizen is in violation of
international law if he or she consents to cooperate with any government
which produces, possesses or uses nuclear weapons. (Part of the material
included here is from Graber, “The International Law Defense”,
Pacificus Papers,
Vol. 2,
No. 5, Colorado Springs,
Center on Law and Pacifism, ).
The Applicability of International Law to Taxpayers is Proven
The payment of war taxes to the United States for the years
would have
constituted complicity in the commission of crimes against peace, crimes
against humanity, war crimes in Vietnam and in nuclear planning. A moral
choice to refuse to be in complicity with the commission of such crimes was
available to the Petitioner and he exercised that choice and refused to pay a
war tax. On the point of the nature and extent of individual responsibility,
the Nuremberg Judgment states: “The very essence of the charter
is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national
obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.”
F.R.D.
69, 110 ().
Fundamental fairness requires that the Petitioner be permitted to rely on
any argument arising from his accountability under international law. That
such a policy extends to the Nuremberg Principles is confirmed by the former
Assistant General Counsel for International Affairs of the Department of
Defense, who acknowledged that “from an international criminal law point of
view… the Nuremberg norms are part of our municipal law and may be enforced
by our courts.” Quoted in Falk, A Global Approach to National
Policy, 112 (). However, Petitioner
has not been given an opportunity to present evidence concerning the
questions of fact contained in this Writ before any court.
Individual liability is determined on the basis of knowledge of war crimes
coupled with inaction. See “The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Decision,” Ⅱ The
Law of War: A Documentary History, 1029 (Friedmann
ed.
). It follows, then, that anyone with
knowledge of war crimes and the opportunity to do something about it is
potentially criminally liable unless that person takes steps to prevent
further commission of the crimes. Even if these principles do not impose an
affirmative duty to act, the imposition of criminal liability on persons
having knowledge of war crimes must create a right in persons to act in a
prudent manner in an effort to halt what they reasonably believe to be
international crimes.
In a due process sense, it is enough that the Petitioner reasonably believed
that the domestic law was superseded by international law. Because domestic
law must be construed in conformity with international law whenever such a
construction is possible, Borchard, “The Relation Between International Law
and Municipal Law,” 27 Va.
L.
Rev., 137
(), it violates due process to subject the
Petitioner to possible criminal liability for tax deficiency in the face of
the contradictory claims on his behavior posed by the domestic and
international law. Due process does not permit the imposition of criminal
liability for tax deficiency (which is possible under the Internal Revenue
Code) for an act intended to terminate complicity in war crimes and its
preparation when the act was justified under relevant principles of
international law.
In , at Nuremberg, Germany, the United
States participated in the prosecutions of persons under principles of
international law imposing criminal liability for deference to municipal law
when they knew, or should have known that their government was
committing violations of international law. It violates the most basic
principles of fundamental fairness and due process for the United States,
while continuing to participate in the punishment of persons convicted of
violating the Nuremberg Principles, to refuse to acknowledge the right of
taxpayer to refuse war taxes in violation of municipal law established by the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal [sic].
Arguments Invoked Against the Applicability of International Law are
Invalid
Usual rebuttals to the international law argument are stated as follows:
(1) “International law does not apply to American courts unless it concerns a
treaty not superseded by a statute.”
As presented aforesaid, this is not so and moreover in the instant case
insofar as the Nuremberg Charter is concerned it has been made part of
domestic law by its incorporation in 59
U.S.
Stat. 1544. (2) “The provisions of the Nuremberg Charter are strictly
limited. Crimes Against Peace only apply to ‘major’ war criminals, and War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity are limited to wartime.” In respect to
Crimes Against Peace, Petitioner argues that 18
U.S.C. 960
makes any person within the United States criminally liable. In
respect to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, The Report of the
International Law Commission () at
Principle Ⅵ, paragraph 122 states that “The Tribunal did not, however,
exclude the possibility that crimes against humanity might be considered
before a war.” Finally, as to all three classes of Nuremberg crimes, the
limitation placed upon the jurisdiction of the then court by itself were
self-imposed flowing from its discretionary power due to a desire to strictly
construe the charges because of the initial use of the Charter, the
ex post facto charge against its use, giving the benefit of
the doubt to defendants for that reason. The literal words of the Charter do
not make such discretion mandatory upon future judges or interpretors as this
Court.
International law is progressive. See 2 Mueller, International Criminal
Law, () at 263. No such conditions
apply 35 years later and individuals such as business men and women, ordinary
soldiers or members of war organizations would have been of a sufficient
status then and now to be considered an accessory. See Ⅱ Whitman, Digest
of International Law 885–87, . The
last paragraph of Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter concerns complicity and
states that “…accomplices participating in the formulation… of a common plan
to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed
by any persons in execution of such plan.” See also Mueller at
269. (3) The argument is tirelessly repeated that International Law prohibits
only the use and not the possession of nuclear arms. But the
aforesaid chronology of applicable international law provisions vitiates that
myth. “First Strike” planning puts the lie to that rebuttal forever. If the
law must wait on “use” in this type of case there will be no law or people
left to adjudicate. (4) Finally, these arguments are usually rebutted, if all
else fails, on the basis that they are political in nature and
non-justiciable. This rebuttal is spurious on its face for this Petitioner’s
plea is a plea much more than political. It is a plea for humanity and against
the super-powers of the
U.S. and
U.S.S.R., lest we find our planet destroyed for want of “legal standing”.
Thus the involvement of the United States in Vietnam war crimes and the
formulation of current plans for nuclear war violate international and
constitutional law, and will make Petitioner an accessory to both and
criminally liable if he is forced to pay war taxes for said plans and
preparations. Thus Purvis concludes his argument on international law.
Durland noted that Purvis also made an argument that a domestic statute that
said “Whoever within the United States knowingly begins or furnishes the money
for any military enterprise to be carried on from thence against a territory
or dominion of any foreign state or people with whom the United States is at
peace shall be imprisoned,” also applied to his case.
The law of war is so adorable.
I can’t help but shake my head, sigh, and give a bittersweet smile at the
well-intentioned ridiculousness of it all. I almost sympathize with the White
House torture lawyers who looked at international law and found it “obsolete
and quaint.” Apparently the cutting edge international law thinkers a century
ago seriously contemplated a scene in which officers would lead their troops
to battle with something like, “Okay everybody, to the trenches… but don’t
forget that it’s forbidden by law to kill or wound treacherously!”
And after the 20th century played itself out
anyway, we’re apparently still supposed to take the Hague Convention
seriously.
But there is still something satisfying in trying to hold the
U.S. government to
the principles it so pompously crafted as it was collecting scalps after World
War Ⅱ — watching those principles dissolve in a reductio ad
absurdum where the absurd part is expecting Uncle Sam to agree that what’s
good for his own goose is what was good for der Adler.
Durland complains that “The Supreme Court refused to hear
Purvis and probably will continue to refuse to
recognize the law because the court acts solely out of power when confronted
with morality.” While his conclusion may be valid, I think there may be more
to it than this.
Durland’s “writ” is strangely writ. It is hard for me to imagine Durland
expecting the Supreme Court justices to be impressed by his citations of a
Playboy interview with George McGovern or a
Progressive magazine estimate of the size of the
U.S. nuclear
arsenal. Much of the discussion of arms technology and arms control
difficulties seems not to have much to do with the legal argument and would be
more at home in a for-the-choir think tank article. There’s precious little
citation of legal precedents but plenty of quotation of books and essays and
law review articles and appeals to “the most basic principles of fundamental
fairness” and the like.
Perhaps it wasn’t really intended for the audience to which it was ostensibly
delivered, but then why go through such fuss? It seems to me if you’re going
to bother to try to take a legal argument up the court system, you ought to
try to craft it in a form that will be persuasive to judges. As it is, because
Purvis lost his case and was unable to get the courts to take his argument
seriously, the legal legacy of Purvis
v.
Commissioner is as a precedent for the idea that
…the act of paying taxes does not amount to complicity in any war crime
committed by the Government. [The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals citing
Purvis in its ruling against war tax resisters
Robert and Linda Randall in ]
Here are a handful of artifacts relating to the American war tax resistance
movement circa .
First, some relics that were filed alongside a letter from Herbert Sonthoff to
W. Walter Boyd (though I think this filing may be arbitrary and that the
letters are not related to each other):
At this late date it is pointless to muster the evidence which shows that the
war we are waging in Vietnam is wrong. By now you have decided for yourself
where you stand. In all probability, if you share our feelings about it, you
have expressed your objections both privately and publicly. You have witnessed
the small effect these protests have had on our government.
By ,
every American citizen must decide whether he will make a voluntary
contribution to the continuation of this war. After grave consideration, we
have decided that we can no longer do so, and that we will therefore withhold
all or part of the taxes due. The purpose of this letter is to call your
attention to the fact that a nationwide tax refusal campaign is in progress,
as stated in the accompanying announcement, and to urge you to consider
refusing to contribute voluntarily to this barbaric war.
Signed:
Prof. Warren Ambrose
Mathematics, M.I.T.
Dr. Donnell Boardman
Physician, Acton, Mass.
Mrs. Elizabeth Boardman
Acton, Mass.
Prof. Noam Chomsky
Linguistics, M.I.T.
Miss Barbara Deming
Writer, Wellfleet, Mass.
Prof. John Dolan
Philosophy, Chicago University
Prof. John Ek
Anthropology, Long Island University
Martha Bentley Hall
Musician, Brookline, Mass.
Dr. Thomas C. Hall
Physician, Brookline, Mass.
Rev. Arthur B. Jellis
First Parish in Concord, Unitarian-Universalist, Concord, Mass.
Prof. Donald Kalish
Philosophy, U.C.L.A.
Prof. Louis Kampf
Humanities, M.I.T.
Prof. Staughton Lynd
History, Yale University
Milton Mayer
Writer, Mass.
Prof. Jonathan Mirsky
Chinese Language and Literature, Dartmouth College
Prof. Sidney Morgenbesser
Philosophy, Columbia University
Prof. Wayne A. O’Neill
Graduate School of Education, Harvard University
Prof. Anatol Rapoport
Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan
Prof. Franz Schurmann
Center for Chinese Studies, University of Calif., Berkeley
Dr. Albert Szent Gyorgy
Institute for Muscle Research, Woods Hole, Mass.
Harold Tovish
Sculptor, Brookline, Mass.
Prof. Howard Zinn
Government, Boston University
* Institutions listed for informational
purposes only
P.S. The No Tax for
War Committee intends to make public the names of signers, hence if you wish
to add your signature, early return is desirable. Contributions are needed,
and checks should be made payable to the Committee.
The committee will publish the above statement with names of signers at tax
deadline — .
Send signed statements to: NO TAX FOR WAR COMMITTEE,
c/o
Rev. Maurice McCrackin,
932 Dayton St., Cincinnati,
Ohio 45214.
For additional copies of this form, put number you will distribute and name
and address on the following lines:
No. _____ Name ____________________
Address _________________________
Signers So Far
Meldon and Amy Acheson
Michael J. Ames
Alfred F. Andersen
Ross Anderson
Beulah K. Arndt
Joan Baez
Richard Baker
Bruce & Pam Beck
Ruth T. Best
Robert & Margaret Blood
Karel F. Botermans
Marion & Ernest Bromley
Edwin Brooks
A. Dale Brothington
Mrs. Lydia Bruns
Wendal Bull
Mrs. Dorothy Bucknell
John Burslem
Lindley J. Burton
Catharine J. Cadbury
Maris Cakars
Robert and Phyllis Calese
William N. Calloway
Betty Camp
Daryle V. Carter
Jared & Susan Carter
Horace & Beulah Champney
Ken & Peggy Champney
Hank & Henry Chapin
Holly Chenery
Richard A. Chinn
Naom [sic] Chomsky
John & Judy Christian
Gordon & Mary Christiansen
Peter Christiansen
Donald F. Cole
John Augustine Cook
Helen Marr Cook
Jack Coolidge, Jr.
Allen Cooper
Martin J. Corbin
Tom & Monica Cornell
Dorothy J. Cunningham
Jean DaCosta
Ann & William Davidon
Stanley F. Davis
Dorothy Day
Dave Dellinger
Barbara Deming
Robert Dewart
Ruth Dodd
John M. Dolan
Orin Doty
Allen Duberstein
Ralph Dull
Malcolm Dundas
Margaret E. Dungan
Henry Dyer
Susan Eanet
Bob Eaton
Marc Paul Edelman
Johan & Francis Eliot
Jerry Engelbach
George J. Etu, Jr.
Mary C. Eubanks
Arthur Evans
Jonathan Evans
William E. Evans
Pearl Ewald
Franklin Farmer
Bertha Faust
Dianne M. Feeley
Rice A. Felder
Henry A. Felisone
Mildred Fellin
Glenn Fisher
John Forbes
Don & Ann Fortenberry
Marion C. Frenyear
Ruth Gage-Colby
Lawrence H. Geller
Richard Ghelli
Charles Gibadlo
Bruce Glushakow
Walter Gormly
Arthur Goulston
Thomas Grabell
Steven Green
Walter Grengg
Joseph Gribbins
Kenneth Gross
John M. Grzywacz, Jr.
Catherine Guertin
David Hartsough
David Hartsough
Arthur Harvey
Janet Hawksley
James P. Hayes, Jr.
R.F. Helstern
Ammon Hennacy
Norman Henry
Robert Hickey
Dick & Heide Hiler
William Himelhoch
C.J. Hinke
Anthony Hinrichs
William M. Hodsdon
Irwin R. Hogenauer
Florence Howe
Donald & Mary Huck
Philip Isely
Michael Itkin
Charles T. Jackson
Paul Jacobs
Martin & Nancy Jezer
F. Robert Johnson
Woodbridge O. Johnson
Ashton & Marie Jones
Paul Jordan
Paul Keiser
Joel C. Kent
Roy C. Kepler
Paul & Pauline Kermiet
Peter Kiger
Richard King
H.A. Kreinkamp
Arthur & Margaret Landes
Paul Lauter
Peter and Marolyn Leach
Gertrud & George A. Lear, Jr.
Alan and Elin Learnard
Titus Lehman
Richard A. Lema
Florence Levinsohn
Elliot Linzer
David C. Lorenz
Preston B. Luitweiler
Bradford Lyttle
Adriann van L. Maas
Ben & Sue Mann
Paul and Salome Mann
Howard E. Marston, Sr.
Milton and Jane Mayer
Martin & Helen Mayfield
Maurice McCrackin
Lilian McFarland
Maureen & Felix McGowan
Maryann McNaughton
Gelston McNeil
Guy W. Meyer
Karl Meyer
David & Catherine Miller
James Missey
Mark Morris
Janet Murphy
Thomas P. Murray
Rosemary Nagy
Wally & Juanita Nelson
Marilyn Neuhauser
Neal D. Newby, Jr.
Miriam Nicholas
Robert B. Nichols
David Nolan
Raymond S. Olds
Wayne A. O’Neil
Michael O’Quin
Ruth Orcutt
Eleanor Ostroff
Doug Palmer
Malcolm & Margaret Parker
Jim Peck
Michael E. Pettie
John Pettigrew
Lydia H. Philips
Dean W. Plagowski
Jefferson Poland
A.J. Porth
Ralph Powell
Charles F. Purvis
Jean Putnam
Harriet Putterman
Robert Reitz
Ben & Helen Reyes
Elsa G. Richmond
Eroseanna Robinson
Pat Rusk
Joe & Helen Ryan
Paul Salstrom
Ira J. Sandperl
Jerry & Rae Schwartz
Martin Shepard
Richard T. Sherman
Louis Silverstein
T.W. Simer
Ann B. Sims
Jane Beverly Smith
Linda Smith
Thomas W. Smuda
Bob Speck
Elizabeth P. Steiner
Lee D. Stern
Beverly Sterner
Michael Stocker
Charles H. Straut, Jr.
Stephen Suffet
Albert & Joyce Sunderland, Jr.
Mr. & Mrs. Michael R. Sutter
Marjorie & Robert Swann
Oliver & Katherine Tatum
Gary G. Taylor
Harold Tovish
Joe & Cele Tuchinsky
Lloyd & Phyllis Tyler
Samuel R. Tyson
Ingegerd Uppman
Margaret von Selle
Mrs. Evelyn Wallace
Wilbur & Joan Ann Wallis
William & Mary Webb
Barbara Webster
John K. White
Willson Whitman
Denny & Ida Wilcher
Huw Williams
George & Lillian Willoughby
Bob Wilson
Emily T. Wilson
Jim & Raona Wilson
W.W. Wittkamper
Sylvia Woog
Wilmer & Mildred Young
Franklin Zahn
Betty & Louis Zemel
Vicki Jo Zilinkas
Following this was a page explaining how to go about resisting:
For those owing nothing because of the Withholding Tax.
Such persons write a letter to the Internal Revenue Service, to be filed
with the tax return, stating that the writer cannot in good conscience
help support the war in Vietnam, voluntarily. The writer
therefore requests a return of a percentage of the money collected from
his salary.
Note: Of course, the
IRS
will not return the money. However, the writer has refused to pay for the
war voluntarily and has put it in writing. This symbolic action
is not to be belittled since anybody who does this allies himself with
those who will withhold money due the IRS.
For those self-employed or owing money beyond what has been withheld from
salary.
Such persons write a letter to be filed with the tax return, stating that
the writer does not object to the income tax in principle, but will not,
as a matter of conscience, help pay for the war in Vietnam. The writer is
therefore withholding some or all of the tax due.
Note: In all cases, we recommend that copies of these letters be sent to the
President and to your Senators.
Remarks:
The Internal Revenue Service has the legal power to confiscate money due
it. They will get that money, one way or another. However, to obstruct the
IRS
from collecting money due (by not filing a return at all, for example)
seems less important to us than the fact that each is refusing to pay
his tax voluntarily. With this in mind, many of us are placing the
taxes owed in special accounts and we will so inform the
IRS
in our letters.
Willful failure to pay is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and up to
a year in jail, together with the costs of prosecution. So far, the
IRS
has prosecuted only those who have obstructed collection (by refusing to
file a return, by refusing to answer a summons,
etc.).
Usually, the
IRS
has collected the tax due plus 6% interest and possibly an added fine of
5% for “negligence”. The fact that the
IRS
has rarely, if at all, prosecuted tax-refusers to the full
extent of the law does not mean they will not do so in the future.
Finally, an article from the edition of The Capitol East Gazette:
Two thousand anti-war leaflets on telephone tax refusal were distributed in Capitol East on , by members of CHOICE, a group of local residents who are withdrawing their support for the Vietnam war.
The leaflet explains that the 10% phone tax was enacted in specifically to raise money for the Vietnam war.
According to CHOICE, the phone company will not remove a person’s telephone if he refuses to pay the tax.
The company asks refusers to state why they are withholding the tax and then turns the matter over to the Internal Revenue Service.
According to CHOICE, there are presently 25 known tax refusers in the Capitol Hill area.
Those desiring CHOICE’s leaflet are asked to call LI 6‒9836.
![No Income Tax For War! Now Particularly the U.S. War in Vietnam. Statement: Because so much of the tax paid the federal government goes for poisoning of food crops, blasting of villages, napalming and killing of thousands upon thousands of people, as in Vietnam at the present time, I am not going to pay taxes on 1966 income. Name ___. Address ___. [In order to withdraw support from war, particularly the savage and expanding war in Southeast Asia– Some are refusing to pay their total tax, or some portion. ☐ Some have in advance lowered their income so as to owe none. ☐ (for our information, would you like to check which form of nonpayment you are following?) NOTE: There are laws which (although not usually applied to principled refusers) cover possible fine and jail term for non-payment of a legally-owed amount.]](noIncomeTaxForWar.png)
